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A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF HELEN ZILLE 
 
 
 As women have attained more prominent political positions, the study of gender, 
communication, and electoral politics has expanded over the last few decades. Public 
address scholarship in particular has covered speeches by many women, from Angelina 
Grimke to Hillary Clinton, from Sojourner Truth to Eleanor Roosevelt. However, as 
scholars in Communication Studies have begun concerning themselves with the rhetoric 
of political women, much of that attention has been focused on U.S. American women. 
This thesis expands that conversation by exploring the rhetoric of a woman politician 
acting outside the U.S. American context. This project examines the complex and varied 
rhetorical strategies employed by Helen Zille. The goal of this work is threefold: First, I 
hope to gain a deeper understanding of how women in developing nations impact and 
shape the political landscape through their rhetorical effort by examining the situation of 
a specific figure. I believe this case study offers important insight into the rhetoric of 
women leaders acting in the context of a developing, post-colonial nation. Second, this 
work examines how constitutive rhetoric functions in South Africa’s complex political 
landscape. Third, this project responds to the need for more scholarship that examines 
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rhetoric in non-U.S. contexts. More broadly, this project addresses the question of how 
Zille’s rhetoric functions to overcome barriers of race, class, and gender as she works 
towards the 2014 presidential elections. This study will be guided by two major theories, 
Eugene White’s theory of exigential flow and Maurice Charland’s theory of constitutive 
rhetoric. In addition, in order to truly understand how Zille’s rhetoric functions, I will 
explore the unique post-colonial mindset of South Africa that is a defining feature of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 In the 1970s and 1980s world attention was riveted by the brutal images coming 
out of South Africa: striking black school children braving bullets and white security 
forces bulldozing homes in the black townships. South Africa was commonly compared 
with other cases of intractable conflicts, most notably the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
the troubles in Northern Ireland.1 In September 1989 a conference was held in Bonn to 
compare these three cases. The keynote address was by a distinguished British professor 
of politics, Bernard Crick, which underlined the theme of intractability and made stark 
assumptions about the limited possibilities of progress: 
I call the three problems “insoluble” for two formal reasons: (i) that no 
internal solution likely to guarantee peace can possibly satisfy the 
announced principles of the main disputants and (ii) that any external 
imposed solution or enforced adjudication is likely to strengthen the 
desperation and self-righteousness of the threatened group.2  
 
In this context, it is clear that South Africa’s transition to democracy in the first half of 
the 1990s appeared so surprising to most observers that it was widely dubbed a miracle.3 
What can be considered more miraculous—aside from the successful transition from 
what was essentially a colonial dictatorship into a functioning democracy—is the ability 
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of South Africans to sustain their democracy.4 Bruce Baker writes, however, that 
“Democracy has no automatic right to be the political ideology of Africa; sustainability 
means constant persuasion.”5 Baker goes on to argue that it is not just a matter of 
changing political institutions, or even economic policies, but a matter of changing social 
attitudes. 6 If democracy is to be sustained, “people must identify with the chosen unit of 
democratic decision making.”7 The “national question” must be resolved; that is, are the 
people contained within the state, despite racial and ethnic differences, committed to a 
“higher allegiance?”8 The reality is that “the people cannot decide until somebody 
decides who are the people.”9  
Despite the sophisticated and liberal democratic framework currently in place, 
democracy still occupies a tenuous space in the minds of South Africans. For the masses 
who have struggled for political rights, often at great personal cost, political views are 
held intensely and do not include the tolerance which comes from a legitimate political 
order. A viable democracy relies upon the view that those who disagree are rivals and not 
enemies.10 Genuine democratic attitudes, such as tolerance of diversity and acceptance of 
alternative ideas and interests, tend to be most prevalent in wealthy and educated 
societies, and the cruel reality of South Africa is that a large majority of the population, 
especially within the black community, is poor and lacking in appropriate education. 11 
Ron Ottoway argues that a strong democracy must have a strong counter-government or 
opposition parties in order to ensure accountability and integrity.12 Ottoway goes so far as 
to say, “The only guarantee that a government will remain democratic is the existence of 
a strong opposition . . . no political system can be considered democratic in the absence 
of countervailing centers of power.”13  
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South Africa is at a critical juncture in its democracy. On the one hand, South 
Africa has a complex system designed to contain state power such as the provincial 
powers, the separation of power between the executive and the judiciary, and a respect 
for the rule of law, despite unfavorable political outcomes for the African National 
Congress (ANC), which has been in power since 1994.14 However, in a country where 
much of the population is poverty stricken and uneducated, a political class has emerged 
that stands to lose everything if dislodged from power, which has resulted in wide-scale 
ethnic mobilization campaign strategies.15 It is clear that the ANC has been electorally 
dominant for the last two decades and that the majority of opposition parties are too weak 
to provide any real challenge. The question remains, can black voters be persuaded to 
vote en masse for an opposition party? If they cannot, then the odds of South Africa 
succeeding as a democracy are not favorable.16 South Africa, with its massive 
inequalities, racial and ethnic tensions, and authoritarian legacies is not an ideal 
environment for liberal democracy, but though “South Africa may not have the 
democracy it deserves, it may well have the democracy that it can sustain.”17 
It is clear that the context for democracy in South Africa is unfavorable, but not 
impossible. The majority population is largely uneducated, ethnic/racial tensions 
dominate political discussions and the economy is shaky at best. As well, though South 
Africa has worked to divorce itself from apartheid, any regime inevitably carries with it 
historical baggage that can restrict contemporary options.18 Baker writes, “Most Africans 
over [the age] of 65 today have actually experienced as adults colonial rule, independent 
democracy, autocratic state predation and the democratic transition.”19 Despite this, 
South Africa has maintained its grip on democracy, and in the 2009 elections a possibility 
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of a real opposition party took root. On May 6, 2009, Helen Zille officially accepted the 
position as Premier of the Western Cape, one of the wealthiest and most influential 
provinces on the country. Zille is the head of the largest opposition party in South Africa, 
the Democratic Alliance (DA), which holds the largest majority in National Parliament as 
of the 2009 elections.  
 Since 1994 South Africa has been under the complete rule of the African National 
Congress. No party or candidate in the last sixteen years has been able to dent the 
stronghold the ANC has held on the nation, until 2009 when the Democratic Alliance led 
by Helen Zille produced the best results ever at the polls, scoring almost a million new 
voters to take its nationwide tally from 1,931,201 to just under 3,000,000, a growth of 50 
per cent. This made it the only party in South Africa to have grown in all three of the 
most recent elections. Zille led the party to unparalleled success. In the last election the 
DA kept the ANC below a two-thirds majority (albeit only just), won an outright majority 
in the Western Cape (the first time any party had done so in post-apartheid South 
Africa)20 and significantly improved its standing in parliament, taking twenty more seats 
in the National Assembly; whereas the ANC lost thirty-three seats.21 Indeed, it was the 
only party in the entire country to increase rather than lose overall support since the 2004 
elections.22 
 Helen Zille is the face of the DA, and the power behind its success. Zille herself 
won the Western Cape Premiership in a landslide election, and has clearly set her sights 
on political advancement. In 2008, Zille told reporters “Our [The DA’s] plan is to 
become the government in 2014."23 The biggest challenge facing Zille is the need to 
overcome her symbolic role as a colonial oppressor and win over black voters.  
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Newly commissioned research by the party showed voters of all races were looking for a 
political re-alignment, where “parties and people sharing the same values came together 
to forge an open society with equal opportunities, as opposed to a closed, patronage-
driven society under the ANC."24 What makes Helen Zille such an important figure then, 
both politically and historically, is that her rise to power is an unprecedented 
phenomenon in South African politics, especially in the DA, which unlike the ruling 
ANC, does not have political party quotas for women. Though women were a critical part 
of the resistance movement and transition into democracy, it wasn’t until the early 1990s 
that women were placed in position of power, and Zille is arguably the most powerful 
women in politics in South Africa, with clear ambitions for higher office. 
 Zille is also an important object of study for critics of rhetoric and public address. 
As women have attained more prominent political positions, the study of gender, 
communication, and electoral politics has expanded over the last few decades. Public 
address scholarship in particular has covered speeches by many women, from Angelina 
Grimke to Hillary Clinton, from Sojourner Truth to Eleanor Roosevelt.25 However, as 
scholars in Communication Studies have begun concerning themselves with the rhetoric 
of political women, much of that attention has been focused on U.S. American women. 
This thesis expands that conversation by exploring the rhetoric of a woman politician 
acting outside the U.S. American context. This project examines the complex and varied 
rhetorical strategies employed by Helen Zille. The goal of this work is threefold: First, I 
hope to gain a deeper understanding of how women in developing nations impact and 
shape the political landscape through their rhetorical effort by examining the situation of 
a specific figure. I believe this case study offers important insight into the rhetoric of 
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women leaders acting in the context of a developing, post-colonial nation. Second, this 
work examines how constitutive rhetoric functions in South Africa’s complex political 
landscape. Third, this project responds to the need for more scholarship that examines 
rhetoric in non-U.S. contexts.26 More broadly, this project addresses the question of how 
Zille’s rhetoric functions to overcome barriers of race, class, and gender as she works 
towards the 2014 presidential elections. This study will be guided by two major theories, 
Eugene White’s theory of exigential flow and Maurice Charland’s theory of constitutive 
rhetoric. In addition, in order to truly understand how Zille’s rhetoric functions, I will 
explore the unique post-colonial mindset of South Africa that is a defining feature of 
Zille’s rhetorical situation.   
The goal of this first chapter is to lay the foundation upon which I will build the 
larger thesis project. First, I review the relevant literature that is the theoretical 
foundation for this project. Second, I lay out the specific steps I have taken to study 
Zille’s rhetoric and which texts I utilize. Lastly, I provide a brief overview of the chapters 
that comprise my thesis.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Configurational Rhetoric and Exigential Flow 
In 1968, Lloyd Bitzer changed the way rhetorical scholars analyzed public 
address. His theory of “the rhetorical situation” challenged critical perspectives that 
traditionally tended to focus on the personality, motives and background of speakers. 
Bitzer contended that critics should judge whether or not a speaker’s response to a 
rhetorical situation is a “fitting” response to the situation that called forth the speech. In 
1992, Eugene White extended and refined Bitzer’s situational view of rhetoric by making 
"configuration a prominent element in his . . . formulations.”27 He created the theory of 
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exigential flow, which, simply put, is at once “cause, context and product” of a 
communicative event. What is of particular use both in this study, as well as in the field 
of public address scholarship broadly, is the notion that “the meaning of a body of 
rhetoric is not in its provoking urgencies, nor in the rhetoric’s antecedents, nor in the 
rhetorical action itself, nor in the consequences of the rhetoric, but in the perceived 
interrelationships of all these features of the event” [emphasis in original].28  Bitzer’s 
contribution to the field of rhetorical studies lay primarily in his idea of exigence – that in 
any particular situation there is a compelling imperfection that gives rise to a rhetorical 
event. White takes this concept and extends it to allow for the longitudinal development 
of any particular exigent, an improvement that is particularly relevant when looking at a 
campaign spread out over time, rather than at a single speech. 29   
Much like Bitzer, White believed that a rhetor must understand a rhetorical 
situation in order to properly respond, but unlike Bitzer, White theorized that in addition 
to understanding the immediate rhetorical situation, a rhetor must understand the history 
leading to this particular rhetorical moment and how this moment will affect the urgency 
in the future.30 White postulated that any urgency is not an isolated event, but is a result 
of a previous urgency and rhetorical act, and that by responding to the immediate 
urgency, the rhetor then alters the urgency, provoking “further rhetorical and other 
responding actions, generating a continuing cycle of antecedents and consequences.”31  
White goes on to construct a sophisticated method for examining the "interplaying 
of regularized forces constituting a historical configuration—a dynamic, cyclical 
movement or development—of antecedents-events-consequences."32 White develops as a 
case study an extensive review of John C. Calhoun's March 4, 1850, speech to the United 
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States Senate.  In Calhoun's speech, long considered a failure by historians and rhetorical 
critics, White sees the configuration of forces coalescing around the speech act, which 
provides Calhoun the opportunity to reach congruence in the situation to the greatest 
degree possible under the constraining influences.33 While it is clear that Zille is a 
successful politician, I argue that we need a deeper understanding of the historical 
antecedents which constitute the exigential flow of the situation, a more in-depth analysis 
of the circumstances of her rise to power, and a more complex examination of the racial 
and gendered obstacles facing Zille to fully see the configurations influencing the 
rhetorical situation.  
 One of the key concepts from White’s book guiding this study is the idea of how 
we experience rhetoric “as a part of a developing flow of events,” or what White calls 
“exigential flow.”34 A rhetorical flow will posses certain patterns of forces, called 
“configured interplay,” that identifies the flow as rhetorical and provide the means for 
understanding and evaluating it. White terms it an exigential flow because, “it is at once a 
cause, context, and product of communication.”35 This rhetorical flow can also provoke 
further rhetorical actions, subsequently generating a “continuing cycle of antecedents and 
consequences.”36 These cycles of antecedents, rhetorical events and consequences consist 
of 1) the situational constraints surrounding the communicative act, 2) the 
communication itself, and 3) the consequences of the communication. Like Bitzer, White 
believes that rhetoric arises in response to exigencies, but goes a step farther than Bitzer 
by arguing that the exigence is not merely satisfied or unsatisfied, but is instead altered 
and continued on to the next rhetorical response.37 Again like Bitzer, White 
acknowledges that many exigencies may arise and die away without prompting a 
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rhetorical response, but that only when a situation is sufficiently “provoking” will 
communication take place. White argues then that the “reality” of communication 
therefore exists in a “flow of changing circumstances of which the communication is 
intrinsically a part.”38 Zille’s rhetoric, therefore, cannot be looked at as a singular 
moment in time but as a part of the flow of changing circumstances. 
 When a situation does arise that can be modified by communication, what White 
calls a “rhetorical urgency,” speakers respond to it in the hope of inducing change in the 
audience. A provoking rhetorical urgency is defined as “the part of the exigential flow 
that occurs prior to a particular communication event and provokes it.”39 It is through 
communication that a speaker hopes to change her audience, in order that their change 
will somehow alter the provoking circumstances. “The ultimate purpose of all serious 
communication,” White proposes, “is to influence the state of affairs (the exigential flow) 
that made the communication possible or necessary.”40 White posits that our response is 
rhetorical because “our actions have the rhetorical objective of altering people whose 
responses (whether rhetorical or not) will have consequences affecting the circumstances 
that originally caused us to communicate.”41 Once the original circumstances have been 
altered by the rhetorical response, it is probable that the changed state will result in new 
provoking exigencies that will be more inclined towards speaker influence in later 
rhetorical efforts.  
 White offers the concept of constraints/satisfactions to analyze these 
interrelationships among forces in a configuration. He argues that it is only when 
rhetorical constraints are matched by appropriate rhetorical responses can persuasion take 
place. White defines rhetorical constraints as “forces in a configuration that influence the 
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way a persuader chooses rhetorical responses, if he or she wants to communicate 
effectively.”42 A rhetorical response, or satisfactions, then is “those things a persuader 
says or does in answer to impinging constraints.”43 The difference here between Bitzer 
and White is White’s emphasis on understanding how well the persuader used the 
available means of rhetoric to influence the flow of events.44 The limits of 
constraints/satisfactions may prescribe what a persuader can or cannot say or do, leaving 
limited realistic choices for attempted persuasion, but also are the “seats of rhetorical 
possibilities.”45 Thus the term “constraints” actually implies freedom within limitations. 
According to White, in every rhetorical situation there are six variables that will constrain 
the speaker in both positive and limiting ways: 
1. The potential for modification of the urgency. 
2. The capacity of the listeners to alter the urgency. 
3. The readiness of the listeners to be influenced. 
4.  The occasion—the immediate circumstances in which the communication 
takes place. 
5. Relevant aspects of the persuader’s self-system. 
6. The persuader’s real and apparent purposes in communicating.  
These six variables will all fluctuate in importance depending on the situation faced by 
the persuader. It is the interplay of these six factors that must be taken into account by 
communicators, and “read” by those who interpret and analyze the communication.46  
 When analyzing constraints/satisfactions there are three questions the researchers 
must ask themselves: 1) what is the persuader’s intentions? 2) how well does the basic 
“thrust” of what is said fit the potential for modifying the urgency? and 3) how well does 
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the persuader select rhetorical options that match the readiness of the audience to be 
influenced? White argues, “Before you can evaluate any human action you have to think 
about the purpose behind the action.”47 Without an understanding of what the persuaders 
are attempting, you cannot make an accurate assessment of how well a persuader uses 
rhetoric, or how rhetoric functions to change a situation. The second question is really a 
question of the ultimate goal of a persuader, which is not strictly to induce change in 
listeners, but to get the listeners to “exert pressure on the state of affairs that provoked 
communications or made it possible.”48 The persuader speaks in the hope of getting the 
listeners to see the urgency in a new light and act differently towards whatever created or 
sustained the urgency. This usually results in voting in a different way, buying certain 
products, boycotting people or places etc. White believes that this is the ultimate purpose 
of rhetorical discourse, getting audiences to either act differently or think differently.49 As 
White reminds us, Aristotle points out, “communication is the principal agent of social 
change and the effecting social change is the ultimate function of society.”50 The last 
question White poses for scholars is to consider what the immediate objectives of a 
persuader are. As discussed, one of the main goals of speaking is to alter the provoking 
agency; a persuader’s immediate goal is to induce change in the audience. How much and 
what kind of change listeners are willing and able to sustain depends on four variables: 1) 
the nature of the listeners’ self-systems, 2) the ways they respond to the original 
provoking urgency, 3) the persuader herself, and, 4) the communication event.51 What 
successful persuaders choose to say and how they choose to say it depends on their 
ability to perceive the readiness of the listeners to be influenced. This broader view of the 
rhetorical situation is particularly well suited to the study of South African rhetoric 
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because of the complex history of South Africa and the demanding and ever changing 
urgencies that confront Helen Zille as she manages her and her country’s political future. 
Constitutive Rhetoric 
 In his article “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the Peuple Quebecois,” Maurice 
Charland illustrates the key role identity plays in the larger struggle for political agency. 
Charland believes that constitutive rhetoric as a theory of identification permits scholars 
to “examine how rhetoric affects . . . the key processes in the production of ideology,” 
which Louis Althausser identifies as the “constitution of the subject,” and “where the 
subject is and . . . who simultaneously speaks and initiates action in discourse . . . and in 
the world.”52 Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification informs Charland’s theory, and 
considers that persuasion and audiences are not two separate concepts, but allows for 
audience members to “participate in the very discourse by which they would be 
‘persuaded.’” 53 Ultimately, Charland argues, current theories of “rhetoric as persuasion” 
do not, and cannot, account for the true audiences that rhetoric addresses.54 The theory of 
constitutive rhetoric accounts for this gap in theory. My study is particularly concerned 
with the ways in which Zille’s rhetoric attempts to constitute a new South African 
identity. Charland builds of off Burke’s theory of identity, which simply says that 
identification must be present in order to persuade.55 Where Charland differs from Burke, 
and where the theory of constitutive rhetoric differs from other social movement rhetoric, 
is the approach to audiences. Charland believes that what most rhetorical critics consider 
to be the product or consequence of discourse, such as a social identity, religious faith, or 
sexuality, are beyond the realm of rational or even free choice, and thus are beyond the 
realm of persuasion. As Burke notes, identification of social identity often occurs 
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“spontaneously, intuitively, even unconsciously.”56 Logically, these must be present 
before persuasion as they form the basis of persuasion. Consequently then, attempts to 
“elucidate ideological or identity-forming discourse requires a subject-as-audience who is 
already constituted within an identity and within an ideology.”57 
 According to Charland’s perspective, then, audience members are not free agents 
to be persuaded nor are they “extra-rhetorical”; rather, audience members are historical 
subjects that are already constituted with an identity and ideology.  Charland argues, 
“Persuasive discourse requires a subject-as-audience who is already constituted with an 
identity and within an ideology.” 58 Audience members are then “interpellated” or 
constituted as subjects who participate in the discourse and come into being as a result of 
discourse. More precisely, any identity that a rhetor might “assert exists . . . becomes real 
only through rhetoric.” Audiences therefore “do not exist in nature, but only with a 
discursively constituted history.”59 Paradoxically, rhetoric must constitute an audience’s 
identity, while simultaneously presuming the identity to be “pregiven and natural” in 
order to form the basis for a rhetorical event.60    
 Interpellation occurs in the moment the audience recognizes and acknowledges 
that it is being addressed and, therefore, “occurs at the very moment one enters into a 
rhetorical situation.”61 Charland argues that the significance of interpellation to rhetoric is 
that “the acknowledgement of an address entails an acceptance of an imputed self-
understanding which can form the basis for an appeal.”62 Further, interpellation is always 
ongoing—individuals are subjects from the moment they acquire language so that 
constitutive rhetoric is an inherent part of socialization. Thus, audience members “must 
already be an interpellated subject and exist as a discursive position” in order that they 
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might be “part of the audience of a rhetorical situation in which persuasion could 
occur.”63 
 Identity—or collective subject identification—occurs through ideological effects 
in the narrative structure of constitutive rhetoric, and can only occur when “individuals 
accept living within a political myth.”64 That is, the notion of a “people” is a fiction that 
can only come into being when people buy into the fiction created by discourse. There 
are three ideological effects through which audiences are interpellated: 1) The process of 
constituting a collective subject (identity and ideology), 2) the positing of the collective 
subject as transhistorical (the past is presented as an extension of the present), and 3) the 
illusion of freedom (the subject is constrained by the narrative and must act to maintain 
its consistency because it is already spoken or written).65 
 The first ideological effect through which audiences are interpellated, the process 
of constituting a collective subject (identity and ideology), is done within a narrative 
framework that emphasizes a collective ideological vision. Charland asserts, “Narratives 
suppress the fact that, in a very real sense, no person is the same as he or she was a 
decade ago, or a year ago, or even yesterday,” which shows how rhetors must use rhetoric 
to create an identity that the audience themselves might not even know they have 
themselves until that moment.66  Collective identities form the basis of appeals and yet 
these collective identities themselves rely upon rhetoric. A “people” only exist through 
the ideological discourse that constitutes them—the people, then, exist as “a series of 
narrative ideological effects.”67 Narrative in rhetoric often offers an “ultimate” 
identification “permitting an overcoming or going beyond of divisive individual or class 
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interests or concerns.”68 To tell a story of a collective people is to implicitly claim the 
existence of a collective subject. 
 The second ideological effect through which audiences are interpellated, the 
positing of the collective subject as transhistorical (the past is presented as an extension 
of the present), is a type of narrative that interprets the actions of an individual with 
respect to a “collective agent.”69 Charland explains, 
It is within the formal structure of a narrative history that it is possible to 
conceive of a set of individuals as if they were but one. Thus, the 
“struggles” and “ordeals” of settlers, as a set of individual acts and 
experiences, become identified with “community,” a term that here masks 
or negates tensions and differences between any members of society.70  
 
This histories of a people creates a sense of what Burke calls “consubstantiality,” a state 
where audience members feel “substantially one” with the rhetor.71 This process results 
in a collapsing of time as narrative identification occurs—a concrete link for audience 
members that connects the past with the present. It is also what Charland calls “perfectly 
tautological.”72 He explains that, for audience members, historical narrative “is a making 
of sense.”73 It depends upon the “a priori acceptance of that which it attempts to prove the 
existence of, a collective agent that works to transcend the limitations of individuality at 
any historical moment” and also functions as a way to “transcends the death of 
individuals across history.”74 Historical narratives provide a framework for audiences to 
identify collectively with their past and with each other (and perhaps more significantly 
with the rhetor) in the present. 
 The final ideological effect of audience interpellation is the illusion of freedom in 
which the subject is constrained by the narrative and must act to maintain its consistency 
because the narrative is already spoken or written. Charland writes, “Subjects within 
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narratives are not free, they are positioned and so constrained” [emphasis in original]. 75 
In any given narrative, characters are inexorably moving towards their telos, they are 
constituted with a history, motives, and an ultimate goal. Narrative then, largely offers 
only the illusion of agency. Moreover, because the narrative is a “structure of 
understanding that produces totalizing interpretations,” audience members are 
“constrained to follow through,” that is, to act to maintain the narrative that in part forms 
them, one that presents the characters as “freely” acting towards a fixed ending [emphasis 
in original]. 76 
 Constitutive rhetorics have power because they are predominantly oriented 
towards action. As Charland points out, “Ideology is material, existing not in the realm of 
ideas, but in that of material. Ideology is material because subjects enact their ideology 
and reconstitute their material world in its image,” and constitutive rhetorics are 
ideological because they “insert ‘narratized’ subjects-as-agents into the world”77 
Audiences who are successfully constituted into the rhetor’s ideology then go and enact 
that ideology in a material world. To be effective, constitutive rhetoric positions and 
motivates the audience members towards political, social, and economic action in a two-
step process: 
1. Audience members must be successfully interpellated. 
2. The tautological logic of constitutive rhetoric must necessitate action. 
 In order to overcome what Charland calls the “giveness” of the rhetorical 
situation, where the “ontological status of speaker, speech, audience, topic and occasion” 
seem clearly defined and unproblematic, Charland employs constitutive rhetoric. 78 
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Ultimately, this theory helps scholars recognize that the “position one embodies as a 
subject” is a rhetorical effect.79 
Colonialism and Apartheid in South Africa 
 What makes South Africa such a unique study is the complicated relationship 
between the native Africans, the Indians, and the different white ethnicities that all claim 
a South African identity, along with a conflicting understandings about when, exactly, the 
country became a post-colonial republic. The state of colonialism, at its base definition, is 
the building and maintaining of colonies in one territory by people from another territory, 
usually accompanied by a set of unequal relationships between the colonizers and the 
indigenous population. The Dutch first began colonizing South Africa as early as 1652, 
when the Dutch East India Company created the first non-African colony in Cape Town. 
Between 1652 and 1780 the Dutch settled much of Southern South Africa and subjugated 
the indigenous people, the khoikhoi and began importing slaves. The khoikhoi eventually 
rebelled, and the British stepped in to take ownership of the Cape in 1806. In 1834 the 
British emancipated the slaves, a move that the Boers generally regarded as against the 
God-given ordering of the races. Yet the British settlers' conservatism stopped any radical 
social reforms, and in 1841 the authorities passed a Masters and Servants Ordinance, 
which continued to perpetuate white control. The Boers eventually moved north looking 
for their own land, engaging in vicious battles with the Zulus, and, eventually, with the 
British as well. By 1909, the British passed the South Africa Act that brought the 
colonies and republics—Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State – together 
as the Union of South Africa. Under the provisions of the act, the Union remained British 
territory, but with home-rule for Afrikaners. The British High Commission territories of 
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Basutoland (now Lesotho), Bechuanaland (now Botswana), Swaziland, and Rhodesia 
(now Zambia and Zimbabwe) continued under direct rule from Britain. 
 The system left blacks and coloreds completely marginalized. The authorities 
imposed harsh taxes and reduced wages, while the British caretaker administrator 
encouraged the immigration of thousands of Chinese to undercut any resistance. The 
Natives' Land Act of 1913 was the first major piece of segregation legislation passed by 
the Union Parliament, and remained a cornerstone of apartheid until the 1990s when it 
was replaced by the current policy of land restitution.80 Under the act, blacks were 
relatively restricted from the legal ownership of land, at that stage to 7% of the country. 
This percentage later increased to 13%, at about 158, 734 km² a 1/6th bigger than Greece, 
resulting in an estimated population density of 30/km², the same as modern USA.81 The 
Act created a system of land tenure that deprived the majority of South Africa's 
inhabitants of the right to own land outside of reserves, which largely contained sub-par 
land that made it impossible to turn the land into a profitable business. 
 Segregationist legislation also included the Franchise and Ballot Act (1892), which 
limited the black vote by finance and education, the Natal Legislative Assembly Bill 
(1894), which deprived Indians of the right to vote; the General Pass Regulations Bill 
(1905), which denied blacks the vote altogether, limited them to fixed areas and 
inaugurated the infamous Pass System; the Asiatic Registration Act (1906) requiring all 
Indians to register and carry passes; the South Africa Act (1910) that enfranchised whites, 
giving them complete political control over all other race groups; and the previously 
mentioned Native Land Act (1913) which prevented all blacks, except those in the Cape, 
from buying land outside '”reserves.”82 The reserves were the "original homes" of the 
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black tribes of South Africa. The reserves later became known as bantustans, the 
objective of which was to make “self-governing, quasi-independent ethnically 
homogeneous states.”83 At this time the state effectively reserved 87% of the land which 
whites exclusively could purchase; the Natives in Urban Areas Bill (1918) designed to 
move blacks living in "white" South Africa into specific 'locations' as a precautionary 
security measure; the Urban Areas Act (1923) which introduced residential segregation in 
South Africa and provided cheap unskilled labor for the white mining and farming 
industry; the Color Bar Act (1926), preventing blacks from practicing skilled trades; the 
Native Administration Act (1927) that made the British Crown, rather than paramount 
chiefs, the supreme head over all African affairs; the Native Land and Trust Act (1936) 
that complemented the 1913 Native Land Act and, in the same year, the Representation 
of Natives Act, which removed blacks from the Cape voters' roll.84 The final apartheid 
legislation passed by the South African parliament before the beginning of the apartheid 
era was the Asiatic Land Tenure Bill (1946), which banned any further land sales to 
Indians.85  
 Its clear that the roots of apartheid are firmly in the colonial era, yet I argue that 
when South Africa became an official free Republic in 1961 the country did not become 
a post-colonial country, it merely entered into a neocolonial time period. Though the 
majority of black South Africans saw the Afrikaaners as ‘Other’ and separate from South 
Africa, the Afrikaaners believed themselves to be as much a citizen of South Africa as 
any black citizen. This is an important distinction to make as it sets South Africa apart 
from other colonized countries. For the most part, colonized countries were ruled by clear 
and distinct outside forces, who did not consider themselves to be fully citizens of a 
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colonized country, unlike the Boers. Traditionally, when a country is freed from colonial 
power, usually by violent force or native uprising, the outside forces retreat and the 
country is governed by indigenous or native people. In the case of South Africa, when the 
country was free from British colonial rule, black South Africans would have considered 
the Boers just another form of colonial power, whereas the Boers saw themselves as 
South Africans governing other South Africans. Looking back to the base definition of 
colonialism, Afrikaaners would seem to be as much a colonial power as the British, and 
that legacy continues through a system of white, Western politics, and the predominance 
of both the English language and the Afrikaaner language, which is still a mandatory 
subject in elementary, primary and high schools throughout the country.  
 Another event that differentiates South Africa from other post-colonial countries is 
how apartheid was ended. For most post-colonial countries, the transfer of power from a 
colonial system of government to a native, post-colonial system of government is usually 
the result of local uprising, or violent coup. In the case of South Africa there was no true 
revolution, as the decision to end apartheid was partially spurred by the rebellion amongst 
Afrikaner and English-speaking youth as well as open revolt within the ruling National 
Party. By 1992, 68% of the white electorate voted in favor of dismantling apartheid 
through negotiations.86 From April 26th to 29th, 1994, the South African population 
voted in the first universal suffrage general elections. The African National Congress 
won election to govern for the very first time, leaving the National Party and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party behind it and parties such as the Democratic Party and Pan African 
Congress took up their seats as part of the parliamentary opposition in the first genuine 
multiracial parliament. Nelson Mandela was elected as President on May 9, 1994 and 
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formed—according to the interim constitution of 1993—“a government of national 
unity,” consisting of the ANC, the NP and the Inkatha.87 On May 10th Mandela was 
inaugurated as South Africa's new president in Pretoria with Thabo Mbeki and F.W. de 
Klerk as his vice-presidents. This is one of the few instances were colonial power was 
handed over electorally, without bloodshed. Although South Africa ceased being a 
British colony in 1961, academic theories of post-colonialism help us understand the 
ways in which colonial discourses shaped South African political culture and maintained 
a hegemonic influence even after the establishment of an independent, South African 
republic. 
Post-Colonialism 
  As I stated previously, in order to truly understands how Zille’s rhetoric functions 
in South Africa, critics must have an in-depth understanding of the post-apartheid 
mindset. To accomplish this I utilized a post-colonial framework as a lens for 
understanding how rhetoric functions in a country where its citizenry is so impacted by 
the recent past. After briefly outlining how the term post-colonial has been defined in the 
academic literature, I explain the specific way this theoretical framework informs my 
project.  
 Post-colonial is a term scholars in multiple fields have been using for several 
decades to describe the immediate time-period that follows colonization. Post-colonial 
theory then is, broadly speaking, a type of intellectual discourse that consists of reactions 
to, and analysis of, the cultural legacy of colonialism. Two major schools of thought have 
emerged within post-colonial theory. One school of thought defines “post-colonial” as a 
specific time period after colonization, whereas the second, more recent, school of 
thought contends that “post-colonial” covers “all the culture affected by the imperial 
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process from the moment of colonization to the present day.”88   
 For the purposes of this thesis, I ascribe to the broader definition of post-
colonialism as outlined by Gauri Viswana, who argues that a post-colonial time period 
refers to an “attitude or position from which the decentering of Eurocentrism may 
ensue.”89  I further narrow the parameters of this theory to focus on the aspect of post-
colonialism that deals with cultural identity in colonized societies, specifically the 
dilemmas of developing a national identity after colonial rule. This understanding of 
post-colonialism allows for a deeper understanding of how the theory addresses matters 
of identity, gender, race, racism and ethnicity with the challenges of developing a post-
colonial national identity, of how a colonized people's knowledge was used against them 
in service of the colonizer’s interests, and of how knowledge about the world is generated 
under specific relations between the powerful and the powerless. Understanding the 
conflicts inherent in the term post-colonialism is important not just within the bounds of 
this thesis, but also because “terminology itself can lead to cognitive erasures, 
displacements, and suppressions.”90 
 The critical nature of post-colonial theory entails destabilizing Western ways of 
thinking and provides a framework for scholars to subvert dominant discourses in the 
West, challenge “inherent assumptions,” and critique the “material and discursive 
legacies of colonialism.”91 In order to challenge these assumptions and legacies of 
colonialism, post-colonial studies need to be grounded, which entails working with 
tangible identities, connections, and processes. Post-colonial works emphasize the 
reconsideration of categories assumed to be natural and immutable, and deals with 
cultural identity in colonized societies: the dilemmas of developing a national identity 
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after colonial rule; the ways in which writers articulate and celebrate that identity (often 
reclaiming it from and maintaining strong connections with the colonizer); the ways in 
which the knowledge of the colonized (subordinated, or subaltern) people has been 
generated and used to serve the colonizer's interests; and the ways in which the 
colonizer's literature has justified colonialism via images of the colonized as a perpetually 
inferior people, society and culture.92 
 More broadly, post-colonial theory is a tool that many scholars use in hopes of 
combating the residual effects of colonialism on cultures around the world. I employ this 
particular theoretical lens because I believe that this type of scholarship can help us as a 
community expose and deconstruct the racist, imperialist nature of colonialist thought 
and bring us a step closer to moving beyond this period together, towards a place of 
mutual respect. Recognizing that they are not simply airy substances but have widespread 
material consequences for the nature and scale of global inequality makes this 
undertaking all the more critical. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Giffiths, and Helen Tiffin argue, 
“The concept of the post-colonial has been one of the most powerful means of re-
examining the historical past and re-configuring our contemporary world-wide cultural 
concerns.”93 Furthermore, they believe that “more than any other concept, the post-
colonial has facilitated the gradual disturbance of the Eurocentric dominance of academic 
debate,”94 and has “empowered post-colonial intellectuals to redirect the discussion 
towards issues of direct political relevance to the non-Western world.”95 Further proof of 
post-colonialism’s saliency can be found in the number of scholars utilizing the theory. 
Post-colonialism has experienced one of the steepest trajectories of any theoretical 
concept in the last two decades of the twentieth century. Rarely used in 1989, it now 
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raises over 10,000 hits in the Library of Congress catalogue.  
 By some definitions, post-colonialism can also be seen as a continuation of 
colonialism, albeit through different or new relationships concerning power and the 
control/production of knowledge, also known as neocolonialism. I argue that in the 
technical post-colonial era in South Africa, from 1961-1994, through the system of 
apartheid white South Africans actively maintained colonialism, both as a mindset as 
well as an economic and political reality, and furthermore, the attitude of colonialism 
continues to be sustained through a thoroughly Western electoral process. As South 
Africans struggle to discover a national identity they must decide what it is that makes 
them South African and how the legacy of colonialism will impact that identity.  A few 
recent post-colonial scholars question the traditional post-colonial focus on national 
identity.96 The Moroccan scholar Bin Abd al-Ali argues that what is seen in 
contemporary Middle Eastern studies is “a pathological obsession with . . . identity.”97 
Yet, without an understanding of national identity, or lack thereof, scholars cannot fully 
grasp how those in power can manipulate ethno-cultural diversity to their own ends.  
 I would like to further refine my use of the term post-colonial by referring 
specifically to feminism and women in a post-colonial mindset. Post-colonial feminists 
can be described as “feminists who have reacted against both universalizing tendencies in 
Western feminist thought and a lack of attention to gender issues in mainstream post-
colonial thought.”98 These post-colonial feminists are critical of Western forms of 
feminism, notably radical feminism and liberal feminism, because of their 
universalization of women's experiences.99 Post-colonial feminists argue that cultures 
impacted by colonialism are often vastly different and should be treated as such. Colonial 
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oppression may result in the “glorification of pre-colonial culture,” which, in cultures 
with traditions of power stratification along gender lines, specifically cultures with 
patriarchal tribal systems, could mean the acceptance of, or refusal to deal with, inherent 
issues of gender inequality.100  
 Ipshita Chanda illustrates the necessary “retooling” required of Western feminism if 
it is to prove liberating for “Third World” women.101 The article exhaustively compares 
Indian and African women’s movements, and argues that modern Indian and African 
women are themselves the products of colonial power relations, and their “contemporary 
disempowerment” is in most cases the result of the patriarchal systems invented by 
colonial rulers to facilitate their power.102 Chandra poses the question, “Who then can 
recommend that Western feminist theories and tactics are capable of undoing these 
relations, and what of the precolonial relations these undoings imply?”103 She argues we 
are then faced with a “’back to the future’” scenario in which matriarchal traditions, or 
equitable male-dominated domestic traditions, are “so far lost as to be unrecoverable,” 
and the only way to reestablish women’s power is by” reforming toward an uncertain 
future with no proven guides.”104  She contends, then, that the global promises of feminist 
equality confront the practical concerns of specific situations. Since women are not 
repressed by all patriarchies in quite the same way, women’s paths to freedom must 
everywhere be different.  
 This post-colonial lens contextualizes Zille’s rhetorical acts, and combined with 
White’s theory of exigential flow and Charland’s constitutive rhetoric allows for a 
complex and varied understanding of Zille’s rhetorical strategies. Exigential flow creates 
a space for a broader view of Zille’s rhetorical situation, as opposed to an analysis of one 
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rhetorical situation in a given context, which is particularly useful in light of South 
Africa’s long and multifaceted history. A post-colonial framework helps us understand 
the ways in which colonial discourses shaped South African political culture and 
maintained a hegemonic influence even after the establishment of an independent South 
African republic. Lastly, constitutive rhetoric explains the ways in which Zille’s rhetoric 
attempts to constitute a new South African identity. 
METHODOLOGY 
 Edwin Black wrote, “Criticism is a discipline that, through the investigation and 
appraisal of the activities of men, seeks as its end the understanding of man himself.”105	   
The critic, then, must try and choose the best possible method toward that end. White lays 
out three key questions that a researcher must ask him or herself: 1) What is the 
persuader’s intentions? 2) How well does the basic “thrust” of what is said fit the 
potential for modifying the urgency? And 3) how well does the persuader select 
rhetorical options that match the readiness of the audience to be influenced? In order to 
answer these questions, I utilize the two theories described above—Eugene White’s 
theory of exigential flow and Maurice Charland’s theory of constitutive rhetoric—as well 
as a post-colonial understanding of the South African mindset.  
  Post-colonial theory contextualizes Zille’s rhetorical acts. How South Africans 
understand themselves is heavily influenced by their experience as post-colonial subjects, 
and in order to understand the constraints facing Zille, scholars need to acknowledge the 
affects of post-colonialism on the audience. This understanding is key when analyzing 
how Zille uses constitutive rhetoric to try and create a “new” South African audience, one 
not constrained by race, class and gender.106 In addition, I employ White’s theory of 
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exigential flow for a more global understanding of Zille’s rhetorical strategies over time.  
Exigential flow shows how Zille responds to modifications of the exigent as she moves 
through her campaign and how her rhetorical strategies change (or do not change) in 
response to modified exigencies.   
 For this study, I analyzed a series of rhetorical objects that provide a global 
understanding of Zille’s rhetorical strategies. The texts chosen illuminate the multiple 
avenues of persuasion open to political candidates, and the time frame is long enough to 
include the changes in Zille’s rhetorical strategies as they evolved over time.  
The study focuses on three rhetorical forms and five specific texts; two speeches 
delivered by Zille on May 6, 2009 and April 27, 2010, Zille’s Facebook page, and 2 radio 
interviews given by Zille on March 10, 2010 and January 1, 2011. The first speech was 
delivered on May 6, 2009, as Zille officially accepted the post of Premier of the Western 
Cape and laid out her agenda for the coming term. The second speech was given at the 
Constitutional Court in Johannesburg on April 27, 2010, part of the party’s Freedom Day 
celebrations. The Facebook analysis assesses Zille’s page from its creation on May 16, 
2008 to March 26, 2011. The radio interviews were both given on “black” radio stations 
and focus on the political policies of the DA.107 
 I chose my texts with three criteria in mind. First, I looked for texts that were 
aimed at multiple audiences—specifically audiences with various economic statuses, 
education levels, and different races and gender. By analyzing a range of rhetorical 
objects I was be able to gain insight into Zille’s strategies of audience analysis and the 
similarities and differences that emerge from her discourse. Another benefit to looking at 
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an assortment of texts is the ability to get more complete picture of Zille’s repertoire of 
rhetorical tactics.  
 The second criterion was the mode of delivery and accessibility. I selected texts 
that were delivered to a wide range of the public, and were easily accessible to a diverse 
audience. Economics plays an essential role in Zille’s rhetorical strategies. South Africa 
is a country with a population that largely resides below the poverty line, and it is critical 
for Zille to reach the poor majority. Simultaneously, however, Zille needs to appeal to the 
richer population of South Africa, a critical segment that provides the monetary backing 
for her campaign and is the backbone of South Africa’s economy.  The speeches reached 
the widest range of economic diversity. Transcripts are available online, but also appear 
in local newspapers and are broadcast multiple times on the day of the speech. Though 
the majority of poor South Africans have limited access to the Internet, televisions and 
radios are comparatively cheap and can be easily accessed in public venues such as bars, 
restaurants, grocery stores and coffee shops. Internet access clearly is less accessible to 
the poorest of the poor but caters to her wealthier audiences—those who will be funding 
her campaign and are critical to her ability to reach out to her poorer audiences through 
physical appearances in townships or paper campaign literature. Zille must strike a 
balance between the poor voters that make up the majority and the rich voters who will 
financially support her campaign.  
 The last criterion was to look for a variety of texts that spanned a specific time 
frame, that of the first year and half of Zille’s tenure as Premier of the Western Cape. A 
spectrum of texts is necessary to evaluate the long-term rhetorical strategy of Zille, to 
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identify the similarities and differences among platforms and audiences and understand 
how Zille works rhetorically to control and modify the flow of the controlling urgency. 
 In order to facilitate the broad goal laid out in the beginning of this chapter, to 
study the complex and varied rhetorical strategies employed by Helen Zille, I looked for 
common themes that appeared across the multiple texts. In order to identify the key 
narratives that emerged, this study adapted Robert L.  Ivie’s five steps for identifying key 
themes in a speech.108 The five steps are 1) familiarize yourself with the text and context 
of the speeches; 2) do a close reading of the selected text; 3) identify major themes as 
they present themselves in the text; 4) cluster the themes and name the categories, and 5) 
analyze the clusters for rhetorical significance. By identifying themes within a single text 
I can then compare those themes to the different themes uncovered in other texts. I 
employ Ivie’s method of clustering analysis to uncover the ways in which Zille responds 
to the exigencies of a post-colonial world, how she employs constitutive rhetoric to create 
a new South African identity and to discover the rhetorical themes across platforms. 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
 In the last section of this chapter, I outline each subsequent chapter of this thesis 
project. To begin with, chapter one has introduced the research topic, presented the 
theories to be used in my analysis of Zille’s rhetorical strategies, presented a justification 
for this research, explained the critical method to be employed and discussed the artifacts 
to be examined. Chapter two focuses on the post-colonial lens and the context in which 
Zille’s rhetoric is operating. I discuss the speaker’s background, outline the historical 
context within which Zille is acting, and summarize the present political situation. 
Chapter three consists of an analysis of Zille’s speeches. Chapter four contrasts the 
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arguments and strategies employed in Zille’s Facebook page and in two the radio 
interviews. Lastly, chapter five concludes the project. Within the conclusion, I summarize 
and discuss my project’s major findings, the project’s limitations and indicate areas for 
future research.  
The rhetoric of women like Zille has remained a largely unexplored avenue of 
study in the field of communication studies. As previously discussed, the broad goals of 
this work are threefold: first I hope to gain a deeper understanding of how women in 
developing nations impact and shape the political landscape through their rhetorical effort 
by examining the situation of a specific figure.109  I believe this case study offers 
important insight into the rhetoric of women leaders acting in the context of a developing, 
post-colonial nation. Second, this work will examine how constitutive rhetoric functions 
in South Africa’s complex political landscape to create a new South African identity, and 
thirdly, this project responds to the need for more scholarship that examines rhetoric in 
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CHAPTER 2: BIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK 
Public address does not operate within a vacuum, but is situated within a specific 
social and political location. In The Practice of Rhetorical Criticism, James Andrews 
contends that the criticism of discourse must be based upon a full understanding of the 
meaning of the events from which the discourse arose.111 It follows, then, that the critic’s 
job is to determine the nature and the context of the setting in which the speaker 
performs. Scholars of rhetoric understand that “the responsibility of critical appraisal 
depends heavily on the critic’s ability to understand the historical trends, the motivating 
forces, [and] the immediate occasion . . .”112 The context and historical background of 
any text provides a framework in which contemporary developments can be analyzed and 
assessed. As historians Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery write, “The present and the future 
do not spring, fully grown, from nowhere. They are formed and structured in the crucible 
of the past, and carry with them all the marks and burdens of history.”113 
 In addition to an in-depth understanding of the historical framework, critics 
should have an in-depth understanding of the orator. Rhetorical criticism can provide 
insight into various forms of discourse, but it can also provide the critic with illumination 
about the ways a speaker thinks and interprets the world around them. Andrews 
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concludes that “Rhetorical criticism can thus contribute much to biographical study since 
it uncovers the rhetor’s ideas in action as he or she seeks to persuade those over whom 
that speaker would exert influence.”114 Therefore, just as it is important to have an 
understanding of the meaning of historical trends, motivating forces, and immediate 
occasion, it is also important to know the orator’s background. This chapter provides a 
brief biography of Helen Zille and a narrative of the major events that have shaped South 
Africa’s political and social present from which the rhetorical acts emerged and 
illuminates the post-colonial situation in which these rhetorical acts are engaged.  
ZILLE’S BIOGRAPHY 
 Zille began her life in the public as a political journalist for the Rand Daily Mail, 
South Africa’s leading liberal newspaper during apartheid, and became famous for 
exposing the death of anti-Apartheid activist Steven Biko in 1977.115 His death was 
claimed to have been “a result of self-inflicted wounds” but in reality was a consequence 
of torture by the police.116 Zille was also a member of the Black Sash white women’s 
resistance movement and a vigorous peace activist in her hometown of Cape Town.  
 The Black Sash was a non-violent white women's resistance organization founded 
in 1955 in South Africa by Jean Sinclair. The Black Sash initially campaigned against the 
removal of Colored or mixed race voters from the voters' roll in the Cape Province by the 
National Party government. As the apartheid system began to reach into every aspect of 
South African life, Black Sash members demonstrated against the Pass Laws and the 
introduction of other apartheid legislation. The National Director of the Black Sash, 
Marcella Naidoo, characterized the organization as using the “relative safety of their 
privileged racial classification to speak out against the erosion of human rights in the 
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country.”117 She went on to say,  “Their striking black sashes were worn as a mark of 
mourning and to protest against the succession of unjust laws. But they were not only on 
the streets. Volunteers spent many hours in the national network of advice offices and in 
the monitoring of courts and pass offices."118  
 Between 1955 and 1994, the Black Sash provided widespread and visible proof of 
white resistance towards the apartheid system. Its members worked as volunteer 
advocates to families affected by apartheid laws, held regular street demonstrations, 
spoke at political meetings, brought cases of injustice to the attention of their Members of 
Parliament, and kept vigils outside Parliament and government offices. Many members 
were vilified within their local white communities, and it was not unusual for women 
wearing the black sash to be physically attacked by supporters of apartheid.119 
 After her time as a journalist Zille began to work for the University of Cape town 
as Director of Communication and a policy consultant.120 She re-entered public life in 
1999 when she joined the liberal Democratic Party, which became the Democratic 
Alliance in 2000, and was elected as a member of the Western Cape provincial legislature 
in 1999. She served as executive council member (MEC) for education until 2001 and 
then as leader of the opposition before being elected as an MP to the South African 
Parliament in 2004, also in Cape Town.121 Part of her success is due to her fluency in 
English, Afrikaner and Xhosa, which has allowed her to cultivate a broad range of 
support, from white Afrikaners to residents of the black townships around Cape Town.122 
 In March 2006 Zille was elected mayor of Cape Town and resigned from 
Parliament. According to the BBC, “Her position as mayor was fiercely contested by the 
governing African National Congress (ANC) and elevated her status, making her one of 
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the Democratic Alliance's most high-profile figures” and in May of 2007 she became the 
leader of the Democratic Alliance (DA).123 The DA is a fairly new party in post-
Apartheid South Africa, but has its roots in earlier liberal, multi-racial parties, most 
notably the Progressive Party of Helen Suzman. Throughout apartheid the Progressive 
Party was the “principal opposition” movement within Parliament.124 During the late 
1990’s the DA was formed from the alliance of several smaller parties and has since 
become the official opposition party to the ruling ANC party. 
 In 2009, Zille led the efforts of the DA to try and dent the “perpetual dominance” 
of the ANC in South African politics. Though the ANC remained in power nationally, the 
DA won 16.6% of the seats in the National Assembly and, more significantly, Zille was 
able to unseat the ANC-led provincial administration to become Premier of the Western 
Cape, which is South Africa’s richest province and the heart of their wine, cheese and 
fruit trade.125 Much of her success is credited to her time as Mayor of Cape Town, which 
is the only major city not governed by the ANC. Because of the close margins in the city 
elections in 2006, Zille and the ANC, in both the city council and the provincial 
legislature, started off with a strained relationship. Cape Town has seen a steady 
succession of discredited ANC mayors and interim leaders on account of predecessors 
caught up in corruption and Internet porn scandals. Zille, in contrast, has won accolades 
from the community for her work. Her aggressive anti-drug policies actually led to her 
arrest in 2007 on charges of “participating in an illegal gathering,”126 though the charges 
were later dropped and she “issued her own action for wrongful arrest.”127Another high-
profile incident was her vocal opposition to the disbanding of the anti-corruption 
Scorpions unit, and her accusations of corruption within the South African police force. 
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These incidents were widely touted as evidence of her devotion to the people, and in 
2008 she won the World Mayor award by City Mayors, an international think-tank.128 
COLONIZATION AND APARTHEID: A BRIEF HISTORY 
 The single most significant factor distinguishing South Africa from other African 
countries is its particular experience of colonialism and apartheid. European colonization 
began in the 17th century with Dutch and Huguenot settlement in the Cape. Initially, the 
impact of white settlement was mainly limited to the Cape but grew as the Dutch 
speaking Boers, also called the Voortrekkers, moved north to escape British rule.129  With 
the expansion of white settlement north and east, plus the arrival of British settlers in 
Xhosaland and Natal as an outgrowth of British imperialism, pressure on Bantu-speaking 
African groups became increasingly intense. The most direct aspect of this pressure was 
the dispossession of land by whites, through which African farmers were forced either to 
retreat to other areas, or to become sharecroppers or farm laborers. While African 
agriculture continued to thrive for a time and, indeed, posed a highly resented source of 
direct competition to white farmers, it was gradually reduced by further land conquests, 
as well as efforts to curb sharecropping.130   
 In the latter half of the 19th century, the discovery first of diamonds and then of 
gold led to a rapidly growing demand for black mine workers. Various white 
governments introduced laws and policies to facilitate the supply of this labor. The 
Natives Land Act dating from 1913, in particular, formalized the distinction between the 
African reserves and white farming areas, prohibiting Africans from acquiring, owning, 
and renting land in the latter. This had the effect of limiting their economic options so 
severely as to compel many to sell their labor to the mines and white farms.131 Around 
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the same time, there were some 180,000 African mineworkers in the country, of whom 
around half were from South Africa, and half from Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique and 
elsewhere.132   
 Control of Africans’ mobility remained a high priority for the government 
through most of the 20th century. The government sought to balance the “legitimate” 
demand for African workers for mines and unskilled and semi-skilled work in urban 
areas with the desire to keep white settlements insulated from “surplus” Africans.133 
Since at least the late 19th century, a pattern emerged whereby Africans and coloreds 
were relegated to townships adjacent to white towns, not only to separate the “slumyards” 
from white residential areas, but just as importantly to segregate the black poor from the 
white poor.134  The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 formalized the powers of local 
authorities to demarcate urban settlements according to race. In 1950, H.F. Verwoerd, 
who was then Minister of Native Affairs but later to become Prime Minister, introduced 
the Urban Labor Preference Policy, signaling the intentions of the ascendant National 
Party both to continue and to fortify the discriminatory system of labor and pass 
controls.135 Among the more destructive effects of the system was to force many families 
to be split for long periods, with men working in the mines or in the cities, and women 
remaining in the rural reserves. Meanwhile, conditions in the reserves deteriorated as ever 
more people were forced to settle there. During 1955–69, population density in the 
reserves increased from 60 to 110 persons per square mile.136 Effectively, many 
households in so-called rural areas were and remain landless, while many others were left 
with tiny amounts of land.   
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 The logical conclusion of this process came in the 1960s and 1970s, when the 
apartheid government “elevated” the status of the African reserves to ten putatively self-
governing homelands, some of which were declared independent states. These homelands 
were thus set up with their own assemblies, government departments, rights to confer 
citizenship, etc. The idea of “separate development” was that they would also have their 
own economies. But, given that these reserves comprised only 13% of the country’s land 
area, were often geographically isolated, and had terrible infrastructure, this was not 
plausible.137 Poorly conceptualized investments in agricultural irrigation schemes 
benefited mainly a few score white development experts and consulting firms.138 The 
industrial decentralization policy made some inroads, but disintegrated once wage 
subsidies were removed after 1994. The main source of formal employment within the 
homelands was the public service itself.139 As a result, the homelands had virtually no tax 
base, and so had to rely almost entirely on transfers from the apartheid government. Poor 
healthcare services and vastly inferior “Bantu education” were among the consequences. 
Because of the dearth of meaningful income-earning opportunities within the homelands, 
the migrant labor system remained one of the most important survival strategies for 
African households, notwithstanding its high personal costs. In the early 1970s, 54% of 
all Africans lived outside of the homelands in the “white areas.”140   
 The consequences of these historical developments are easy to observe. Based on a 
poverty line of R322 ($48 USD) per capita per month (the “lower-bound” poverty line) 
33.2% of all households are below the poverty line, while 53.3% of households 
consumed less than the "upper-bound" poverty line (R593 per capita per month or $88 
USD).141 There is also a strong geographical dimension to the incidence of poverty. 
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Based on the same data set, 72% of those below the poverty line reside in rural areas, and 
71% of all rural people are poor.142 By most measures, the poorest provinces are those 
encompassing the most populous former homeland areas, namely KwaZulu-Natal, 
Limpopo Province, and Eastern Cape. With regard to education, 22.3% of black Africans 
have received no schooling, 18.5% have had some primary school, 6.9% have completed 
only primary school, 30.4% have had some high school education, 16.8% have finished 
only high school, and only 5.2% of the black population has an education higher than the 
high school level. Overall, 22.0% of black Africans have completed high school.143 
Unemployment is at and all time high at 23.5%, the majority of the unemployed being 
black Africans.144 
WOMEN IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS 
What makes Helen Zille such an important figure is that her rise to power is an 
unprecedented phenomenon in South African politics, especially in the DA, which unlike 
the ruling ANC, does not have political party quotas for women. Though women were a 
critical part of the resistance movement it wasn’t until the early 1990s that women were 
placed in positions of leadership. To understand the impact of Zille and the progress of 
women in general in South Africa one must understand the past of women in South 
Africa. 
 When talking about women in South Africa there are four distinct groups of 
women within the country, each with their own unique struggles. White English-speaking 
women, Afrikaner women, colored women and black women each faced very different 
challenges before, during and after Apartheid. 145 Feminist scholars Beth Goldblatt and 
Sheila Meintjes argue that colonialism, and later apartheid, relied on both racial and 
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gender hierarchies: “Patriarchy was embedded within the social fabric of Apartheid in 
particular ways and meant that women and men from different racial, class and cultural 
backgrounds experienced life very differently.”146 Though there were undoubtedly strict 
gender roles before colonialism these patterns were “heightened, deepened and ingrained 
to ensure white male power, especially within the South African context.”147 Academic 
Hanna Britton contends that colonial conquest was “both a violent and a gendered 
process, which exploited preexisting social divisions within African culture” and led to 
“an increased vulnerability of African women.”148 
 Somewhat ironically, it was actually during apartheid that women, particularly 
black women, began to increase their power in both the home and in their communities. 
As discussed before, during this time black South Africans were forced onto small, 
barren land reserves. Because of the poor quality of the land black men were forced to go 
into cities and towns to look for work, leaving a disproportionately large number of 
women and children in rural areas.149 The result has had broad and long-lasting effects 
for the black women of South Africa. Women had less access to economic opportunities, 
jobs, basic education, healthcare, and ultimately had less control over their basic 
reproduction functions due to lack of birth control and the use of rape and violence as a 
way to intimidate and silence women’s protests. In addition they also had to take on all 
the roles they had to traditionally share with men. According to Winnie Mandela this was 
the central reason black women became politically active before white women did. She 
explained, “When they removed our husbands and our fathers from the rural areas to 
work in the mines . . . the Black woman found herself acting as head of her family. As 
well as raising her family, she had to look after the cattle and till the land. So it has not 
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required any special transformation for women in the urban areas to be in the forefront of 
a struggle.”150 Indeed, according to Hilda Bernstein, a South African activist and founder 
of the Federation of South African Women, the black women of South Africa “emerged 
as primary catalysts for protest and challengers of the Apartheid regime.”151  
 What is so unique about black women in South Africa, and indeed in much of 
Africa at large, is the connection made between women’s power and women’s roles as 
mothers and leaders of the household. As black women, and eventually colored women, 
began to occupy more and more areas of political activism such as in labor unions and 
political parties, they did not eschew their traditional roles, rather they “preserved and 
often drew strength from their domestic lives and maternal identities.”152 Motherhood 
was actually a mobilizing force that led to support for radical political change and, 
occasionally, support for “revolutionary violence” in South Africa.153 They did this 
however, in an unusual fashion. Their tactics were highly militant, very aggressive and 
nontraditional – what some called “conservative militancy.”154  
 White women, both English-speaking and Afrikaner, and colored women, on the 
other hand, were much less active. The apartheid system, while deeply gendered, still 
allowed for a level of privilege and comfort for these women that inhibited widespread 
involvement in the apartheid resistance movement. Afrikaner women were especially 
reluctant to involve themselves in the resistance.155  While Afrikaner culture is highly 
patriarchal, Afrikaner women were seen to have a “complementary and equally 
significant role” in the preservation of Afrikaner language and culture. Men were tasked 
with preserving the Afrikaner way of life in the public, political and economic spheres of 
life while the women were “supposed to promote, preserve, and uplift” the Afrikaner 
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culture by “raising children and making a home for their families.”156 English-speaking 
white women have traditionally enjoyed more freedom and choices than Afrikaner 
women. It was English-speaking women who pushed for women’s suffrage for nearly 
three decades before it was won in 1930, and it was an English-speaking women named 
Helen Suzman who led the Progressive Party, the precursor to the DA, which was one of 
the most active white resistance groups in the 1970s and 1980s and became a rallying 
point for the resistance.157 
 Though women were active throughout apartheid, especially in the 1970s and 
1980s, women were still “the soldiers on the ground, but the generals remained men.”158 
Women were certainly leaders in the struggle but were excluded from formal leadership 
roles. Even up to the early 1990s women were excluded from any positions of power or 
influence. As Lindiwe Zulu, an MP from the ANC, asserts “When the negotiation process 
led by the ANC started in 1994, women were not involved – not because of unwillingness 
on their part but because the negotiators had not thought it necessary to involve 
women.”159 However, the process of democratization in Africa has traditionally allowed 
women key opportunities to move into political office, where there is space open for new 
ideas and movements. 160 As women struggled alongside their male counterparts during 
apartheid they simultaneously developed a national gender that would ultimately lead to 
constitutional protection and electoral success.161 No longer did women focus solely on 
women’s rights for their particular race, they also began to re-conceptualize feminism 
and women’s rights as human rights that crossed racial lines. 
The collective voice of women had power during the transition to democracy 
specifically because they had been vital members of the struggle and this power allowed 
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them to create a multiparty coalition focused on securing a place for gender equality in 
the national constitution and ensured the pursuit of affirmative action measures in the 
recruitment of women for national office. The involvement of women in the building of 
nations is one of the best ways to develop a successful democracy according to UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan: "Study after study has shown that there is no effective 
development strategy in which women do not play a central role . . . When women are 
fully involved the benefits are immediate, families are healthier and better fed and their 
income, savings and investments go up. And what is true of families is also true of 
communities and, in the long run, of whole countries."162 
As a result, women in South Africa have a much more powerful voice than most 
women in African countries. South Africa ranks fourth out of fifty-three African 
countries for its record on women’s rights, and in the World Economic forum’s “gender 
gap index” it comes in sixth out of 134 countries in the world.163 According to the 
Economist, “On paper, South Africa has one of the world’s most impressive legal 
arsenals for protecting women’s rights.”164 In the “founding provisions” of South Africa’s 
1996 constitution, sexism was given equal weight as racism. The ANC has introduced a 
large number of new laws in the past sixteen years to try and promote women’s rights in 
a country that has historically been overwhelmingly patriarchal.165  
However, the gap between principal and practice is often wide. In some arenas, 
particularly politics, women do very well. Women hold 44% of parliamentary seats (the 
third highest proportion in the world), 41% of cabinet posts, including defense, 
agriculture, foreign affairs, mining, science and technology and home affairs. In other 
areas, however, women’s progress has been slower. More than a decade after the passage 
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of the Employment Equity Act, which requires companies with over 50 people to hire 
and promote women (as well as blacks and the disabled) in proportion to their 
representation in the population as a whole (52%), white men still dominate senior 
management and company boards in both the public and private sectors.166 The Women’s 
Business Association says that a fifth of the country’s private-sector boards have no 
women (and that only 10% of chief executives and board chairpersons are women).167 
Universities, where more than half of undergraduates are now female, have done more, 
with women now accounting for 45% of academic staff. About a quarter of judges are 
female.168 
Although women make up nearly half the labor force, most are in lower-wage 
sectors, particularly domestic service. Women are also more likely to be unemployed and 
to head the poorest households. The introduction of a child-support grant for children up 
to the age of 15, recently raised to 18, has helped, but it amounts to only 250 rand ($36) a 
child each month.169 It is in the home, particularly in black ones, where women continue 
to struggle the most against gender discrimination. Men continue to dominate as head of 
the household, oftentimes imposing their authority with drug- or alcohol-fuelled brutality. 
In its latest world report, Human Rights Watch, a New York-based lobby, describes the 
level of physical and sexual violence against South African women as “shockingly 
high.”170 South Africa has one of the highest incidences of reported rape in the world. In 
a study by the World Health Organization, 40% of South African women claimed that 
their first experience of sex was non-consensual.171  
The founder of a new women’s-rights lobby called the Sonke Gender Justice 
Network–led by a black man—says “his biggest challenge is to convince men that 
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abusing women is culturally unacceptable.”172 Violence is often seen as a normal part of 
male-female relations. According to recent research by the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation, a Johannesburg-based group, most black women believe a 
man has a right to have sex with his wife or partner whenever he wants. Another study 
showed that most black teenagers felt it is fine to force sex on a girl if you know her or if 
she accepts a drink from you.173 
Traditional customs are also difficult to undo, especially when role modeled by 
authority figures. President Jacob Zuma has at least twenty-one children by at least ten 
different women, four of whom he married; he is now engaged to another, who is 
pregnant.174 In certain rural areas women are still expected to walk a few paces behind 
their husbands. In KwaZulu-Natal “thousands of bare-breasted maidens display their 
virginal beauty in a dance before the polygamous Zulu king, Goodwill Zwelithini.”175 In 
villages in the eastern Cape teenage girls continue to be forced into marriages with older 
men who treat them as virtual slaves. Women who do not fit into the community are still 
sometimes burned as witches. Lesbians are gang-raped to “cure” them of their 
abnormality.176 The situation for women in South Africa is complex, and without an 
understanding of their unique situation, there can be no wholesale understanding of any 
communicative phenomena in the country.  
 Zille’s gender has certainly been an issue in her political career. In May 2009, 
shortly after being elected Premier, Zille wrote a letter to the Cape Argus newspaper that 
was accidentally copied by her spokesperson to the left-wing Sowetan newspaper. 
Responding to criticism from gender lobby groups and the ANC over her all-male 
provincial cabinet, Zille stated in the letter that the ANC had never even been led by a 
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woman, and that its leaders set bad examples on gender issues. She cited South African 
President Jacob Zuma's "deeply sexist views," accused him of being a "womanizer," and 
condemned him for putting "all his wives at risk of contracting HIV" by having 
unprotected sex with an HIV positive woman.177 Zuma, a polygamist, admitted in his 
rape trial that he had known that the woman with whom he had had sex was HIV 
positive.178  
 Zille's condemnation of Zuma's behavior was then used by The Sowetan as the 
basis of a front-page story entitled "Zuma an AIDS risk." The paper stated that Zille had 
"launched an extraordinary new attack" on Zuma.179 This began a wave of attacks on 
Zille from both the ANC and a number of its left-wing alliance partners. The ANC Youth 
League claimed Zille was racist, and that her all-male cabinet consisted of "boyfriends 
and concubines so that she can continue to sleep around with them."180 The Umkhonto 
we Sizwe Military Veterans Association restated the Youth League's sex claims, and 
warned it would launch "a political program aimed at rendering the Western Cape 
ungovernable."181 The ANC also criticized Zille, but distanced itself from the remarks of 
its Youth League, stating that they were "deeply embarrassing."182 In response, Zille 
claimed that the dispute exemplified South Africa's warped approach to gender issues: 
The (male) gender commissioner has remained silent about the extreme sexism of 
the ANC Youth League and the Umkhonto we Sizwe War Veterans Association 
that both accused me of appointing men to my Cabinet in return for sexual 
favours. Contrast the commissioner's silence on this issue with his vocal threats to 
take me to court to impose quotas on the Western Cape Cabinet. His obsession 
with quotas is actually a useful diversion from the real issues that oppress women 
in South Africa. Have you ever heard the gender commissioner challenge the 
assumption, still held by millions of South African men, that multiple unprotected 
sexual encounters are their right? This is the worst manifestation of South African 
patriarchy, and it is encouraged by the behaviour of some leaders. It is also the 
main reason why we cannot bring the AIDS pandemic under control and why 
women bear the greatest burden of this disease. I will keep making these points no 
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matter how much outrage it elicits. Denial and political correctness are far easier 
than challenging deep-rooted cultural norms of sexual dominance that are the root 
cause of gender oppression.183  
 
THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE, THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, AND 
DIFFERING VISIONS OF SOUTH AFRICAN IDENTITY  
 The African National Congress (ANC) has been South Africa's governing left-
wing political party, supported by its tripartite alliance with the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP), since 
the establishment of non-racial democracy in April 1994. It defines itself as a "disciplined 
force of the left."184 The most powerful party in the country, the ANC is the party of the 
people, thanks in large part to Nelson Mandela and the work of other ANC leaders during 
apartheid. In order to fully understand the challenges facing Zille and the DA in the 
present, the power of the ANC must be seen through its past. 
 The history of the ANC shows three key ideological influences feeding into the 
making and the complexity of the ANC: the first is that of the Christian liberal- 
democrats, a legacy of its founding rulers and later leaders such as Albert Luthuli and 
Oliver Tambo. The second key influence is the Africanists and their endorsement of a 
Black African-biased African nationalism. The third influence is that of the communists 
and their non-racialism and socialist economic ideals. Added to these influences is the 
ideological complexity the ANC’s organizational structure, which also has three distinct 
elements: 1) an external mission based in Europe and Africa, 2) an internal movement 
grouped around the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (Cosastu), and 3) the Robben Island prison diaspora. All these complicated 
and competing factors shed light on the current internal factions within the ANC. They 
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explain its broad support base, which maintains its dominance and they provide insight 
into the ANC’s current policies and actions.  
 The first of the three influences originates from its founders. In 1912, a group of 
black African men and women created the South African Native National Congress 
(SANNC), the beginning of what was to become the ANC. Its leadership consisted of a 
small group of black middle-class citizens including lawyers, doctors, journalists and 
landowners—those who stood to lose most from the post-Union political dispensation.185 
Its members were largely drawn from the kholwa, a Zulu word meaning Christian 
converts, who promoted Victorian values of moral progress, material advancement and 
personal respectability.186 The ANC’s founding leaders tended to be the product of the 
early Christian missionaries, who provided missionary schools such as Lovedale in the 
Ciskei and Adams College in Natal.187 Unsurprisingly, the government did not provide 
education for black Africans so those who received an education did so at these 
missionary schools, an education in the “relatively liberal Western tradition.”188 The early 
ANC’s call for inclusion in the South African body politic was as “citizens of a common, 
non-racial society,” informed by Christian and liberal conceptions of justice and 
humanity.189 The leadership was committed to “a method of opposition that emphasized 
responsible citizenship and spurned popular protest and demonstrations.”190 Rather, they 
were deeply committed to constitutionalism. Thus, the first tradition can be described as 
one of liberal-democracy based on Christian values.  
 In the 1920s the ANC became increasingly influenced by the ideals of pan-
Africanism—an “Africa for Africans”—and communism. In 1921 the Communist Party 
of South Africa was created, and a relationship between them and the ANC formed in 
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1928 when the Communist Party adopted the call for ‘an independent native republic’ as 
its key objective.191 The Communist Party was, initially, the only political organization in 
South Africa to recruit members from all racial groups as “the party adhered to the 
principle that ‘working class unity transcended racial divisions’”192 It was not a large 
party, but it was highly organized, its centralized structure drawn from the Leninist 
model.193 This influence of communist and Africanist groupings within the ANC would 
have considerable long-term significance for the organization. The communists and 
Africanists situated themselves at polar ends of the ANC, the former emphasizing non-
racialism and class solidarity, and the latter stressing African self-sufficiency and the pre-
eminence of the racial struggle.194 The Africanists were suspicious of communism, 
believing it merely served to hide another version of white paternalism: “Africans are a 
conquered race—they do not suffer class oppression—they are oppressed as a group, as a 
nation.”195 Nevertheless, at key periods, the two traditions would unite to produce a type 
of indigenous radicalism embodied in the idea of African socialism.  
 The 1940s saw the rise in pre-eminence of pan-Africanist consciousness, an 
influence that became evident in the ANC’s 1943 seminal document African Claims. It 
differed significantly from previous ANC official discourse, as polite requests turned into 
demands, and it called for a future, which promoted a more interventionist state. The 
ANC Youth League was formed in 1943 with Anton Lembede as its key mover. 
Lembede’s philosophies differed from those of his elders as they indicated a move 
towards revolutionary militancy and racial exclusivism: “Africa, the League declared, 
was ‘a Black man’s country.’”196 In 1949, the ANC adopted the ANC Youth League’s 
Program of Action, a document that served as a manifesto for campaigns of mass action 
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in the 1950s. The objective of the ANC, under the program, was defined as the 
achievement of national freedom, which meant “freedom from white domination and the 
attainment of political independence.”197 It committed the ANC to a campaign of 
boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience. However, although it was developing into a 
radical mass nationalist movement, the ANC was neither organizationally nor 
ideologically unified. 
 The South African Communist Party (SACP), a reconfigured Communist Party of 
South Africa, became a key influence in the development and ideology of the  
ANC during the 1960s as it began to play “a dominant role within MK [Umkhonto we 
Sizwe  - the "Spear of the Nation"] and, through MK, the ANC itself.”198 When the ANC 
was banned in 1960, its structure as a mass organization made it difficult to move into 
underground activity; it thus became more reliant on the SACP. Gevisser writes, “The 
key effect of this influence was undoubtedly the move from non-violence into armed 
struggle.”199 As Ellis and Sechaba recognize, “the decision to build a guerrilla 
organization and to declare war on the government greatly increased the Party’s weight in 
its alliance with the ANC.”200 Much of the essential material and military resources that 
the ANC received from Moscow were a result of the SACP’s links. Communist members 
within the ANC were able to arrange for volunteers to travel to Eastern Europe, China 
and Africa for training and to acquire equipment.201 The SACP also provided the ANC 
with “organizational discipline, revolutionary theory and ideological conviction.”202 
Together with the party’s contribution of intellectual and organizational competencies 
came the “entrenchment of authoritarian ‘democratic-centralist’ practices and 
attitudes.”203 Membership of the SACP was for “only a select few—a ‘vanguard’ 
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handpicked by the Party leadership,” recruited through a highly secretive process.204 Its 
democratic centralism allowed for tight control of members from the centre. It was an 
organization where “secrecy was more than a necessity—it was a cherished virtue and a 
mark of true revolutionary.”205 Although the SACP had been instrumental in the ANC’s 
adoption of a non-racial outlook, it was nevertheless one of the last communist parties in 
the world to reject Stalinism.206  In addition, it had already acknowledged, in 1927, that a 
‘black republic’ was the first step to socialism; this led to the ANC-SACP alliance being 
based on a “two-stage theory of revolution: democracy first, socialism second.”207  
 Besides the above three differing traditions influencing the composition, direction 
and policies of the ANC, a further significant watershed event would produce an 
additional three influences on the make-up of the organization—the 1964 Rivonia Trial. 
The ANC would practically cease to exist in South Africa, as its key leaders were either 
in jail on Robben Island or had been forced into exile. London became the centre of its 
external mission with forward bases established in African “frontline” states. During this 
period, Oliver Tambo’s leadership style, which “combined pragmatism, collective 
leadership and deep Christian beliefs, provided an important source of strength, enabling 
the ANC to function as a broad coalition and to lay claim to the moral high ground.”208 
As a result of the trial, three spheres of ANC activity began to feed into the composition 
and character of the organization: 1) those incarcerated on Robben Island, 2) those in 
exile, and 3) the internal domestic and labor struggle, led by organizations aligned with 
the ANC, namely the UDF and Cosatu.209  
 There were vast cultural and organizational differences between these various 
components of the ANC.210 The Robben Islanders were hierarchically organized, 
 
 57 
disciplined, but nevertheless fairly democratic within limitations. The Island was known 
as the “University” since emphasis was placed on political and theoretical learning; as a 
result they tended to be open to debate. Internally, the UDF and its affiliates mobilized a 
broad base of support against the apartheid regime, focusing on massive community 
mobilization in black areas while also including targeted initiatives in white suburbs. The 
UDF, founded in 1983, was an effort to coordinate internal opposition to apartheid, by a 
thousand delegates from all races, representing 575 organizations, including trade unions, 
sporting bodies, community groups and women’s organizations.211 It had a culture of 
openness, discussion and tolerance of alternative viewpoints and was non-racial and 
inclusive. The UDF endorsed the Freedom Charter and recognized the need for “unity in 
struggle through which all democrats, regardless of race, religion or color shall take part 
together.”212 By contrast, the exiles comprised different groupings, ranging from those in 
the camps in the frontline states to those in European capitals. As a result they tended to 
be hierarchically organized, “with information tightly guarded and decision making 
centralized . . . The vanguardist, democratic centralist aspects of the organization in exile 
betrayed Leninist roots, while an additional Stalinist dimension saw the party as 
paramount and loyalty as the crucial currency.”213   
 Professor Ben Turok, veteran ANC MP, admits that “we currently live in a period 
of massive contradictions—contradictions between the aspirations of the  
ANC and the way we run the country . . . between our socialist views and our practise in 
government.”214 As Butler points out “the liberation movement’s democratic tendencies 
coexist with democratic centralist and hierarchical conceptions of legitimate 
authority.”215 These internal inconsistencies culminated in the change of leadership at the 
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ANC’s Polokwane Conference in 2007. It can be argued that the faces may be different, 
but the underlying world-views have not changed and as a result there are strong beliefs 
among the people that the ANC will be more open to criticism and debate, with fewer 
hierarchical decision-making procedures. 
 The DA is a much younger party, having formed from an alliance with the 
Nationalist Party (NP) and the Democratic Party (DP) in 2000. The NP was established in 
1914 and has traditionally been an all-white party. The NP acted as the architects of 
apartheid and supported a volksstaat, or Afrikaner homeland. In 1990 the NP renounced 
apartheid and in 1994 won a surprising amount of votes from minorities: 49% white, 30% 
colored, 14% blacks, and 7% Asian. However, it quickly became apparent that the party 
held little long-term appeal and party leaders began to talk of a “united opposition party.” 
The DP was founded in 1989, though its roots go back to the Progressive Party (PP), 
which was founded in 1959. The DP was already a mix of various white political parties 
and swiftly overtook the NP in terms of white voters. When the two parties merged, they 
first had to reconcile their greatly differing policies; the DP was considered very liberal, 
while the NP was characterized as technocratic. The current DA has largely managed to 
maintain the reputation of the DP, that of a liberal party, though it is considered to be 
broadly centrist. For example, their economic policy supports a mix of high spending on 
crucial social services such as education and health care, a basic income grant, and a 
strong regulatory framework, with more moderate policies such as a lower budget deficit 
and a deregulated labor market. They believe in limited government and “do not believe 
that a state, with limited capacity, should over-reach itself."216 
 In many ways DA and ANC policies are very similar; they both are founded in 
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basic liberal beliefs, they both support policies of non-racialism, and both believe in a 
strong unified South African state. The biggest difference lies in their differing views of 
the role of government. The DA, much like the Republican Party in the United States, 
believes in a very limited role for national government with an emphasis on local 
government and personal responsibility. The ANC, much like the Democratic Party in the 
United States, believes in a strong central government and social liberalism. The two 
parties are also divided along racial lines, though that seems to have more to do with the 
country’s historical background and identity politics, rather than any true difference in 
political views. Zille faces the challenge of reaching out to black voters without 
alienating her largely white base. To accomplish this Zille is trying to position herself as 
the next phase in South African politics, a leader of a party, and hopefully a country, 
where race is no longer a motivating factor but rather where the focus is on government 
policies. The struggle she faces when trying to sell this vision to black voters is that 
without racial divisions being drawn, blacks lose the opportunity for redress in the form 
of affirmative action policies.  
 Apartheid social engineering was shot through with contradictions, uncertainties, 
irrationalities, and lapses of control. Yet the system endured for over four decades. This 
tenacity derived in large measure from the repressive might of the apartheid state. But it 
also had a lot to do with the systematic bureaucratization and normalization of race. With 
the advent of apartheid (which built on white supremacist foundations laid decades 
earlier), South Africa became one of the most thoroughly racialized social orders in the 
world and despite the end of apartheid and the repeal of legislation like the Popular 
Registration Act, the demarcation of South African society into whites, Indians, coloreds, 
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and Africans has been continued to be normalized—for many, a "fact" of life. Though 
there has been limited conversation on the topic of race as a hindrance to democracy in 
South Africa, it remains the norm for articles and letters in the press, reports on radio and 
television, and other modes of conversation and commentary to identify social actors in 
racialized terms, attesting to the lingering importance of these racial constructions within 
social consciousness. Paradoxically, one of the principal legal instruments for redressing 
the racial imbalances of the apartheid past—the Employment Equity Act (Act 55 of 
1998)—reproduces the racial categories enacted in the Population Registration Act as the 
basis on which affirmative action is to be instituted and measured.217 This legislation 
names "black people" as one of three "designated groups" identified as the targets for 
affirmative action. But "black people" are in turn defined as those who were previously 
classified as "Africans," "Coloreds," and "Indians.”218 If, as Paul Gilroy argues, "action 
against racial hierarchies can proceed more effectively when it has been purged of any 
lingering respect for the idea of ‘race,’ then the residues of apartheid's racial categories 
remain a daunting obstacle to the pursuit of a nonracial democracy in South Africa.”219 
The issue of race is not relegated to black South Africans alone. White South African 
identity is heavily rooted in racial superiority, class, and a fear of black dominance. To 
give up one’s status as “white” is to lose the privilege and power that comes with that 
racial designation. Zille’s attempt to articulate a South African identity that privileges 
policy over race is a daunting task that ironically requires Zille to continue to 
acknowledge race in order to reach and persuade different audiences.  
CURRENT POLITICAL CONTEXT 
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In 1994 Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratically elected president of 
South Africa. The “New South Africa” was immediately accorded international 
acceptance.220 It was welcomed into the Organization of African Unity, it was readmitted 
into the Commonwealth, and it established itself as a leader in Africa. Inside the country, 
there was an emphasis on the building of a “new” nation: the South African Defense 
Force was combined with Umkhonto we Sizwe and APLA guerilla forces, the new flag 
combined the old colors with those of African Nationalism, and the former national 
anthem was merged with the liberation hymn Nkosi Sikele iAfrika (God Bless Africa). In 
1996 the new government approved one of the most liberal constitutions in the world, 
and set up commissions to safeguard gender and individual human rights.221 There was a 
rapid growth of a black middle-class in business and professions, encouraged by 
affirmative action policies modeled on the successful promotion of Afrikaner interests 
under the apartheid government. At the same time, Mandela stressed the importance of 
creating an inclusive nation, following the principles of the Freedom Charter that “South 
Africa belongs to all who lives in it, black and white.”222 
But granting everybody the vote and espousing equality could not undo all the 
social and economic harm done by the apartheid system. There is still crippling poverty, 
an HIV/AIDs epidemic (more people are infected with HIV/AIDs in South Africa than 
anywhere else in the world), systemic and widespread violence (215,000 people were 
murdered in the first decade after the end of apartheid), and serious issues of corruption 
within the ANC (Jacob Zuma disbanded the police's anti-corruption unit upon taking 
office).223 Despite these issues, the ANC has been the dominant party with 60–70% of the 
vote. But the ANC's power does not go unchecked. A robust civil society grew out of the 
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movement that ended apartheid; its various parts—newspapers, activist organizations, 
and churches—have become "surrogate checks and balances to complement those that 
are ostensibly provided in the constitution."224 There are more than 26,000 registered 
NGOs, and many are effective at both providing services the government doesn't and 
advocating for better policies. Active news media get "under the thin skin" of the 
country's leaders, and religious leaders, such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, are among 
the ANC's loudest critics.225 Arguably the most public and influential critic, as well as the 
“official” opposition, is Helen Zille and the Democratic Alliance.  
In the most recent election in 2009, many already considered Zille a “star player” 
and a true threat to the monolithic ANC.226 This was partly due to the interparty issues 
the ANC was facing. In the beginning of the campaign the ANC underwent a public and 
acrimonious split and in October of 2008 former South African President Thabo Mbeki 
was dismissed a month before his term expired and was replaced by Kgalema Motlanthe, 
and ally of the then favorite Jacob Zuma, who was expected to become president after the 
election year.227 This “humiliating” dismissal led to “A bitter spat between rival camps” 
that “exploded onto the front pages of South African newspapers . . . when one party 
member rebuked another for charging that the party had become a threat to 
democracy.”228 LA Times writer Robyn Dixon wrote, “Opponents complained that Mbeki 
was aloof and intolerant of criticism. They regarded his policies as too pro-business, 
criticized his failure to improve the lot of the poor and abhorred his failure to act more 
urgently to fight AIDS.”229 Zuma had his share of problems as well. During the campaign 
he was charged with corruption, fraud and racketeering. Though these charges were 
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thrown out on a technicality, suspicion remained, and he frequently had to address the 
issue during his candidacy. 230  
 Zille was quick to take advantage of the opening, claiming that an ANC split 
would strengthen democracy. In her weekly online letter Zille wrote, “The dominant 
party is beginning to fracture and the opposition is beginning to coalesce around common 
core values."231 These core values, Zille claimed, were embodied in the DA, and the split 
was a sign that it was time for South Africa to have new leadership. At the DA's elections 
campaign launch in Kliptown, Soweto, Zille also claimed the split meant that the DA 
could beat the ANC and take back the Western Cape in this year’s elections.232 To a 
crowd of 5,000 supporters Zille proclaimed, "Politics have changed. The ANC has split, 
it is no longer guaranteed majorities in every province in South Africa," and that the DA 
was “in it to win it.”233 This message had particular significance because of the location 
of the kick-off celebration. The Cape Town Times wrote “The DA chose to launch its 
campaign at the site where the Congress of the People adopted the Freedom Charter in 
1955 sending the message that the split in the ANC, which gave rise to COPE (Congress 
of the People), had opened the door to it ascending to power.”234 
 Another factor in favor of the DA was the fact that the Independent Democrats 
(ID) decided not to side with the ANC. The ID, though not a nationally powerful party, 
had numerous supporters in the Western Cape provinces, enough that if the ID had 
decided to side with the ANC during the 2009 elections Zille would have faced a much 
tougher campaign that she did. As it was, by February 2009 Zille was “the most likely of 
all the candidates to be the Western Cape premier.”235 On Election Day lines were out the 
doors for hours in the Western Cape, and Zille was quoted as saying “I am expecting a 
 
 64 
good result. I think South African voters know what we need to do to save democracy 
and to ensure that a government delivers. I know that they know what to do to prevent a 
criminal state and they'll go out today and do it."236 As expected, Zille swept Cape Town, 
and emerged victorious as the new Premier of the Western Cape after “winning an 
outright majority in the province with more than 51 percent of votes.”237 The Cape Times 
reported that “It [was] the first time since the end of apartheid that a party has scored an 
overall majority in the province and the result of a driven campaign by DA leader Helen 
Zille to unseat the ANC.”238 The Western Cape was the only region where the opposition 
managed to defeat the ANC in the elections in the history of South Africa after apartheid 
and on May 6, 2009 Zille formally accepted the position as Premier of the Western 
Cape.239 Since then she has continued to campaign for votes, and battle the ANC for 
power. 
 The events surrounding Zille’s rise to power have deep social, political and 
historical underpinnings. This chapter has attempted to provide a better understanding of 
the historical trends, the motivating forces, and the immediate occasion from which 
Zille’s rhetoric arose, as well as the current policies and constraints facing Zille and the 
DA as a result of apartheid’s legacy. In discerning these various constituents of the 
historical framework I illuminate the constraints that have been placed on Zille based on 
her race and gender, as well as the restraints and opportunities posed by contemporary 
events. Clearly, these are important factors that deeply impact Zille’s rhetorical messages. 
The brief biography of Zille provides an understanding of the ethos that she brings to the 
table, and shows how she has the potential to use her history to sway audiences.  In the 
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next chapter, I analyze how Zille navigates these competing forces through her public 
speeches.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE POWER OF SPEECH 
 Eugene White argues that when a situation arises that can be modified by 
communication, what he calls a “rhetorical urgency,” speakers respond to it in hopes of 
inducing change in the audience. In this chapter, I explore two particular communication 
events in which Zille attempted to use her rhetoric to modify a particular situation. 
Specifically, this chapter examines two speeches given by Zille: her May 6, 2009 
acceptance speech for Premier of the Western Cape and a speech delivered almost a year 
later on April 27, 2010 at the Constitutional Court in Johannesburg as part of the party’s 
Freedom Day celebrations. I chose these two speeches because I am specifically 
interested in looking at the longitudinal development of Zille’s rhetoric in order to 
discern the way in which her rhetoric functions over a period of time and changes as she 
progresses in her political campaign. I focus this chapter on speeches because they are a 
particularly important aspect of Zille’s campaign as they reach the widest number of 
South Africans because they are available in a number of formats.  Transcripts are 
available online, but also appear in local newspapers. The speech itself is broadcast 
multiple times on the day of the speech on TV or on the radio and though the majority of 
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poor South Africans have limited access to the Internet, televisions and radios are 
comparatively cheap and can be easily accessed in public venues such as local 
bars/restaurants called Shebeens.240  
 In Chapter Two I laid out the major events that have shaped South Africa’s 
political and social present from which these rhetorical acts emerged. In the case of Zille, 
historical events are particularly important as they heavily influence the constraints Zille 
is facing and shape the kind of satisfactions she can employ. As noted in Chapter One, 
White defines constraints as “forces in a configuration that influence the way a persuader 
chooses rhetorical responses, if he or she wants to communicate effectively.”241 A 
rhetorical response, or satisfaction, then is “those things a persuader says or does in 
answer to impinging constraints.”242 The restrictions of constraints/satisfactions prescribe 
what a persuader can or cannot say or do, leaving limited realistic choices for attempted 
persuasion. However, White argues that these limitations can also be “seats of rhetorical 
possibilities,” a way for rhetors to specifically tailor their response to the constraining 
forces.243  
 In this chapter, I contend that Zille faces four major constraints that she must 
work to satisfy in order to alter the controlling exigent: 1) her race, 2) her class, 3) her 
gender, and 4) a strong culture of identity politics. In order to craft proper satisfactions 
for these constraints, Zille uses her speeches to create feelings of consubstantiality with 
her audiences and constitute a new South African identity, which creates a space for a 
new non-ANC government. In the speech given in 2009, Zille focuses on creating 
feelings of identification and consubstantiality with her audience; Her 2010 speech 
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functions to ideologically alienate the ANC from its base and to set the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) up as a viable political alternative to the ANC.  
ZILLE’S 2009 ACCEPTANCE SPEECH 
 One of Zille’s most important speeches to date was her 2009 acceptance speech 
after being elected Premier of the Western Cape. Zille had just swept the Western Cape, 
an unprecedented win in the history of South Africa, with a large majority of votes 
coming from black and colored voters. Her party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), also had 
a strong showing in the election, producing the best results ever at the polls, scoring 
almost a million new votes to take its nationwide tally from 1,931,201 to just under 
3,000,000, a growth of 50%. Under Zille’s leadership the DA not only managed to keep 
the ANC below a two-thirds majority, but also significantly improved its standing in 
parliament, taking twenty more seats in the National Assembly as opposed to the ANC 
which lost thirty-three seats.244 The DA has been the only party in the entire country to 
increase overall support since the 2004 elections.245 Zille’s acceptance speech then is a 
particularly important moment for Zille and for South Africa. Never before had the ANC 
lost so spectacularly, and in such numbers. For the first time South Africa had a chance to 
see what the country might be like under a non-ANC party, run by a white leader, who is 
also a woman. The realities of the constraints are such, however, that Zille faced a deeply 
ambivalent audience; one that struggles to overcome generations of ingrained loyalty to 
the ANC and is still profoundly divided over issues of race, class, and gender.  
 In order to provide adequate satisfactions in light of these constraints Zille 
employs three rhetorical strategies: she 1) fulfills the basic requirements of an epideictic 
speech, 2) names the key issues of her administration, and 3) creates feelings of 
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identification and consubstantiality with her audience. Through the fulfillment of these 
three expectations, Zille is able to increase the audience’s receptiveness to persuasion, 
which in turn creates a discursive space for her rhetoric to act as a constitutive force.  
 First, Zille meets the audience’s immediate expectations by fulfilling the basic 
requirements of an epideictic speech. White argues that in order to alter a provoking 
urgency, a persuader must take into account the ways an audience responds to the 
original provoking urgency and the expectations of the communication event. In this 
case, the original provoking urgency was Zille’s acceptance of the post of Premier of the 
Western Cape, a communicative event that calls into being a very specific type of 
discourse: epideictic rhetoric.  
 Renato Barilli attributes the invention of epideictic oratory to the early Sophists and 
describes it as "less functional and immediate" than deliberative and forensic speech, 
"almost superfluous.”246 According to Barilli, epideictic developed after the other two 
because it was not as vital to the polis as was forensic or deliberative. Prejudices against 
epideictic discourses as mere "show-pieces" meant solely to reflect upon the speaker and 
his or her oratorical talent have persisted since the time of the Sophists. Originally, the 
word "epideixis" simply meant "lecture" and “denoted discourse appropriate within 
pedagogical or ritual contexts.”247 Hence, epideictic is traditionally seen as the rhetoric of 
ceremony, commemoration, declamation, and demonstration. It is also the rhetoric used 
at festivals, such as the Olympic games and other events (i.e., openings, closings, and 
anniversaries as well as at births, deaths, and marriages). Epideictic discourse fell into 
disfavor in antiquity as it evolved into a ritualized mode of discourse that seemed to 
exclusively advertise a speaker's skill without any true meaning or impact. However, as 
 
 76 
rhetorical theory has evolved, our understanding of epideictic has changed. Celeste 
Condit contends that epideictic is a genre worth studying, and one that fulfills three very 
important functions in society; understanding and definition, sharing and creation of 
community, and entertainment and display.248 
 The first function of epideictic rhetoric is definition and understanding—a 
particularly important aspect of Zille’s speech for this audience as it provides a way of 
knowing what the future will look like under the first non-ANC Premier. Again, this is 
the first time since the end of apartheid that a party other than the ANC has been in 
power, and audiences are uncertain what that means for them.  Zille takes into account 
the anxieties of her audience and uses this speech as an opportunity to define 
expectations: those expectations she has of the community and what, in turn, the 
community can expect from Zille. Audience expectations are defined by Zille as “key 
values that . . . underpin [her] administration” and show audiences how her term in office 
will be guided by two core values in particular: “Firstly, a dedication to establishing and 
telling the truth in each situation we face. Secondly, a commitment to defining, accepting 
and meeting our responsibilities.”249 Zille also lays out the community’s responsibilities, 
much like a mother to a child. After explaining the duties of government, she says, “We 
all recognize the fact that a government which neglects its responsibilities undermines its 
citizens’ rights. It is equally true that citizens who shirk their responsibilities and duties 
undermine the rights of others, as well as their own.” Zille gives three specific examples 
of how individuals can fulfill their civic duty, which serves the dual purpose of 
emphasizing citizens’ responsibility and lessening her own accountability. She states, 
“While the state has a crucial role in changing the circumstances that give rise to these 
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social ills, breaking the cycle is a responsibility we share with citizens who understand 
that personal discipline is essential if we are to enjoy the fruits of freedom.” Here Zille 
seeks to instill a sense of personal responsibility for the larger community's welfare—if 
not for the way things are, then for the way they might be. She enjoins audience members 
to remember the burden of freedom: “No government can enforce and impose behaviour 
changes on free individuals . . . [and] all citizens are equally entitled to the rights, 
privileges, and benefits of citizenship; and equally subject to the duties, and 
responsibilities of citizenship.” These calls to personal responsibility do not invite 
immediate action, but convey “the philosophical ideas which form the basis of future 
judgment and action."250 
 The second function of epideictic is crucial to Zille’s ability to craft a new South 
African identity. The ability of epideictic rhetoric to share and, literally, create 
community is key to Zille’s future political success. In order to make a viable run for the 
presidency Zille needs to show audiences that despite profound historical divisions of 
race, class, and gender she can identify with and represent the majority of South Africans. 
This speech lays the groundwork for identification and consubstantiality, as the genre of 
epideictic allows for a unique opportunity to build community through a sharing of 
common values and traditions. Waldo Braden and Harold Mixon define epideictic as “a 
celebration of communal values and traditional beliefs” that plays a pivotal role of 
inspiring the realization and reinforcement of values.251 Although epideictic rhetoric is 
rarely used in an effort to sway audiences to a new way of thinking, it does allow 
audiences to reconstitute traditional thoughts and beliefs. More than reaffirming 
community values, epideictic allows for a new take on values, creating new meaning for 
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old ideas. For example, Zille’s focus on a citizen’s civic responsibility to work with the 
government is juxtaposed with the historically understood meaning of civic 
responsibility, which for South Africans largely meant to undermine the government 
through civil disobedience. In effect, she is working to reconstruct the cultural archetype 
from the responsible citizen as rebel, to the responsible citizen as pro-government.  
 This ability to reconstitute basic values and beliefs forms the basis of the 
constitutive function of Zille’s rhetoric. Charland argues that every rhetorical act draws 
on preexisting discursive positions and that by virtue of addressing an audience, recreates 
those positions in new and different ways. We see that Zille is using this speech to create 
feelings of identification with her audience, yet the collective identities that she draws on 
are themselves a rhetorical creation.  Therefore, if a “people” only exist through the 
ideological discourse that constitutes them, the people then only exists as “a series of 
narrative ideological effects.”252 To tell a story of a collective people, or to draw on a 
collective’s values and beliefs, is to implicitly claim the existence of a collective subject.  
The last function of epideictic, display and entertainment, is largely used to 
support the shaping and sharing of community, but it is also an important point of 
contrast between Zille and the current South African President Jacob Zuma. As Zille 
works to shape and create community, she invokes archetypal themes of truth, justice, 
and cooperation as ways to better their community and country. These themes “entertain” 
audiences in what Condit describes as the “most humane manner.”253 Audiences are 
“allowed to stretch their daily experiences into meanings more grand, sweet, noble, or 
delightful.”254 The eloquence displayed by Zille reassures her audience of her worthiness 
as a leader, an assurance that the right candidate won. Audiences “take eloquence as a 
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sign of leadership” because to be an eloquent speaker means that a person “knows truth, 
recognizes and wields beauty, and manages power.”255 Zuma is a very popular president, 
but is not generally considered particularly adept at public address.256 According to an 
article in The Daily Mail,  
Many are going to compare President Jacob Zuma to them [Nelson 
Mandela and Thabo Mbeki] and ask how he fares. The honest answer has 
to be not well, not well at all . . . The nation that needs a great speech from 
its leader is not a spoiled nation. And when it is a nation that is at such a 
precarious point in its existence as South Africa is at the moment, the 
importance of it is even greater. 257 
 
Though this particular failing has not impacted Zuma’s career at this point, it seems 
likely that in this area, Zille will have a distinct advantage over Zuma during the 
presidential campaign. 
 This speech cannot be considered purely epideictic though, and certainly not part 
of a genre that is full of “hollow bombast and gaudy verbal baubles.”258 Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that “Epideictic speeches are preparatory to action.”259 They 
further contend that “epideictic functions by increasing adherence to values that might 
later support legislative and judicial arguments.”260 This speech for Zille, though 
epideictic, is an important opportunity for her to alter the exigential flow. Zille has been 
working on the primary (or controlling) exigence of establishing the DA as an alternative 
to the ANC party for a number of years, and more recently, establishing herself 
specifically as a viable alternative to Zuma. Each time she engages the ANC as an 
opposition candidate or as spokesperson for her party, she attempts to alter the exigential 
flow. 
One of the most important functions of this speech was Zille’s chance to name the 
five key issues of her administration, which serves the dual purpose of clearly delineating 
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what the DA stands for, but also sets the terms under which the ANC should be judged in 
the coming years. The five key issues she highlights in her speech are 1) having an “open, 
accountable, and transparent government,” 2) the HIV/AIDs epidemic, 3) drug abuse, 4) 
teen pregnancy, and 5) crime. These are all problems that have burdened South Africa 
since apartheid ended more than a decade ago. However, her use of these issues now not 
only emphasizes the criteria by which President Zuma and the ANC will be judged for 
the next four years. Doing this allows Zille to place herself in a position of rhetorical 
power, forcing Zuma and the ANC to meet her agenda. 
 These specific issues are not unique to Zille, but within the context of an epideictic 
speech, naming these problems implies that Zille’s administration holds the key to a 
solution and predisposes the audience to act in particular ways under particular 
circumstances. Therefore the naming itself, even of common issues, has real, significant, 
and enduring consequences. The naming also serves as an implicit challenge to the ANC, 
forcing them to make visible, measurable progress in addressing these problems, 
something that cannot rationally be accomplished in the next four years due to the scale 
of the financial, social, and political crisis facing South Africa. It is unlikely that Zuma 
will be able to make any dramatic change within the next three to four years.  
 Zille, however, has a much stronger opportunity to impact these issues in the short 
amount of time left before the presidential elections, in a way that the ANC could not 
possibly hope to match. Zille leads one of the wealthiest provinces in the country, with a 
significantly higher tax base and a considerably lower poverty rate, comparatively.261 The 
Western Cape's total GDP for 2006 was R225.8 billion, making the province the third-
highest contributor to the country’s total GDP, at 14.7%.262 It also has one of the fastest 
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growing economies in the country, growing at 5.7% in 2006.263 The province has a 
substantially lower unemployment rate than the national average—15% to the nation’s 
25%.264 High-tech industries, international call centers, fashion design, advertising and 
TV production are niche industries that are rapidly gaining importance and prestige.265 In 
fact, the city of Cape Town is ranked as the most entrepreneurial city in South Africa 
with “Early-Stage Entrepreneurial Activity” 190% greater than South Africa’s national 
average.266  
In addition, Zille’s province is geographically placed in such a way that the rest of 
the country acts as a buffer from the influx of illegal immigrants. South Africa is 
currently facing serious immigration issues as other Africans, especially Zimbabweans, 
Congolese and Mozambicans, flock to the relative success and safety of South Africa.267 
South Africa has one of the highest GDPs in Africa, as well as one of the most stable 
governments and economies, with some of the best infrastructure on the continent. The 
World Bank ranks the country as an upper-middle economy, which makes the country 
one of only four countries in Africa represented in this category (the others being 
Botswana, Gabon, and Mauritius).268 Clearly the ANC needs to address the same issues 
as Zille, but on a much larger scale. Two of the largest cities, Johannesburg and Durban, 
are outside of the Western province, and contain the largest slums in the country. Both 
cities are located close to borders and have huge illegal immigrant issues, which in turn 
results in housing and job shortages, a lack of sanitation capabilities, and a rise in crime 
and poverty. For the ANC to make noticeable and remarkable inroads on these issues 
requires a tax base that doesn’t exist.269  
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This setting of the agenda in turn places voters in the position of having to judge 
the ANC on named and visible criteria, forcing them to go beyond identity politics. If 
Zille’s administration is seen as having more success in fighting these problems, she 
creates a scenario in which voters are obligated to vote for the DA, for the betterment of 
the country, despite her race, class, and gender. The problem is that the majority of voters 
believe that the only party that can better South Africa is the ANC, because they, the 
voters, are the ANC. This is one of the biggest impediments Zille faces to becoming a 
viable presidential candidate. As laid out in Chapter Two, the ANC played a major role in 
the anti-apartheid movement during the seventies and eighties, and as a result, the 
majority of the black population sees themselves in the ANC. This is compounded by the 
near legendary figure and leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela. People want to be a part 
of his party, to claim ties with this renowned figure. In order for Zille to succeed in the 
Presidential elections, she needs to break the culture of identity politics, and re-craft 
South African identity to focus on issues, rather than historical or familial allegiance. 
In order to break the cycle of identity politics, Zille needs her audience to 
acknowledge her own position as a South African and identify with her as a fellow 
citizen. In order to create any sort of identification with her audience Zille must 
overcome the barriers of her race, class, and gender, a steep challenge because of the 
history of the country and the symbolic nature of white skin in a post-apartheid South 
Africa. James McBath and Walter Fisher argue that campaign persuasion “involves more 
an interest in communicating values than logical information. That is, the candidate 
attempts to convince the electors that they can identify with her or him because both the 
elector and the campaigner own the same value orientation.”270 According to McBath and 
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Fisher’s perspective “the candidate must appear as owning a worldview corresponding 
with that of the voters.”271 Ultimately, “the potential elector is encouraged to vote for 
himself [sic]—that is, the candidate closest to his own self-image.”272 Though Zille is not 
officially a candidate anymore, having won her campaign for Premiership, she is 
positioning herself as a future presidential candidate, and in a sense, this is her kick-off 
speech. In working to more fully indicate how Zille identifies with black South Africans 
this study relies on the explanation of identification provided by Kenneth Burke.  
For Burke, rhetoric is largely concerned with persuasion, and persuasion is 
inherently linked to identification: “A is not identified with his colleague, B. But insofar 
as their interests are joined, A is identified with B. Or he [sic] may identify himself with 
B even when their interests are not joined, if he assumes that they are, or is persuaded to 
believe so.”273 Burke went on to say that rhetoric “considers the ways in which 
individuals are at odds with one another, or become identified with groups more or less at 
odds with one another.”274 He noted that if people did not stand at odds with one another, 
divided, no need would exist for the study of a subject whose aim is to bring them 
together so they can become “consubstantial”275 with each other. Focusing on the specific 
purpose of rhetoric, Burke stated that an individual’s “act of persuasion may be for the 
purpose of causing the audience to identify itself with the speaker’s interests; and the 
speaker draws on identification of interests to establish rapport between himself and his 
audience.”276 Creating identification is not just key to persuasion. Charland argues that is 
also forms the basis for constituting an audience.  
As discussed in Chapter One, one of the distinguishing theoretical tenets of 
constitutive rhetoric is the approach to audience. Charland argues that what most 
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rhetorical critics consider to be the product or consequence of discourse, such as a social 
identity, religious faith, or sexuality, are beyond the realm of rational or even free choice. 
Nonetheless, they form the basis of persuasion. Consequently, while creating a sense of 
identification with her audience, Zille also is able to constitute a new identity for her 
audiences. 
In order to create a sense of identification, Zille employs five tactics: she 1) 
addresses common narratives of dissatisfaction, specifically those of civil servants and 
the unemployed, which make up a majority of black South Africans, 2) invokes common 
apartheid narratives, referring to her history as an anti-apartheid activist and her role in 
the revelation of the murder of iconic anti-apartheid martyr Steven Bikko, 3) emphasizes 
common values held by her audience, such as government transparency, strong family 
ties and responsibility, 4) creates an us versus them mentality, what Burke calls the 
workings of antithesis, which works to unite a group in opposition to another group and 
5) delivers the speech in three languages—English, Afrikaans and most importantly 
Xhosa. Her use of multiple languages distances her from the colonizing languages of 
English and Afrikaans and shows her willingness to learn native African languages. 
Zille begins her speech by addressing common narratives of dissatisfaction among 
public servants, speaking to those citizens who inhabit jobs that are important to society, 
but are generally underappreciated and underpaid, such as those of “nurses, doctors, 
teachers, [and] police officers” who “work at the coalface of delivery.”277 She addresses 
the fact that the people in these industries typically “work under extremely difficult 
conditions, with capacity constraints, high vacancy rates and inadequate budgets.” These 
jobs, especially in the poorer province areas, are largely held by black Africans, and by 
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acknowledging their struggles, and praising them for their work, Zille is trying to show 
that she understands her constituency. This also reassures black audiences that Zille has 
no intention of bulldozing local governments, a dig at Zuma and the ANC, who have a 
reputation of placing ANC members in any and all government roles, despite marginal 
competence.278 She states: “Each sphere of government in the Western Cape has 
specifically assigned competences and each has a role to play in the development of our 
democracy. Our oversight role in various spheres will be fulfilled in the spirit of 
cooperation and support.”  
The second and third methods of identification utilized by Zille (employing 
archetypal anti-apartheid narratives, and emphasizing common values held by her 
audience) are tied tightly together as common values that are embedded in the anti-
apartheid narratives. The common values found in her anti-apartheid narratives are 
“telling the truth,” “accepting and meeting responsibilities,” “an open, accountable, and 
transparent government,” “defend[ing] the independence of institutions that exist to call 
us to account and to curb power abuse,” and “respecting, protecting, expanding and 
realizing the rights enshrined in our Bill of Human Rights.” These values were at the core 
of the anti-apartheid resistance movement, and Zille reminds her audience of her past as 
an active member of the Black Sash, her part in revealing the truth of Steven Bikko’s 
murder and her work as a vocal anti-apartheid white woman within the political 
system.279 Another value that Zille highlighted was personal responsibility, which again, 
was a common anti-apartheid narrative. She reminds her audience of the work of anti-
apartheid activists by saying, “A society only progresses to the extent that a growing 
numbers of citizens claim their rights in order to fulfill their responsibilities,” a reference 
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that again, reminds the audience of her past and encourages black audiences to see her as 
one of them—a citizen dedicated to claiming rights for all of South Africa. This also 
serves as a call to action and participation. By supporting these values, which Zille 
believes “are the bedrock on which we build our lives as individuals and as 
communities,” individual members of the community can “become a part” of the DA, 
which allows audience members to “participate in the very discourse by which they 
would be ‘persuaded.’”280 As a result of this participation audience members are 
“interpellated” or constituted as subjects who participate in the discourse and then come 
into being as a result of discourse.  
Another type of identification employed by Zille is the use of the terms we, us, 
and our instead of the traditionally used they in her speech. Both Burke281 and George 
Cheney282 underscore the power of these three words to act as identification tools, which, 
they argue, are powerful because they are subtle and often go unnoticed. In addition, the 
use of these words by a rhetor signals to audiences that the speaker and listener have a 
significant amount in common—that they are by virtue of language, the same. In this 
speech Zille only used the word I seventeen times, out of 1,985 words, and she used we 
fifty times. By using these inclusionary terms Zille creates a situation where the audience 
doesn’t just indentify with her, but with the DA as a whole. Clearly the DA is a popular 
party, so even those who might disagree, or even dislike Zille personally, can instead see 
her as part of a “team” (a term she also uses quite a bit) that has at least some control over 
her actions and choices. 
Zille also works to strengthen the identification she has already created with her 
original supporters: “Our administration will welcome those committed to effective and 
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efficient delivery and those who understand the distinction between the party and the 
state.” This particular sentence serves as praise for her immediate audience, made up 
mainly of supporters, for their intelligence, and ability to see past racial issues—yet 
another dig at the ANC, which many whites see as racist.283 This reminds both white and 
black voters of their identification with her and creates an “us (the DA) versus them (the 
ANC)” dichotomy. Burke would label these remarks as “the workings of antithesis, as 
when allies who would otherwise dispute among themselves join forces against a 
common enemy.”284 The idea of a common enemy is a symbol of the evil against which 
people must unite, and it distracts the people from politically inconvenient issues by 
relating all evils to the common rhetorical enemy. According to Burke, this is creating an 
antithesis. Burke contends that we are born separate individuals and divided by class or 
other criteria, so identification is compensation for division.285 He sees this human need 
to identify with or belong to a group as providing a rich resource for those interested in 
joining us, or more importantly, persuading us. To promote social cohesion, antithesis 
makes a simple balancing statement, "We do this" but "They do that." This symmetry 
creates an expression of conjoined opposites, which stigmatizes the latter and encourages 
the former to cohere.286 By making the ANC the “other” as well as the “evil” party by 
necessity, Zille forces her audience to align itself with the DA in order to be part of the 
community of the Western Cape as well as a member of the “good” party. However, she 
does this in a very subtle way that makes use of the context of the situation rather than as 
a blatant attack on the ANC. It can’t be ignored that this is the first time since the end of 
apartheid that the ANC was not the ruling party, so every declarative statement made by 
Zille silently contrasts her government with that of the ANC. For example, Zille 
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proclaims, “We will govern for all the people of the Western Cape in all our rich 
diversity. We will be a government for all the people.” The unspoken argument then is 
that the ANC is not a government for all the people.  
Lastly, Zille creates a sense of identification through her use of multiple 
languages. Zille delivered the speech in three languages—English, Afrikaans and Xhosa, 
which shows her willingness to learn native African languages. This is a particularly 
significant tactic because of the history of language in South Africa, specifically the use 
of the English language to disadvantage black South Africans during apartheid. The 1976 
Soweto student uprising is an important anti-apartheid narrative that symbolizes how 
many black South Africans feel about issues of language. During a reorganization of the 
Bantu Education Department of the government, the South African apartheid government 
decided to start enforcing a law requiring that secondary education be conducted only in 
Afrikaans, rather than in English or any of the native African languages. The law “was 
bitterly resented by both teachers and students” and many teachers themselves did not 
speak Afrikaans and so could not teach the students.287 The students themselves “resented 
being forced to learn the language of their oppressors” and saw it as a direct attempt to 
cut them off from their original culture.288 By 1976 tensions peaked and a protest march 
was organized in the black township of Soweto, just outside Johannesburg on June 16, 
1976. Over 20,000 students turned up to the march, followed closely by the police. 
Conflict began almost immediately, as police fired round after round of tear-gas into the 
crowds, quickly escalating into actual gunfire. That day, two students, Hastings Ndlovu 
and Hector Pieterson, died from police gunfire; hundreds more sustained injuries during 
the subsequent chaos that engulfed Soweto. The shootings in Soweto sparked a massive 
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uprising that soon spread to more than 100 urban and rural areas throughout South 
Africa.289  
English is still the language of education in South Africa, which is unsurprising, 
for reasons that have to do with the modalities of colonial oppression in the 19th and 20th 
centuries.  Neville Alexander comments that it seems as though “every newly 
independent African state is doomed to take the same language policy by accepting in 
practice the primacy of the ex-colonial language.”290 Zille’s willingness to not only learn 
but also use a native African language shows a dedication to multilingualism that appeals 
to her wider audience.  
 Zille’s acceptance address was hailed as one of her best speeches and an excellent 
way to kick-off her term as Premier.291 One article said that “Zille has a sharp tongue and 
a short fuse, and she doesn't dodge a fight . . . [this speech] is a striking example of 
democracy at work.”292 The speech was also posted online, and comments from Times 
Live and Politics Web ranged from “An exemplary speech and a challenge for the future,” 
posted by Sikelela Ilizwe Lethu, to “it was a moving, eloquent speech from the heart 
from a great leader.”293 Another comment read, “This was a speech that showed us by 
voting DA, we are winning!” An additional poster in response to the speech said “In spite 
of the critics this ‘girl’ is a committed leader we need in the realization of the 
implementation of the government policies to give a better life to the people of the 
western cape.”294 Furthermore, one poster pointed out that “Apparently her housekeeper, 
Grace, had tears streaming down her face,” and went on to say, “This is how leaders are 
meant to act - Zuma, please take notes.”295 One commenter compared Zille to Zuma, 
writing that this was “a long and boring speech full of rethoric [sic], please try and learn 
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to summarise, learn from Zuma`s speech it was short and to the point.”296 In response, 
posters argued that “Zuma READS his speeches, barely looks up, very boring, so short is 
definitely best.”297 Another poster wrote, “You need to EARN respect—so far Zuma has 
done little to earn my respect. It has nothing to do with skin colour. If he was White he 
would be equally unimpressive.”298 A third reply to this comparison reminded readers 
that “it [this speech] was a ‘brief acceptance speech to talk about the key values that will 
underpin this administration.’ It was not designed for those with short attention spans like 
yourself. Even so, people who were there were so moved they cried.”299 
The speech allowed Zille to rhetorically place herself in a space that addressed the 
major challenges facing her bid for presidency—her race, class, gender, and the culture of 
identity politics. She was able to create strong bonds of identity, as evidenced by polling 
numbers and a jump in voter registration for the DA, and set an agenda that Zuma and the 
ANC cannot possibly hope to meet on a national scale, but one that she can much more 
easily meet in her province. Looking at her Freedom Day speech a year later, it is obvious 
that her tactics have shifted to a bolder attack on the ANC, a marked contrast to the more 
subtle assaults in her 2009 speech.  
FREEDOM DAY SPEECH, 2010 
Much like the Fourth of July for U.S. Americans, April 27 is very important 
holiday for South Africans. Known as Freedom Day, it is an annual celebration of South 
Africa's first non-racial, democratic elections and the end of apartheid. It is a holiday that 
represents the defeat of racial injustice and the birth of a new, Rainbow Nation. On April 
27, 2010, sixteen years after the end of apartheid, Zille addressed a crowd of supporters at 
Constitution Hill in Johannesburg, overlooking the Constitution Court. Though this 
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speech is also considered an epideictic speech, it takes place in a very different setting 
and with very different constraints than her 2009 speech. As a result of the shift in the 
exigential flow, Zille needed to alter her rhetorical strategies; building on the foundation 
she laid in the last year of her Premiership, she included much more aggressive language 
when referencing the ANC, and an even more pointed focus on personal agency and 
responsibility, with a much more assertive call to action. These changes were a result of a 
growing dissatisfaction with ANC policies among poor black voters, the key 
demographic if she wants to make a legitimate run for the presidency. Zille knows 
though, that despite this increasing unhappiness, there is a history of passive-aggressive 
resistance in the black culture. Black voters, rather than voting for a different party, 
instead choose to show their displeasure with the government by protesting or striking, 
or, more troubling for her campaign, decide to abstain from voting entirely.300 In this 
speech Zille is trying to reach those discontented and frustrated voters and urge them to 
act by voting for the DA. This speech also functions to create a space for a re-working of 
South African identity on a global scale. Whenever Zille tries to create a sense of 
identification with her audience, she is also working on constituting her audience, and 
whenever she contrasts herself and the DA with the ANC, she creates a discursive space 
in which audiences can begin to contemplate that new identity. 
In Zille’s 2009 speech she focused intently on the DA itself and her personal 
vision for the future. Not once in the speech did she refer to Zuma or the ANC explicitly, 
though implied in much of the speech was the contrast between the DA and the ANC. In 
her 2010 speech Zille is quick to name Zuma specifically as problematic and the ANC 
more broadly as corrupt and corrupting. This speech does not rely on the audience to 
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make enthymematic inferences; instead, Zille works to clearly lay out a syllogistic 
structure for her argument.  
The first stated premise is that “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.”301 Zille claims 
They [the ANC] think freedom is represented by the fact that they won power. 
The more power they get, the more free they are to do what they like. So they ask 
the people to give them more and more power. They pretend that this will make it 
easier to do more for the people. But the opposite happens. The more power the 
people give to a small powerful group, the more the powerful few abuse that 
power, to enrich themselves, and their families and their political friends (with 
jobs, tenders and contracts) while the people suffer . . . This is the most important 
lesson we have learnt since our first freedom day 16 years ago. 
 
If the ANC has absolute power, and absolute power corrupts, then the ANC must be 
corrupt. Zille points to a number of examples of the ANC’s abuse of power and evidence 
of their inevitable corruption—Zuma’s politically motivated nominees to the Supreme 
Court, other political appointments of family and close friends, charges of corruption and 
fraud, and interference in criminal proceedings for “cronies” like Shabir Shaik.302 She 
also uses Zimbabwe as a warning of what’s to come if the ANC’s power is left 
unchecked. She cautions that  
. . . [P]owerful politicians . . . are free to loot, abuse power and enrich themselves, 
and fail to fulfill their mandate. They put their friends in the police and courts to 
protect themselves. They don't tolerate opposition and put people in jail and 
imprison them if they protest. They take over the army and the police to protect 
the corrupt elite instead of putting them in jail. 
 
You don't have to look far to see an example of this. Zimbabwe. Right here on our 
doorstep. Mugabe says he wants to give the land back to the people. He gives it to 
himself and his generals. He has ten of the biggest farms. The land did not go to 
the poor. Now there is no farming and the poor are starving to death. Literally 
starving. 
 
Zille’s opposition to the ANC had never been contrasted so clearly and so sharply within 
a public address by Zille before. Her 2009 speech relied on allusions and insinuations, but 
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as she worked to alter the exigential flow in 2010, it is plain that Zille began to step up 
her campaign in a more aggressive manner to make the distinctions between parties more 
apparent to voters.  
 More crucial to Zille’s success is her ability to turn out voters on Election Day. 
Zille’s Chief of Staff Geordin Hill-Lewis commented, “Black voters would rather not 
vote at all than vote for a party other than the ANC.”303 If Zille has any hope of becoming 
President of South Africa she needs to reach disaffected voters and actually get them to 
vote for her rather than protest the ANC through inactivity. As discussed previously, Zille 
is facing a strong culture of identity politics and lifelong affiliation with the ANC, which 
has resulted in a lack of voting as silent protest. There are two main underlying causes for 
this: the first is that black voters do not see the ANC as a political party with an agenda 
and an appetite for power. Rather, the ANC is viewed as a type of extended family—for 
example, Nelson Mandela is referred to as the father of the nation, which makes his party 
an extension of his family. Tribal cultures are typically seen as collectivist cultures that 
emphasize family loyalty, so to act against the ANC goes against the very nature of their 
cultural beliefs. Second, black South Africans are not accustomed to using official 
channels to change politics. For hundreds of years the only people with the vote were 
whites, so the black population had to use different tactics to influence the political 
structure. The need for an alternative outlet resulted in a strong protest culture, with an 
emphasis on civil disobedience and the use of strikes to affect change. When faced with 
political issues it is only natural for them to turn to the traditional methods of creating 
change rather than utilize the power of the vote. 
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 In her 2010 speech, Zille is trying to instill a sense of agency in her audience in an 
effort to get black voters to believe that voting can have as much effect as protests while 
also asserting that abstaining from voting only makes the situation worse. She reminds 
audiences of a time when voting created the most substantial change in history, when 
blacks used their vote to “bring down one government and replace it with another.” She 
prompts audiences to remember when they “called the apartheid government to account” 
and prompts them to recall that “a little cross made with a pencil on a ballot paper could 
change South Africa, and our future, forever.” She cautions, though, “that this power, and 
our freedom, can be taken away from us by people who are threatened by it” and that 
ignoring the responsibility that a democratic government places on people will result in 
“more and more abuse, and more and more corruption.” Zille also warns that if South 
Africa turns into a criminal state “then everyone will blame the politicians. But actually 
we are also to blame, because we did not use our vote in time. We complained, we toyi-
toyi'd, but we did not use our power” and that “everyone has a responsibility in upholding 
our freedoms.”304  
 Much like her 2009 speech, this call to action also serves as a way for audience 
members to actively participate in the dialogue that is working to shape them. Charland 
argues that to become a subject one must engage the discourse. However, this 
engagement is not entirely deliberate or conscious. When individuals enter a rhetorical 
situation and acknowledge or recognize the rhetorical address, they become the audience 
member the text calls forth. Identification and (re)identification is a continual process 
though. Charland reminds us,  
This rhetoric of identification is ongoing, not restricted to one hailing, but 
usually part of a rhetoric of socialization . . . Persons are subject from the 
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moment they acquire language and the capacity to speech and to be 
spoken to . . . Thus, one must already be part of the audience of a 
rhetorical situation in which persuasion could occur.305  
 
 Each rhetorical act draws on preexisting discursive positions and, in addressing the 
audience, recreates those positions. Zille’s 2009 speech began the process of constituting 
an audience, and with each speech, she continues to work on her ultimate goal of a new 
South African identity that is not bound up in race and ethnicity. 
 In addition to inciting voters to action, Zille paints a very partisan and power-
hungry picture of the ANC, and Zuma in particular. She states, “The real problem is that 
the powerful politicians of the ruling party, starting with President Zuma, are not 
accountable.” She lays out a laundry list of Zuma’s offences, very public ones that have 
been hotly contested in the media: 
He has undermined the constitution to make sure he does not have to go to court 
and answer to over 700 counts of corruption against him. He abuses power to 
protect his friends . . . from the law, while persecuting his political opponents. His 
family starts all sorts of companies that then abuse their position to get rich on 
state contracts. President Zuma himself does not declare his assets to Parliament 
until he is forced to do so by the DA. He is undermining the independence of the 
prosecuting authority and the courts for his political purposes. Some people are 
now more equal than others depending on their political connections. He supports 
a system in which the ANC uses the people's money to make themselves rich. 
 
Zille ends by saying “if the voters allow them to do this, it is our fault. Let us remember 
this lesson on this freedom day. In a democracy, people get the government they 
deserve.” This list of problems is Zille’s way of politicizing the ANC and showing 
audiences that although Zuma is black, and a leader of Mandela’s party, he is not a loving 
father figure who has the country’s best interests at heart. Instead she argues that Zuma is 
nothing more than a greedy politician. She specifically compares Zuma with the 
President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, as an example. Again, she is trying to use 
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Zimbabwe as a portrait of the future if voters do not act now to stop the ANC: “The 
people of Zimbabwe must take some of the responsibility . . . because they did not use the 
power of their vote early enough. They used it when it was too late.” This is a particularly 
effective comparison, because South Africa has suffered much of the burden brought 
about by Mugabe’s policies. Refugees are flooding into South Africa and are seen as 
competition for food, jobs and housing.306 
  By politicizing the ANC Zille is hoping to begin to dispel the culture of identity 
politics. The ANC, of course, plays strongly on people’s sense of identification with the 
party. They see themselves “not so much as a political party as the embodiment of the 
nation,” and the traditional two-thirds majority win in elections is a confirmation of that 
status.307 Zuma frequently refers to the ANC as “the parliament of the people,” as if the 
decisions of the leaders were more important than those of the elected national 
assembly.308 By disturbing this culture of identity politics, Zille is also hoping to make 
room for a new kind of identity. As Charland notes audiences are always “already 
constituted with an identity and within an ideology.” 309 Zille must acknowledge these 
historically and socially created identities and then reconstitute them if she hopes to 
create a new identity for South Africans. 
 The list of Zuma’s failures and scandals serves another important role in 
disrupting the ANC’s power. Leading up to this year’s municipal election Zuma, a lay 
pastor, warned voters at an election rally of the party faithful in the Eastern Cape 
Province on February 5, 2011, “When you vote for the ANC, you are choosing to go to 
heaven. When you don’t vote for the ANC, you should know that you are choosing that 
man who carries a fork . . . who cooks people.”310 In a country where more than 80% of 
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the people describe themselves as Christians and two-thirds believe that the Bible, as the 
word of God, should be understood literally, President Jacob Zuma’s warning has serious 
impact.311 Zuma went on to say “When you are carrying an ANC membership card, you 
are blessed. When you get up there, there are different cards used, but when you have an 
ANC card, you will be let through to go to heaven.”312 Zille tries to counter this religious 
rhetoric with a type of civil religion, largely by referencing the 1996 Constitution, a 
document that has taken on almost biblical importance in the eyes of many South 
Africans. Throughout the speech she tells voters “We supported a Constitution to 
guarantee our freedoms and rights,” and “we must celebrate and protect the 
Constitution.” She urges that South Africans, no matter the party, “must pledge to do 
everything that is needed to protect the Constitution that guards our freedom. It cannot do 
so unless we guard it. As the saying goes: the price of freedom is constant vigilance.” 
Also, in an attempt to create a sense of agency, Zille reminds her audience, “The 
constitutional court is the symbol of the power of ordinary people. It is the institution that 
upholds the Constitution, that defends our rights, freedoms and opportunities and that 
stands between us and power abuse. We, in turn, must protect the Constitution. We can 
do that by using our power to vote out people who abuse the Constitution.” Zille is again 
creating an us vs them mentality, though this one is very different from the dichotomy she 
created in her 2009 speech. Rather than the DA versus the ANC, Zille is trying to create a 
scenario in which it is the ANC versus the Constitution. This forces voters to think more 
critically about their choices in the election. To vote against the Constitution very well 
might be even worse than voting against the ANC; both are legacies of Mandela and are 
considered cornerstones of the country, but Zille is banking on the hope that the 
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Constitution, even more so than the ANC, is seen as the embodiment of the true South 
Africa.  
 The speech was not given much media coverage, most likely because at this point 
in Zille’s political career few people would be surprised by her remarks. However, 
looking at the comments section on various newspaper websites, reactions seemed to be 
mixed.313 One poster commented that the DA was just as corrupt, but that the party 
lacked the media attention to bring their crimes to light: “Granted the ANC have their 
issues, terrible terrible injustices but the DA is also guilty of their own ethical 
misdemeanours they just have not come to light because the DA lacks media enemies.” 
The same poster, Zibusisozethu Sithole, continued, “I might not be voting for the ANC in 
the next elections but I sure as hell am not voting DA.” On the other end of the spectrum, 
another poster, Steve van Niekerk, wrote, “What a pity ANC supporters think like sheep. 
Once they realise how to use their freedom to vote SA will become a true democracy and 
realise its true potential.”314 Though reactions to the speech differed greatly, most posters 
agreed that the elections were race-controlled, and while Zille might not be the answer, 
the posters also seemed to agree that South Africans needed to vote on policy and not 
color. 
  Unsurprisingly, there are certain similarities between the speeches, notably 
thematic similarities. In both speeches Zille is attempting to point out very specific issues 
on which the voters should judge both the DA and the ANC. She emphasizes issues that 
she is better able to address than Zuma, or has already had a chance to address in both her 
time as Mayor of Cape Town and in the last year of her Premiership. For example, 
corruption is mentioned a number of times in both speeches, along with a need for 
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transparent government. Zuma is well known for disbanding South Africa’s anti-
corruption unit, the Scorpions, whereas Zille is notorious for her diatribes against Zuma’s 
“distorted views of accountability,” even going so far as to say, “Zuma personifies 
corruption.”315 Zille’s focus on this particular subject is an interesting choice, however, 
one that might not pay off in the end. Although most South Africans believe strongly in 
the idea of democracy, most of the population holds an extremely deferential view of 
political authority, according to a recent study of 19 democratic countries on the 
continent carried out by Robert Mattes of the University of Cape Town.316 South Africa 
scored particularly poorly on questions relating to accountability. Barely one in three 
citizens thought that members of Parliament (MP) should hold the president to account. 
Fewer than 40% agreed that “the government is like an employee; the people should be 
the bosses,” most preferring the view that “people are like children; the government 
should take care of them like a parent.”317 Only 10% thought that voters should hold MPs 
to account, whereas as many as four out of ten believed that presidents should be able to 
“decide everything.”318 
  Zille is facing an uphill battle as she works towards the 2015 presidential 
elections. The medium of the speech is particularly important, as this is the most 
expedient avenue by which to reach a national audience. In both her 2009 and 2010 
speeches she attemptedto create a sense of consubstantiality with her audience, set herself 
up as a viable and legitimate alternative to the ANC, showcase the strengths of the DA 
(both moral and political) as opposed to the ANC, and articulate her policy agenda. 
Although Zille’s message remained consistent in both speeches, her language changed 
significantly. Having laid the groundwork in her 2009 speech, Zille’s rhetorical style took 
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on a much more aggressive edge in 2010, utilizing particular examples that point to Zuma 
and the ANC’s corruption and mismanagement.  
  These speeches mark obvious and significant attempts to alter the exigential flow. 
The speeches also function as a tool to begin interpellating audience members. However, 
because of the mixed races and ethnicities of the audience, the constitutive power of the 
speeches is limited. In order to continue to constitute a new South African identity for 
voters Zille uses contrasting media formats to reach specific audiences and make nuanced 
and targeted arguments. In the next chapter I explore how Zille appeals to diverse 
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CHAPTER 4: CONSTITUTING AUDINECES: BLACK VERSUS WHITE 
 One of the biggest challenges facing Zille in her run for the presidency is the 
strong culture of identity politics in South Africa. As discussed in previous chapters, 
South Africans are still deeply divided along racial and ethnic lines as a result of 
apartheid, and that legacy can be seen in current voting trends. The ANC continues to 
struggle to get votes from the non-black population, especially whites, while parties like 
the DA have virtually no support from black voters. In order to make a legitimate run for 
the presidency, Zille needs to reach out to black voters without alienating her white base. 
To accomplish this goal, Zille is trying to position herself as the next phase in South 
African politics, a leader of a party, and hopefully a country, where race is no longer a 
motivating factor in election, but rather where the focus is on a politician’s and party’s 
policies. However, to create this new South Africa, one that focuses on policy and not 
race, Zille needs to rearticulate the identity of South Africans both for blacks and whites.  
 Zille’s attempt to articulate a South African identity that privileges policy over 
race is a daunting task, one that ironically requires Zille to continue to acknowledge race 
in order to reach and persuade different audiences. Apartheid not only impacted the 
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country socially and politically but economically as well. Whites continue to be the 
economic power in the country, while the majority of the black population resides in 
abject poverty. This economic division means that the different races have very different 
access to forms of communication—a fact that Zille uses to her advantage. Because each 
population holds differing reasons for their reservations about a race-free South Africa, 
Zille needs to make different arguments to persuade these various audiences that a race-
free country is both possible and desirable. In the process of persuading these audiences 
though, Zille must be careful not to alienate one or the other. One way for her to navigate 
this issue is to use specific communication channels to target diverse constituent groups. 
After reviewing the research on media use in the South African context, I examine the 
arguments Zille crafts for both white and black audiences, assessing both Zille’s 
Facebook page and interviews broadcast on the radio. As of August 2010, an estimated 
10.8% of South Africans had access to the Internet, and out of that population 6.5% are 
Facebook users.319 As of April 4, 2011 there were 3,904,420 active Facebook users in 
South Africa.320 In a country of almost 50,000,000 where only 10% of the population 
even has access to the Internet, Facebook clearly plays a limited role in politics. 
However, Facebook functions as an ideal channel for Zille to play to her base—whites, 
coloreds and Asians.321 These ethnicities comprise the wealthiest strata of South African 
society and as a result are more likely to have regular access to the Internet.322   
 Conversely, according to the African Media Development Initiative: South Africa, 
“Radio is the undisputed mass medium in South Africa,” and almost 88% of South 
African homes contain a radio.323 That same study noted that more than 92% of South 
Africans listen to the radio, and that African language radio stations dominate regional 
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listening figures, with four of the five top stations broadcasting in languages other than 
English.324 Because of the financial limitations that curb access to media formats such as 
television or Internet, it is clear that radio plays an important role in politics in South 
Africa, where almost 88% of the (almost exclusively black) population lives on or below 
the "upper-bound" poverty line (R593 per capita per month or $88 USD).325 
 With every rhetorical event, Zille is making some impact on the exigential flow. 
The different mediums for communication, however, allow for a different impact. Zille’s 
Facebook page works on an everyday level—users can visit her page at any time and see 
different updates, notes or pictures. Since the radio interviews are static and unchanging, 
they function differently than Facebook, simply because of the nature of the 
communicative event. The purpose of this chapter is to explorehow Zille uses these two 
different communication channels in her attempt to constitute her disparate audiences 
into a new people.  Following Michael C. McGee and Louis Althusser, Maurice Charland 
argues that who a “people” are in any context is “open to rhetorical revision.”326 He 
further contends that “audiences are constituted as subjects through a process of 
identification . . . [which] occurs through a series of ideological effects arising from the 
narrative structure of constitutive rhetoric.”327 Audiences are therefore seen as embodied 
and are active participants in the rhetoric that is attempting to persuade them. 
 In Chapter One, I explained how Charland developed his theory of constitutive 
rhetoric through his analysis of the sovereignty claims made by Quebec in its bid for 
Independence from Canada. The discourse he examined sought to convince a specific 
population to vote for seccession, a population that first had to recognize themselves as 
the rhetorically framed “Quebecois.” In a similar fashion, Zille is attempting to engage 
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audience members as a new community in South African democracy, a people who can 
transcend race, ethnicity and identity politics to make a new non-racialized government, 
an identity that would encourage them to vote for the DA. Charland’s theory posits three 
ideological effects that guide my understanding of how Zille’s rhetoric attempts to 
accomplish her goals: 1) the process of constituting a collective subject through narrative 
that fosters an identification superseding divisive individual, class or ethnic interests; 2) 
the positing of a transhistorical subjects; and 3) the illusion of freedom and agency of the 
narrative’s protagonist.  
 In this chapter, I contend that Zille uses Facebook and radio as channels through 
which to address white and black audiences, presenting similar arguments in different 
communicative formats in hopes of constituting a new, unified, post-racial audience. 
These formats also allow Zille to co-create discourse with her audience in ways that 
allow them to actively participate in the dialogue that seeks to persuade them. I begin first 
with an analysis of Facebook and then examine the arguments made in two radio 
interviews given by Zille. 
FACEBOOK AND THE WHITE AUDIENCE 
 The use of participatory media in political campaigns has rapidly grown 
worldwide and is transforming the way we encounter politics today. Politicians running 
for seats in Parliament, in presidential elections, and even local city councils, are 
increasingly using online media to disseminate information to potential voters and, using 
participatory websites such as Facebook, building dynamic online communities.  As 
Andrew Chadwick points out, “the issue is no longer whether politics is online, but in 
what form and with what consequences.”328 Politicians like Zille recognize that social 
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media are tools to not just build a community, but literally to create a community, one 
that only comes into being through rhetoric. In this section I argue that Zille uses 
Facebook as a powerful constitutive force for non-black audiences.  
 Facebook is a relatively new political tool. Launched in 2004 as “The Facebook,” 
founder Mark Zuckerberg designed the site be used as an interactive tool to link college 
students together on the Harvard University campus. The website soon expanded beyond  
Ivy League schools and by December of 2004 had already reached one million members. 
Membership has since been opened to anyone with an e-mail address and members can 
affiliate themselves with an ever-increasing number of networks – from academic 
institutions to cities to employers. In September 2006 the site actively invited political 
candidates for U.S. Senate and House of Representatives to participate in the site and 
created special interactive pages for campaigns. Since then politicians worldwide have 
created Facebook pages in an effort to reach potential voters.  
 Enabling identity expression, community building, and political participation, 
social networking sites are structured around  niche audiences, although their appeal 
frequently evolves beyond a specific target market. Facebook at present consists of 500 
million active users, handles 600 million searches and more than 30 billion page views a 
month.329 This particular online social network application allows users to create their 
profiles, display pictures, accumulate and connect to friends and view each other’s 
profiles. Currently, Facebook is ranked as the seventh most popular website on the 
Internet.330 Facebook traditionally has been considered a site that focuses primarily on 
creating and performing individual identities, but it also increasingly helps shape how 
audiences think of national identity. Users can create or join groups such as “Proud South 
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Africa” or “Politics of South Africa,” and co-create what it means to be South African.331 
Users can also “like” a politician’s Facebook page and participate with that community to 
build social norms, values and beliefs. For Zille, then, Facebook is a tool that is ideally 
suited for reframing both her white audience’s individual identity as well as their sense of 
national identity. 
 What makes Facebook such an ideal tool is the ability to combine text with visual 
images to create feelings of consubstantiality with Zille’s audience as well as the site’s 
capacity as an interactive medium that allows users to co-create the discourse with Zille. 
In addition, Facebook allows Zille to present her message in what Rob Howard calls the 
“vernacular mode,” which facilitates a dialogic form of communication with users.332 
Using Facebook, Zille employs four rhetorical strategies to constitute her audience: She 
1) uses the interactive nature of Facebook to encourage users to participate in the 
narrative of her Facebook page, 2) utilizes the visual capabilities of Facebook to create a 
narrative that fosters an identification that transcends race, class and gender barriers, 3) 
positions her audience as transhistorical, and 4) provides a means of understanding how 
the narrative of her Facebook page connects to social action. 
 The overarching narrative Zille is trying to create is that of a non-racialized South 
Africa in which audience members are positioned as powerful agents who must overcome 
issues of race, class, and gender if South Africa is to continue as a free country. She 
creates this narrative through her status updates, picture posts, and a notes/discussion 
page. For example, on July 24, 2010, Zille posted a status update that read: 
South Africans are increasingly choosing to reject the politics of race. 
Culture, language, race and religion shape our identity. But more and 
more, South Africans are realizing that making a different political choice 
is not a threat to their identity. Each of us can confidently be who we are 
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only if we secure that right for everyone else. Each time we stand up for 
another’s rights, we defend our own. 
 
On September 9, 2010, Zille posted two updates wishing a happy Eid Mubarak to the 
Muslims of South Africa, and a “blessed Rosh Hashanah” to the Jewish people of South 
Africa In each post she also stated her wishes for a united South Africa: “The diversity 
you bring to the many cultures of South Africa is what makes us ‘the rainbow nation of 
the world,’” “May it unite all Muslims, and South Africans at large.” On November 5, 
2010 she posted a special note wishing “all Hindu South Africans a heartfelt and happy 
Diwali . . . This Diwali is an acknowledgement of both yours and South Africa’s journey 
from darkness to light over the last 150 years.” On December 25, 2010, she posted a 
Merry Christmas update. These posts reinforce Zille’s narrative of a united South Africa, 
where citizens celebrate difference, but do not vote based on difference. 
 The narrative Zille is creating is not new, but is consistent with her vision for 
South Africa that she presents in almost every speech, interview, or advertisement. What 
is significant about this narrative is that Facebook offers users a chance to participate in 
building that narrative. One of the most common ways Zille’s Facebook page does this is 
through the “call to action” status update post. Status updates are one of the most 
immediate ways for Zille to reach her Facebook audience. Once she updates her status it 
is visible to everyone who visits the page, and shows up on the newsfeeds of her 
“friends.” Though statuses are limited to 420 characters, the site allows for an unlimited 
number of updates.  
 An example of a post that calls for user participation is a question that Zille posed 
to users on October 17, 2009:  
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How would you respond if you learnt that the SA Government had been 
infiltrated by an organization that had never been elected, and whose aims 
were to eliminate private property, nationalize the mines and food, and 
abolish parliament? What if you learnt that this group had inserted 
ministers in government to drive policy objectives that have brought 
disaster everywhere in the world where they have been implemented? 
 
The post received almost 400 answers that ranged from “Very shocking and scary! Please 
tell us it is not the truth?” to “If we could have proof of what amounts to a conspiracy 
theory, I would be intrigued to learn how we intended to reverse the situation.” A number 
of posters asked Zille to provide steps to solve this problem, while others asked for 
evidence of these accusations. In response, other users posted links to news articles as 
evidence of Zille’s claims, or advised members to register and vote for the DA. From this 
post we can see how Zille uses Facebook to get members to participate in the very 
dialogue that creates them and urges them to vote for the DA. 
 Another example of community participation can be seen when Zille posted a 
note on March 13, 2009 asking supporters to change their profile pictures to that of the 
DA logo to show support for DA policies and candidates: 
This coming Saturday, 14 March, is DA T-shirt Day, in which DA volunteers and 
members will be coming together at various venues across the country to 
campaign for the DA in their DA t-shirts . . . if you cannot make it to an event 
your area, you can still get involved in this initiative right here on Facebook, by 
updating your profile picture with the DA logo. 
 
In another post, Zille created a series of posts over four days (April 6-9, 2010) that 
pointed to Zuma as an example of the problems of corruption facing South Africa:  
Dropping the charges against Zuma is irrational and unlawful. The DA is 
now finalizing its plan to take the matter further through the legal system.  
 
This morning, on behalf of the DA, I filed an application in the North 
Gauteng High Court for a judicial review of the decision by the National 





  Zuma is not innocent, and the DA is going to fight this with everything we 
have.  
 
  Take a look at our final push website: www.helpstopzuma.co.za - donate 
to our legal challenge fund, sign our petition, or become a volunteer  
  
These posts serve two important functions. First they appeal to the common South 
African identity as “defenders of democracy,” and second they create a tangible call to 
action for supporters.  As Zille’s Chief of Staff Geordin Hill-Lewis noted, “People see 
themselves as rebels, as Freedom Fighters. They want to participate in the defense of 
democracy in South Africa.”333 Painting a picture of Zuma and the ANC as corrupt and 
racist inspires Zille’s audience to become supporters of the DA, and to become part of her 
collective ideological vision. The last post—a call to action—serves as an invitation for 
audiences to actively work to maintain the consistency of the narrative. If audiences see 
themselves in the narrative Zille is creating, then when she offers them a chance for 
action either for the DA or against the ANC they can participate in a way that reaffirms 
the narrative and their place in it. This participation is a key element in constituting an 
audience. As stated earlier, Charland considers that persuasion and audiences are not two 
separate concepts, but allows for audience members to “participate in the very discourse 
by which they would be ‘persuaded.’”334  
  Another way for users to participate in a more substantial manner in the co-
creation of Zille’s narrative is by participating on her notes and discussion page. The 
notes section of a Facebook page functions as a pseudo blog for members. Instead of 
being limited to the 420 characters of a status update, members can write as much as they 
want in the notes section, which also has a comment function for viewers. In this section 
Zille spends a considerable amount of time fleshing out the arguments found in her status 
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updates, such as those related to the need for transparent government, the issue of crime, 
and the problem of HIV/AIDs. Again, these are not new arguments for the audience, but 
Facebook offers a rare chance for audience members to read and comment on Zille’s 
arguments—making the process more active and collaborative than, for example, 
listening to a speech. A note that was posted on April 20, 2011 titled “You can choose a 
party that cares about you” had 549 “likes” and almost 300 comments.335 In an earlier 
note titled “By-election victories: DA grows, ANC in decline” posted May 27, 2010 there 
was 1,460 “likes” and almost 400 comments.  
 The discussion page also has an important participatory function. In this section, 
members are largely unsupervised and able to create a discussion in which any Facebook 
user can participate.336 The discussion page has almost 600 discussion threads started, 
with as few as a single reply, to as many as 113 replies. This section of Facebook is 
particularly well suited to Howard’s idea of the vernacular. He writes, “When . . . content 
is marked by cues of noninstitutionalism, it dialectically invokes the vernacular.”337 
However, he notes that “all such content flows are made possible by institutional power,” 
and that as a result, “any such vernacular communication is the result of a hybrid 
agency.”338 A Facebook page created by a political agent, particularly one such one as 
Zille, who is the official opposition to the ANC, is clearly an institutional outlet. 
However, the freedom for users to interact with, change, and create the discourse found 
on her Facebook page reifies the notion of Facebook as a noninstitutional entity. 




 The term “vernacular” is a widely contested term in communication studies, 
though two distinct conceptions of this word inform Howard’s use of the word: the 
“subaltern vernacular” and the “common vernacular.”339 The subaltern view of the 
vernacular emphasizes a community of agents who are alternate to institutions, while the 
common view of the vernacular identifies the community as alternate to institutionally 
empowered speaking situations.340 Both perspectives conceive the vernacular as “an 
agency alternate to dominant power,” and both assume a strict division between the 
vernacular and institutional.341 However, participatory media like Facebook have an 
ability to channel complex and even conflicting intentions into single network locations.  
 These new forms of Internet media are dominated by an emphasis on audience 
participation. This makes them unlike old media, which offers little opportunity for 
interactivity. Participatory media shifts the emphasis from the consumption of 
“monologic discourse” often associated with old media like television and newspapers, to 
the “interactive, modular, and coproduced discourse associated with face-to-face 
communication.”342 In this media environment, single online texts emerge from multiple 
voices. Howard contends, “A Website like FaceBook.com [sic] or MySpace.com creates 
hundreds of thousands of hybridized texts that incorporate both vernacular and 
institutional content and agencies.”343 
 As of April 2011, Zille had 165 notes, and the discussion page had 505 discussion 
threads. Here, vernacularity emerges when users take Zille’s official, institutional 
position on certain topics posted in a seemingly noninstitutional location and comment on 
it.344 Many of the users enact the identity that Zille is creating for them, that of DA 
supporters, but are frequently challenged by non-supporters, both ANC members and 
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members of other smaller parties. Users have the ability to either comment directly on a 
posted note, or create a discussion post themselves. In the posts users generally refer back 
to the original post by Zille through direct quotations or paraphrasing. Within that 
feedback, users who don’t support Zille create vernacularity by inserting subversive 
political statements that are cued as vernacular because they pop out at the audience as 
alternate from the very text to which they are referring.  
 On the opposite end of the spectrum there are those members who express support 
for the institution from the position of the noninstitutional. For example on July 10, 2009, 
Zille posted a note on her Facebook page titled “Scrapping the Provinces Threatens our 
Democracy.” In the note, Zille discusses the debate on the future of the Provinces, 
stating, “The ANC seems to be considering three options for the future of the provinces: 
1) Turning provinces into administrative arms of central government. 2) Reducing the 
number of provinces through mergers. 3) Scrapping the provincial sphere of government 
altogether.” The post received 87 comments and 195 “likes.” In the discussion section, a 
post also was created by a user titled “The Republic of the Western Cape?” where 
viewers discussed the possibility of separating the Western Cape from the rest of the 
country. The overwhelming majority of responses to the discussion post supported this 
position: 
The majority here would definitely choose this is given a chance. Our 
people are fed up with the ANC. 
 
I am 100% in favor of Cape Independence!!! . . . and so is EVERYONE I 
know. 
 
it would be "heaven on earth" to read about all the shit going on in the 
country and think: "Oh wait a minute, that does not really apply to me, 
'cause I live in a different country/republic, with a different/better leader, 




In these responses, the participants use cues to their vernacular position to perform a 
noninstitutional identity. These cues emerge both in various stated identities such as “the 
majority,” “our people,” “everyone I know” and in the informality cultivated by the use 
of multiple punctuation marks, and lower case spelling at the beginning of sentences. 
  While these users agree with the institutional in part—that the Provinces should 
continue to have power—they make it clear that their agreement with this position is their 
choice, and most importantly, outside the bounds of the institution. Expressing support 
for the institution from the position of the noninstitutional, these assertions of what 
Howard terms “alterity,” from the institutional “still renders their intentionality 
alternate.”345  
 As a result of these assertions of alterity, the expression emerges as hybrid.  
Structurally, the vernacular voice must “construct the institutional as previous so that it 
can dialectically assert its alterity.”346 In the case at hand, the priority of the institutional 
is literal in the sense that Zille first created the site at which the vernacular voice was 
later able to speak. At the level of “discursive structure,” the vernacular imagines the 
institutional as prior in the sense that it is “noninstitutional.” Keeping in mind, in order to 
be “noninstitutional,” an institution must first exist from which to express distinction. In 
this sense then, the institutional contributes to “the creation of the agency that enables the 
expression of an alternate intentionality.”347  
 The second rhetorical strategy Zille utilizes to build a constituency is the use of 
the visual capabilities of Facebook to create a narrative that fosters an identification that 
transcends race, class and gender barriers. This functions on two levels: 1) through the 
pictures she posts directly onto her Facebook page in the albums section, and 2) by 
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visually linking her page with users’ pages through comments posted by users and 
updates pictured on users’ newsfeeds.  
 The images posted to Zille’s photo album serve as a type of visual ideograph, a 
way to cue the audience to the broader ideology suggested by the visual image. Andrew 
Mendelson writes that with regard to visual imagery, the communicative functions of 
unifying an audience and values transmission are explained in terms of the connotative 
rather than denotative meaning of the image.348 In mass media, visual images function 
across time, as a body of messages sometimes referred to as “iconology,” a linguistic 
system in which meaning is made in patterns.349 Such patterns are not pre-set, but rather 
are co-created with and by “audience-participants.” As Meg Spratt, April Peterson and 
Taso Lagos explain, the creation of an “iconic” image cannot be predetermined but 
involves “encoding” (message construction) and “decoding” (message consumption) by a 
producer and consumer alike.350 Accordingly, images must then create cultural frames 
and provide significant ways for audiences to perceive and understand their surroundings, 
values and history.351  
  Robert Hariman and John Lucaites add to this discussion a working definition of 
the iconic photograph, developed in connection with their study of the Rosenthal Iwo 
Jima photo.352 They argue that iconic photographs do the following: reflect social 
knowledge and dominant ideologies; shape understanding of specific events and periods; 
influence potential action by modeling relationships between civic actors; provide figural 
resources for subsequent communicative action; and provide resources for thought and 
feeling necessary to constitute people as citizens and motivate their identification with 
and participation in specific forms of collective life.353 Hariman and Lucaites argue that 
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iconic photos have “achieved a social status beyond their mere visual representation of 
fact, to symbolize historic American themes.”354 When this happens, visual images have 
the potential to elicit shared emotional reactions, and at times, even the impetus to 
political action on the part of the audience.355  
 Zille’s Facebook photos cannot be considered iconic images, but they do mirror 
iconic images, prompting an emotional reaction from the audience through the 
mechanism of association. For example, in one photo album posted by Zille, she is seen 
physically linking arms with two of her supporters, an older black man and a middle-aged 
colored woman, in a show of solidarity (see figure 1).356 This picture elicits two strong 
emotional reactions: a feeling of identification with the iconic image and legacy of 
Nelson Mandela (see figure 2), and a link to a 
national identification as an freedom fighter, 
specifically an anti-apartheid protestor.  
  As discussed in Chapter Three, Nelson 
Mandela is a national hero to black South 
Africans—commonly referred to as the Father of 
the Nation. This image holds true for many white 
South Africans as well, and Mandela’s notion of a 
“Rainbow Nation” is a key part of the South 
African identity for both blacks and whites.  The 
term “Rainbow Nation” was actually first coined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu to 
describe post-apartheid South Africa after South Africa's first fully democratic election in 




month of office, when he proclaimed: "Each of us is as intimately attached to the soil of 
this beautiful country as are the famous jacaranda trees of Pretoria and the mimosa trees 
of the bushveld—a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world."357 
 The term is also a nod to indigenous cultures; the rainbow is often associated with 
hope and a bright future in Xhosa and 
Zulu culture, the two largest tribes in 
South Africa. While the phrase has 
served to discursively create a national 
identity with which multiple 
ethnicities can associate, it also 
functions as a broad-based guide to 
national policy. It is important to 
understand that neither Mbeki or Zuma continued this vision of South Africa as a 
Rainbow Nation. Thabo Mbeki’s notion of a unified South Africa was more focused on 
South Africans as Africans. In his most famous speech “I am an African,” Mbeki called 
for an identity based not on color, but on location, that is, the African continent.358 Jacob 
Zuma has not yet managed to articulate a unique South African identity; instead, he has 
focused on his particular ethnicity as a Zulu. Zille’s return to this notion of a Rainbow 
Nation therefore grants her a link with the past and with the legendary figure of Nelson 
Mandela.  
 This particular picture was taken on Saturday, September 18, when Zille, Patricia 
de Lille, DA Youth Leader Makashule Gana and DA Member of Parliament and former 




the ANC’s proposed Media Appeals Tribunal. The four leaders delivered speeches 
outside the Constitutional Court in Johannesburg to a large audience of supporters. 
Protest is a common form of political discourse in South Africa and provides a link 
between past and present identities. During the anti-apartheid movement one of the few 
ways white citizens felt they could be involved in the anti-apartheid movement, besides 
through their vote, was through participation in 
protest marches. This was especially for white 
women, who had limited access to official 
channels of political power to create change. 
As a result, the picture of Zille protesting 
triggers an emotional response from viewers 
that links them with iconic images from the 
anti-apartheid movement, such as the black and white photo of a the protest in Soweto 
during the student uprising of 1976 (see figure 3). Ancestry then is presented here as 
almost as a material link between one group and another. According to Charland, the 
rhetorical appeal of “ancestry” is that time “is collapsed as narrative identifications” 
occur and a “collective agent” emerges that “transcends the limitations of individuality at 
any historical moment and transcends the death of individuals across history.”359  
 Zille’s album also functions as a way to visually represent what the future would 
look like under DA management—an important function in a society that has only seen a 
racist and destructive white government. For example, in a picture posted on March 27, 
2011, from the DA Campaign and Manifesto launch (see figure 4), Zille is seen 




white man with his back to the camera, smiling and reaching out. Even the security 
guard, seen with arms outstretched holding back the mass of supporters, is smiling and 
happy to be at the rally. In turn, the audience seems almost joyful, waving, and proudly 
wearing the signature blue DA shirts. Zille is centered in the photo, clearly the hero come 
to reunite the country. Notice, too, Zille’s right hand, clasped with that of a black 
audience member. The viewer cannot see who this man is; indeed, beyond the fact that he 
(or she) is black, the identity of the individual audience member does not matter. Zille, 
front and center, is reaching out and holding hands with her black constituency, 
signifying that she is willing to reach out to her black constituents and work together with 
them. This photo is Zille’s ideology at work, a snapshot of the future of South Africa. 
Though it is a fragmentary representation of the event, the power of this photo serves 
both to show audiences Zille’s willingness to work with the black population, and 
illustrate the multi-racial future of South Africa under Zille. White audiences see Zille 
smiling and reaching 
out, working eagerly 
with her black 
constituents,  
creating a sense of 
identification with 
Zille, showing that 
whites can work 
successfully with their black counterparts. As discussed in Chapter 2, white South 




dominance. To give up one’s status as “white” is to lose the privilege and power that 
comes with that racial designation. Zille needs to show her audience that is possible for 
whites and blacks to work together without one of the other marginalized or othered. 
 The visuality of Facebook also allows users to connect themselves to Zille through 
pictures on their newsfeed and profile pages. When a user comments on any part of 
Zille’s page—with a note or a status update—or creates a discussion topic, they also 
create a visual link between themselves and Zille. When a user does almost anything on 
Facebook, the activity is posted both on their friends’ newsfeeds, as well as on their own 
profile page. Generally, when a user comments on something the comment, along with 
the original post, is shown, producing a visual connection between comment and 
commentator (see figure 5). By linking themselves visually to Zille and the DA, 
Facebook users acknowledge the role played by Zille in their identity. Early research on 
online identity construction focused on anonymous sites and found that users of such 
sites tended to play-act at being someone else or act out their underlying negative 
impulses in the online world. However, on non-anonymous sites such as Facebook users 
try and project a “real self,” or an “idealized self” that more accurately represents their 
identity in the real world than on anonymous sites. Research has shown that one of the 
ways users create this identity is through pictures.360 The visual self—projected via the 
inclusion of large numbers of photographs—is termed the “self as social actor.”361 It is as 
if the user is saying, “Watch me and know me by my friends.” By “showing without 
telling,” Facebook users seek to make certain implicit identity claims aimed at generating 
desired impressions on their viewers. It is important to note that users do have the option 
of deleting or “hiding” this visual link to their activity on Zille’s Facebook page, so if that 
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visual image is left for a user it seems to imply that Zille and the DA play a strong role in 
how the user sees herself or himself. 
 
Figure 5 
 The third rhetorical strategy Zille employs to constitute her audience is to position 
her audience as transhistorical through pictures as well as through status updates and 
notes. Historical narratives provide a framework for audiences to identify collectively 
with their past and with each other (and perhaps more significantly with the rhetor) in the 
present. Zille is careful to mark historical anniversaries with an update remembering the 
event and linking it with the present: 
Fifty years ago today 69 people were killed at Sharpeville, and a few days 
later, 20 people were killed in Langa, for protesting against apartheid’s 
pass laws. They paid the ultimate price in the struggle for liberty, equality 
and dignity. They will not be forgotten. As we celebrate Human Rights 
Day, we should reflect on the very real threats to our human rights and 
what we must do to counteract these threats. 
 
Tomorrow, we mark the twentieth anniversary of the release of Nelson 
Mandela from prison. Let us be mindful of the fragility of the covenant he 
bequeathed us. Without his leadership, we would not have a Constitution 
today. More importantly, let us remember that, unless we all commit 
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ourselves to honouring Mandela's true legacy, we may not have a 
Constitution tomorrow 
 
Our Day of Reconciliation reminds us how far we have come as a nation. 
It symbolizes the advances we have made towards ending discrimination 
and it offers us an opportunity to reflect upon, and celebrate, the 
remarkable work of many South Africans in building a united society for 
all. We must still continue to foster tolerance and compassion. 
 
This type of narrative is one that interprets the actions of an individual with respect to a 
“collective agent.”362 Charland explains, 
It is within the formal structure of a narrative history that it is possible to 
conceive of a set of individuals as if they were but one. Thus, the 
“struggles” and “ordeals” of settlers, as a set of individual acts and 
experiences, become identified with “community,” a term that here masks 
or negates tensions and differences between any members of society.363  
 
This histories of a people create a sense of what Burke calls “consubstantiality,” a state 
where audience members feel “substantially one” with the rhetor.364 This process results 
in a collapsing of time as narrative identification occurs—a concrete link for audience 
members that connects the past with the present.  
 In a note posted on November 19, 2010, titled “Truth is the First Casualty,” Zille 
blogs about the service delivery protests occurring throughout the country, especially in 
the Western Cape. However, she contends that these protests are carefully orchestrated 
media events that the ANC Youth League is directing in order to unseat the DA. She 
writes:  
In the ANC-dominated wards of Cape Town, there is yet another 
dimension at play because the ANC is determined to do whatever it takes to 
unseat the DA-led coalition in the City. Their agenda is to create the 
illusion of spontaneous community anger at lack of service delivery, to 
reinforce their lie that the DA does not care about the poor. 
 
What is important about this post is the implication that the media is in “in bed” with the 
ANC and the ANC Youth League.  This has strong resonance with many South Africans 
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who remember the censorship forced on the media during apartheid.  During the 
apartheid era, newspapers had to apply for registration if they published more than eleven 
times a year.365 The government also enforced regulations controlling what newspapers 
could or could not publish, especially relating to articles and comment on activities 
against the apartheid system. Newspapers were, for instance, not allowed to quote banned 
organizations or their spokesperson, or report on conditions inside prisons or on the 
activities of the security forces.366 At the height of the anti-apartheid struggle in the 
1980s, when two states of emergency were declared, censorship regulations were 
tightened even further. Newspapers were barred from reporting on any demonstrations or 
activity against the apartheid government or any of its laws. The threat of closure forced 
newspaper editors to apply a self-censorship policy, while other papers printed blank 
pages or whole paragraphs blacked out as a sign of protest.367 Not only does this post 
serve as a tie to the past then, but creates feelings of fear that the ANC is following in the 
footsteps on the apartheid era National Party, and worse, the fear that the ANC will 
eventually turn South Africa into the next Zimbabwe.368  
 This fear is only heightened by the current controversy surrounding the government 
funding of the country’s largest media outlet, the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC). Starting in 2005 several independently minded news editors from 
both radio and television left in the SABC in succession, leaving their posts free for the 
ANC to appointment militantly-loyal party comrades in their place. As noted by Max du 
Preez, a columnist for the Independent newspaper syndicate,  “Under Mbeki’s watch, the 
former Umkhonto we Sizwe commissar took over the news division of the SABC and 
started running it like an old-style liberation movement’s propaganda tool.”369 In 2007, at 
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the 52nd National Conference of the ANC, a new board for the SABC was “unilaterally 
approved,” spurring accusations that the ANC was interfering in the Broadcasting Act of 
1999 and biasing the press in unhealthy ways.370 An unexpected consequence of this 
situation was that a number of alienated journalists and editors moved back into the print 
media and proved to be an adversarial sector of the press that has continued to make 
claims of an impending government take-over of the media.  
 In another note posted on November 1, 2010 titled “A Very South African 
Identity Crisis,” Zille speaks directly to her audience about the way the past has 
complicated the future. Specifically she refers to the end of apartheid, when the majority 
of South Africans happily identified with Nelson Mandela and the ANC. Zille writes, 
“They [ANC supporters] are nostalgic for ‘the moral high ground’—a place the ANC 
once claimed exclusively as its own.  And so they look for ways to regain that comfort, 
without breaking ties with the ANC.” She continues, saying, “They believe that the ANC 
can be rescued from itself; they blame individuals in government for the ANC’s failures 
but remain ‘loyal cadres’ of the movement . . . at heart they remain loyal to what they 
believe the ANC once was and what, they trust, it can still become.” Though the ANC 
has struggled to retain minority voters such as whites, Indians, coloreds and Asians, the 
party is still seen as a legacy of Mandela from which the country is loathe to part. Zille 
speaks to this reluctance when she writes: 
I know how this feels because I was once caught in this identity crisis 
myself.   I have long since given up the illusion that the ANC can be 
rescued from itself.  The ANC’s dominant ideology of racial nationalism 
and political patronage is now so entrenched that it cannot be reversed by 
well-meaning individuals trying to resurrect the values of Nelson Mandela. 
 
This struggle over what the national identity of South Africa should be speaks to all 
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segments of the population, and in some ways, even more so for white South Africans. 
Much like being black in America, the issue of race in many cases also seems to parallel 
issues of national identity, that is who belongs and who doesn’t. In the case of white 
Afrikaner South Africans this issue is complicated even more by the fact that the 
Afrikaner people have no homeland besides South Africa and consider themselves as 
native as any black African.  
 The last rhetorical strategy I discuss is the ability of Zille’s Facebook to provide a 
means of understanding how the narrative created on her Facebook page connects to 
social action, in this instance reconstituting audiences as DA supporters. In a sense, 
Zille’s Facebook page functions as a sophisticated advertisement for audiences. 
Advertising discourse constitutes viewers as “deficient in some quality, attribute, or value 
such as happiness or liberty, a deficiency constructed as happily remedied through the 
consumption of material objects.”371 In terms of Charland’s third ideological effect—the 
illusion of freedom and agency of the narrative’s protagonist—ad narratives construct 
subjects as motivated by lack, sent into the world as “acquisitive agents.”372 Though 
Zille’s Facebook page is not a “political ad” in the traditional sense,  Zille is clearly 
“selling” herself based on the lack of true democracy in South Africa; the solution to this 
lack, it follows, is to vote for Zille and the DA. The ideological and rhetorical work to 
transform viewers into subjects takes place at two different levels, what Sarah Rein terms 
“the cognitive and the emotional.”373 I posit that Zille’s Facebook page creates a 
compelling narrative that provides strong possibilities for identification through the use 
of multi-layered arguments that position South Africa as “lacking” and viewers as 
powerful agents who can create change. 
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 There are three major arguments found on Zille’s Facebook page that work both 
as avenues for identification and a way to show South Africa as lacking: 1) delivery of 
services for all, 2) a focus on personal agency and responsibility, and 3) the DA as the 
practical and moral superior to the ANC. Even within this minority audience of whites, 
Indians, coloreds, and Asians, Zille knows there are significant identity issues.  For 
example, within the Indian population there is a deep divide between Muslim Indians and 
Hindu Indians; for colored citizens, many are torn between their differing ethnicities, 
much like multi-racial people in the United States. As a result Zille must work to provide 
multiple ways for these distinctive populations to identity with the DA. 
 In February 1995, the South African government launched Operation Masakhane 
(“let’s build together”). According to Jay Naidoo, the Cabinet Minister responsible for 
the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Program, the main aim of Masakhane was 
to facilitate “the restructuring of governance institutions so as to put the country on a path 
of sustainable development.”374 A key component of Operation Masakhane was urging 
residents to pay for services such as water, electricity, sewerage, and refuse collection. At 
the height of apartheid many citizens took up the ANC’s call to make the country 
ungovernable. A central tactic for advancing ungovernability was withholding payment 
to unelected and unrepresentative black local authorities—those blacks put in place by 
the white government to control black homelands.375 As a result, millions of residents 
simply stopped paying bills for rates and services in what was called a “rates boycott.”376 
When the first democratic elections took place in 1994, however, the “crisis of 
legitimacy” ended.377 With a popularly elected government in place, municipalities 
expected people to pay. David McDonald and John Pape argue that “at the time, 
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Masakhane seemed like an inevitable step in the transition to democracy.”378 But by 1997 
Jeremy Cronon, a leading ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) stalwart, 
admitted that the message had simply become one of “black communities must pay 
up.”379 Leading figures like Archbishop Desmond Tutu and civic leader Moses Mayekiso 
were drafted for publicity campaigns. Yet, despite the millions of rands spent on the 
campaign the financial yields were minimal. In some cases, payment rates for municipal 
services actually declined.380 The result is that there are large populations, mostly black, 
who have no access to basic services like clean running water, electricity, and garbage 
disposal. For whites and other minorities this is seen as a stumbling block to true 
democracy, and is also seen as an unfair financial burden on a very specific audience—
the wealthier white population. In order for poor black communities to begin paying for 
these services, they must first have access to them. For example, residents of these 
townships struggle to finish school because they have no light in the evenings, which 
makes finishing homework almost impossible. Similarly, some residents have trouble 
finding a job because they don’t have enough water in which to bathe or wash their 
clothes. However, these services are not free, so they are paid for by the government, 
which then taxes the only group that can and will pay for them—the financial and racial 
minority. 
 A focus on personal agency and responsibility is an argument that has the potential 
to strike a chord with many white South Africans. In many ways white South Africans 
live in a country with a culture that is very similar to western cultures like the United 
States or the United Kingdom. They tend to hold values like individualism and 
independence in high esteem, and see Zille’s focus on those traits as integral to their 
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identities. This focus on agency largely takes the form of voting as the ultimate act to 
change South Africa. 
 In addition, this focus on personal agency and responsibility provides the solution 
to her narrative of lack. For example, Zille posted a number of notes and status updates as 
the municipal elections, scheduled for March 8, 2011, drew near: 
Help us change South Africa. Register to vote in the upcoming Local 
Government Elections. This weekend is your last chance to register. Call 
0861 CALL DA (2255 32) if you have any questions (March 3, 2011) 
  
Your vote is your power to effect change in South Africa. To vote you 
must be registered. This weekend, 5 and 6 March, is the last opportunity to 
register. Call 0861 CALL DA (2255 32) for any queries (March 2, 2011) 
 
In a democracy, people get the government they deserve. It starts with 
registering to vote in elections. This weekend, 5-6 February, the 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) is holding its first voter 
registration weekend, ahead of this year’s local government elections 
(February 4, 2011) 
 
Help us fix local government by becoming a DA candidate for the 2011 
Local Government Elections. Nominations close on 8 October 2010 
(September 4, 2010) 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, passive resistance among black voters is a serious 
problem for Zille, but it is an issue that has started to become more and more of a 
problem with white voters as they become disillusioned with the monolithic ANC and 
their domination of politics in South Africa. Zille needs to continue to remind her 
constituency that their vote is the most powerful tool they have to change the country, 
and that the only way to defeat the ANC, and return South Africa to a true democracy, is 
to vote for Zille and the DA. 
 The last major argument found on Zille’s Facebook page is the claim that Zille 
and the DA are practically and morally superior to the ANC. In the practical sense, Zille 
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claims that the DA has done more for the Western Cape in the few months she has been 
Premier, than the ANC has done for the country in the last seventeen years. On May 9, 
2010 she posted a note titled “Zuma’s Presidency One Year On,” in which she examines 
the progress, or lack thereof, of Zuma’s administration. For example, she states that 
“Jacob Zuma has revealed himself to have a poor grasp of policy. He is puzzled about the 
reasons for the outcry every time he says that the ANC is more important than the 
Constitution. He consistently refuses to engage in policy debates with leaders of 
opposition parties, because he is out of his depth.” She also argues that “When he [Zuma] 
assumed office, he promised to create 500,000 jobs by the end of his first year in office. 
In fact, over 500,000 jobs have been lost in his first twelve months in office.” She 
concludes by writing that “after a year in office, Zuma is out of his depth. He is paralysed 
by his own populism, he has failed to provide moral leadership and he has placed his own 
loyalists in control of key levers of power, to enrich and protect each other, and 
particularly himself.”  
 In terms of morality Zille argues that Zuma not only does not lead the life of a 
leader, but actively sets a bad example for South Africans. In one status update posted on 
May 10, 2010 she writes: 
A leader should lead by example. He should be above reproach in his 
political and social conduct. This is where Zuma falls particularly short. It 
is increasingly obvious that the culture of corruption which has escalated in 
the ANC under his tenure is directly attributable to his conduct. He has 
undermined the independence of the criminal justice system to get off 
corruption charges and to place himself and his closest allies above the law.  
 
In another post she lambasts Zuma for his hypocrisy and double standard when it comes 




And then there was the revelation that Zuma fathered a child out of 
wedlock just as he was admonishing those who have unprotected sex with 
multiple partners. In doing so, he undermined, at a stroke, his own 
government’s efforts to fight the pandemic. I don’t believe that his recent 
public announcement of his HIV-negative status has helped in the fight 
against AIDS either. On the contrary, he has now sent out the message that 
risky sexual behaviour can be consequence-free. Many impressionable 
young people will rationalise: if the President can get away with it, why 
can’t I? 
 
Zille has posted numerous status updates and notes discussing the issue of crime and 
corruption in South Africa as well as Zuma’s tendency to “play the race card” when faced 
with tough issues. On May 16, 2010 she posted this status update: 
Whatever goes wrong, the ANC blame apartheid and play the race card. 
When they cannot deliver, they say it’s because the constitution was 
designed to protect whites. Real, progressive change is what the DA must 
bring about where we govern. The more we succeed, the more we will 
show SA that their choice for the future is not a choice between race 
groups, nor a choice between the ANC and apartheid. 
 
 These three arguments run throughout Zille’s Facebook page and serve the dual 
purpose of creating a compelling narrative that provides strong possibilities for 
identification through the use of multi-layered arguments. As well, these arguments act as 
a type of advertisement that showcases South Africa’s deficiencies as a result of Zuma’s 
presidency and positions the audience as powerful agents who can create change by 
voting for Zille and the DA. 
 Facebook is a unique way for Zille to access her white audience. As previously 
discussed, in a country of almost 50,000,000 where only 10% of the population even has 
access to the Internet, Facebook clearly plays a limited role in national politics. However, 
Facebook functions as an ideal channel for Zille to play to her base—whites, coloreds 
and Asians—and use her rhetoric as constitutive force to reshape what it means to be 
South Africans for this particular population.381 What makes Facebook an ideal format 
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for her rhetoric to function constitutively is 1) the ability to combine text with visual 
images to create feelings of consubstantiality with her audience, and 2) the site’s capacity 
as an interactive medium that allows users to co-create the discourse with the Zille. In 
addition, Facebook also allows Zille to present her message in what Ron Howard calls 
the “vernacular mode,” which facilitates a dialogic form of communication with users. 
However, looking at Zille’s radio address it is clear that while many of the arguments 
presented are the same as those on Zille’s Facebook page, there are certain arguments 
that are emphasized for the black audience that are not for her white audience. 
RADIO AND THE BLACK AUDIENCE 
 As previously noted, the particular media format of Facebook, while ideal for 
Zille’s non-black audience, does little to help Zille reconstitute her black audience. In 
order to access this all-important audience, Zille turns to the radio. Cheap, portable, and 
requiring no literacy, radio has long been the most accessed form of media in South 
Africa, reaching beyond urban centers deep into the poorest and most remote rural 
areas.382 There is one radio set for every five South Africans: an estimated 10 million 
radios (and listeners many times that number) in a population of almost 50 million.383 
Radio services are broadcast in all 11 official languages, as well as in German, Hindi, 
Portuguese and the San Bushman languages of !Xu and Khwe.384 Clearly, radio 
commands vast listenership across the country, with community stations catering to 
specific target audiences and national stations drawing in people from across the nation.  
 Political call-in talk shows are a relatively new type of radio show in most of 
Africa. It is a phenomenon that had not been witnessed before on a continent where 
government officials had dominated the airwaves with top-down information, usually in 
 
 136 
the form of monologues and official pronouncements. In several African countries, 
opposition politicians and civil society activists now have an opportunity to compete with 
government leaders to get their message across, in part because of the availability of 
political talk radio, and the recent accessibility of cell phones.385 In addition, and perhaps 
more importantly, the public has an opportunity to call in and express their concerns and 
views, challenge official power, let off steam, listen and learn about political 
developments and the opinions of other citizens and talk directly with politicians. Most 
political communication studies pay attention to the media’s role as a major source of 
information for a majority of people.386 Indeed, information is central to representative 
democracy because citizens can only make meaningful choices of their leaders if they 
have accurate information about their stand on issues, the interests they represent, and 
their record in government. However, the media, particularly interactive forms such as 
talk shows, are more than just “information vessels.”387 They can be forums of 
participation in their own right. As Erik Bucy and Kimberly Gregson argue, “interactive 
political experiences that occur in cyberspace, via cable channels and over the airwaves 
are deemed every bit as ‘real,’ useful and important as their non-mediated corollaries.”388 
 For this chapter, I focused my analysis on two specific radio interviews that Zille 
participated in that are emblematic of her larger radio strategy. The first interview,  
conducted by Redi Direko,  was broadcast on March 26, 2010 on the show Talk Radio 
702 and later was re-broadcast on 567 Cape Talk. The second interview was broadcast in 
January 31, 2011 on the radio station SAfm, a station owned by the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). The host of Morning Talk, Siki Mgabadeli conducted 
the interview, and posted it on YouTube February 1, 2011. Both of these stations are 
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historic radio stations in South Africa, whose presence datesback to the 1930s. SAfm is a 
national radio station that was first known as Radio South Africa. Prior to that it was 
called the English Service.389 It was launched as the "A" service when the SABC was 
established by an Act of Parliament in 1936 and was the Corporation's very first radio 
station. The "B" service (broadcast in Afrikaans) was launched a year later in 1937. 
Currently the SABC has 16 radio stations, only two of which broadcast in English, and 
SAfm is the leading talk radio station.390 Radio 702 is currently a commercial FM radio 
station based in Johannesburg, but has an important history as an anti-apartheid radio 
station. Founded in 1980 as a young adult music station, it moved to a talk radio format 
in 1988 where it was one of only two independent sources of broadcast news during the 
apartheid era. Because the transmitters for the station were located in the nominally 
independent homeland of Bophuthatswana, the South African government could not 
impose restrictions on the content aired or influence the editorial and news content. This 
relative freedom of speech provided an important platform for opponents of the apartheid 
administration, and the station is recognized as having contributed to the peaceful 
transition of South Africa to a democratic society.391 The station has won many awards 
for excellence, and is partially owned by Mineworkers Investment Company, a black 
economic empowerment company.392  
  Because Zille is calling for a new national identity for South Africans, her 
rhetoric functions as a constitutive force that is trying to call into being this new South 
Africa, a truly non-racial government with a people who vote on policy rather than race. 
Zille’s radio interviews function as constitutive moments because they offer a number of 
arguments that South Africans today are a people oppressed by the ANC and would be 
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better off under a DA-run government.  The format of the call-in talk show also allows 
voters a direct chance to talk with Zille, and in an even more immediate and intimate, 
though limited, way than Facebook, co-create the discourse that persuades them. The 
identity of a new non-racial South Africa offers an “ultimate identification permitting an 
overcoming or going beyond of divisive individual or class interests and concerns.”393 
The arguments that she offers form the basis for this re-articulation of identity and take 
the form of a narrative in which the “new” South Africans who were identified with the 
anti-apartheid movement fought for the right to vote. Charland argues that “narratives 
‘make real’ coherent subjects. They constitute subjects as they present a particular textual 
position . . . as the locus for action and experience . . . Consequently, narratives offer a 
world in which human agency is possible and acts can be meaningful.”394 The arguments 
that make up Zille’s narrative are threefold: 1) People are free and powerful agents who 
can affect change through their vote, 2) the ANC is a racial nationalist party and the DA 
espouses an “Open Opportunity Society for All” policy, and 3) the role of the opposition 
party is to serve as the institutional embodiment of the people.  
 Zille’s argument that the people are free and powerful agents who can affect 
change through their vote is a major theme of her campaign. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, the boycotting of elections is a serious issue facing the DA. An even more 
pressing problem is the active call to boycott elections from various organizations 
throughout South Africa. For example, a group called “Nope!” claims to “refuse the logic 
of election politics because [they] refuse to accept that a small cross on a ballot can ever 
constitute democracy."395 This movement of actively boycotting elections in a post-
apartheid democracy was founded during the 2004 elections, when the Landless People's 
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Movement (LPM) initiated the “No Land! No Vote!” campaign to express a vote of no 
confidence in the range of political parties on offer in the elections. The group Abahlali 
Base Mjondolo (ABM), literally translated as “people living in shacks,” joined the 
boycott during the 2006 local elections and changed the campaign slogan to “No Land! 
No House! No Vote!”396 The campaign is now organized under the banner of the Poor 
People's Alliance, an alliance that comprises, among others, LPM, ABM Durban, ABM 
Western Cape, Sikhula Sonke and the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (WCAEC). 
Recently, the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF), a “War on Want” partner based in 
Johannesburg, also opted to boycott the forthcoming elections.397 The results of this 
ideology are startling. In 1999, the second national election since the end of apartheid, 
89.3% of the population voted.398 In contrast, in 2009 only 77.9% of the population 
voted.399 In 10 years voter turnout has gone down by more than 10%.  
 In an effort to counteract this movement Zille must convince voters that the only 
way to express their displeasure with the ruling group and effect change is to vote. In the 
2010 interview on Talk Radio 702 Zille repeatedly says, “Voters hold the power,” and 
“Voters get the government they deserve—they get to decide who leads them and who 
speaks for them.” She references the Western Cape as an example of the people’s power, 
saying,  “People in the Western Cape saw the effects of ANC rule and made a different 
decision, which is their right and their choice.” Zille went on to point out that “According 
to the National Department, Capetonians, across the board, 90 percent of them, have 
access to sanitation which is far higher than any other metro.” In her 2011 interview she 
refers to an unspecified government study that showed that “more poor people get 
services, free services, where the DA governs.” In her 2010 interview she reminds voters 
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that “you can decide your future in a democracy . . . you have the power,” in an effort to 
instill a sense of agency in her voters. Also in her 2010 radio interview, Zille talks about 
her recent visit to the township of Alexandra in the Guateng Province, just outside of 
Johannesburg. During her visit there she said “people kept asking me for help—to get 
basic services—but I can’t. I haven’t been voted into power, but I tell them that they have 
the power to vote a government into power that will fulfill their mandate.”400 The idea 
that voters have power is clearly an important one for Zille, and one she needs to keep 
repeating, especially in the face of a recent declaration by Zuma urging South Africans 
not to “throw away their vote” by voting for the DA. He also goes on to that if they do 
not vote for the ANC then their vote is a “silent vote,” and one not worth anything.401 
More weight was brought to bear on this statement by the presence of Winnie 
Madikizela-Mandela at Zuma’s side as a supporter, former wife to Nelson Mandela, and 
considered a hero in her own right by many. 
 This call to action mimics the strategies Zille employs in her speeches and on her 
Facebook page, serving as a way for audience members to actively participate in the 
dialogue that is working to shape them. Although Charland argues that becoming a 
subject requires engagement with the discourse that is working to create them, this 
engagement need not be entirely deliberate or conscious. When individuals enter a 
rhetorical situation and acknowledge or recognize the rhetorical address, they become the 
audience member the text calls forth. Charland reminds us, “One must already be part of 
the audience of a rhetorical situation in which persuasion could occur.”402  
   Each rhetorical act draws on preexisting discursive positions and, in addressing 
the audience, recreates those positions. Zille is calling on an audience that believes in 
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political action—or inaction—but is trying to reconstitute her audience’s understanding 
of what political participation means. This also speaks to a deeply held, deeply 
ideological understanding of politics and the role people play in politics. South Africa has 
a very Western style of government, and a very Western way of thinking about political 
participation. The problem with this way of thinking is that South Africa is not a Western 
country, at least not completely. There are certainly elements of society that are Western, 
both as a result of colonialism and from the continued presence of German/Dutch and 
English descendants who tend to dominate the intellectual spheres in South Africa. 
However, the overwhelming majority of South Africans are rooted in patriarchal, tribal 
ways of thinking. As noted in Chapter Three, most South Africans have an extremely 
deferential view of political authority.403  Barely one in three citizens thinks that members 
of Parliament (MP) should hold the president to account. Fewer than 40% believe that 
“the government is like an employee; the people should be the bosses,” most preferring 
the view that “people are like children; the government should take care of them like a 
parent.”404 Only 10% think that voters should hold MPs to account, whereas as many as 
four out of ten citizens believe that presidents should be able to “decide everything.”405 
There is a serious divide in how the intellectuals of the country view the political process 
and the people’s role, and how the people think of the political process and their role in it. 
Zille is clearly attempting to bridge that gap through her rhetoric, to transfer the Western 
intellectual understanding of democracy to the people of South Africa. In her 2011 
interview she states, “My message to the people has always been you have the power, 
you can decide your future in a democracy, and I think that is a realization that has to get 
into the hearts and minds of every voter in South Africa.” 
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 The second major argument that forms the basis for Zille’s constitutive rhetoric is 
the argument that the ANC is a racial nationalist party and the DA espouses an “Open 
Opportunity Society for All” policy. This is an important theme in her campaign, one that 
can be seen in her speeches, on her Facebook page, and perhaps even more importantly, 
in her radio interviews. Much like Zille’s 2010 speech, discussed in Chapter Three, these 
two radio interviews serve the important function of ideologically alienating the ANC 
from its base, and setting the DA up as a viable political alternative to the ANC, not an 
easy task to accomplish when the majority of the country still considers the ANC the 
party that freed them from the tyranny of apartheid. In her 2010 interview she states that 
the DA “is not simply based on opposition to the ANC, it is based on an alternative vision 
for South Africa. Those are the clear choices, and that is the idea that we put forward.” It 
is important that South Africans see the DA not just as reactionary, but as visionary, and 
substantially different than the ANC. She goes on in that interview to say that the DA’s 
“Open Opportunity Society for All” is a “new idea that has certainly seized the public 
imagination. We won an election in the Western Cape on that very clear idea, and got a 
million more votes.” Here Zille is trying to very clearly differentiate herself and her party 
from the ANC, and show black voters that the DA is a party that can win elections, and 
win black support.  
 In order to become a viable alternative to the ANC, Zille must show that her party 
cares as much about black South Africans as the ANC does. Ultimately, what this means 
is that Zille must convince audiences that she is invested in helping the poor, which make 
up the majority of the country. One of the main accusations against Zille is that she is a 
racist and only looks out for the interests of her non-black base. For example, ANC 
 
 143 
Youth League (ANCLY) President Julius Malema called Zille “a racist little girl,” 
addressing the comments to a crowd of thousands of tripartite alliance supporters at 
Workers Day celebrations at the Thomas Shabalala stadium at Lindelani, north of 
Durban.406 In response to the claims that Zille is racist and only interested in helping 
herself and her supporters the DA published a new “no frills” handbook that Zille claims 
will put a stop to “excessive spending.”407 For example, one provision in the handbook 
states that, “a Cabinet member may not have a business interest in any entity conducting 
business with the provincial government.”408 The handbook also states that “partners or 
other business associates of the Cabinet member; may not have a business interest in any 
entity conducting business with the provincial government.”409 The most important 
aspect of this book, in terms of Zille’s claim that the DA will proved an open and 
transparent government, is the contrast with the national ministerial handbook that until 
recently was considered “a classified document” and kept from public consumption.410 In 
her 2010 interview she states “We represent an open opportunity society for all, that 
means being clear where people’s money goes, how we spend the taxes we collect.” She 
continues, saying that the ANC is a “closed, crony society for comrades” and that the 
ANC is “only interested in the ANC, not the people.” The ANC has had a number of 
public scandals involving instances of “cronyism” such as the appointment and 
subsequent dismissal of Shabir Shaik, which Zille mentioned in her 2010 Freedom Day 
Speech.411 
 The “toilet sagas” is an important issue that Zille discusses in both of her radio 
interviews in response to claims that she is a racist. The toilet saga is a debate over some 
open-air toilets that the DA provided in the Makhaza area of Khayelitsha. In 2007, the 
 
 144 
DA-controlled Cape Town metro council began building a toilet for each household in 
Makhaza, on the condition that “residents enclosed the toilets themselves so the council 
would have money for more toilets.”412 Residents enclosed 1,265 of the toilets, but 51 
were left open.413 In response to complaints, the council erected corrugated iron walls 
around the toilets. However, the ANCYL demanded that concrete walls be placed around 
the toilets and in 2010 destroyed the iron enclosures and threatened to make the city of 
Cape Town ungovernable. In response, the city council removed the open-air toilets, but 
the ANCYL has continued to make accusations that the toilets are just one example of 
Zille’s racism. On May 2, 2011, speaking at an ANC election manifesto rally at a rally in 
Polokwane, Limpopo, Malema claimed that Zille built open-air toilets because she “hated 
black people.”414 He said that “the open toilets saga is a symbol that Zille hates and 
dishonours Blacks and African people,” and then went on to ask the audience, “Who built 
open toilets for Coloureds? It is not the ANC, it is the DA in Western Cape.”415 Zille used 
the radio interviews as a stage to dispute the allegations, claiming that this incident was 
merely a media circus, and that since then ANCLY has “developed a keen interest in 
ensuring the toilets remained open." In the 2011 radio interview, Siki Mgabadeli asked 
Zille, “What do you say to people who [raise the toilet issue] as proof that the DA doesn’t 
care about poor people or black people?” Zille replies that “The DA cares passionately 
about poor people, in fact in every single survey, it shows that the DA cares more about 
poor people than every other party.” 
 It is important to note that while Zille would frequently refer to “the poor” in 
these interviews, she rarely referred to blacks or Africans. Though it is clear that the 
black population makes up the overwhelming majority of the poor in South Africa, the 
 
 145 
language of “the poor” versus “the blacks” allows Zille to focus on economic and social 
divisions, as opposed to racial ones. If Zille is going to run on the narrative that the DA is 
a non-racial party, then this linguistic distinction, though small, is an important one.  
 The third argument that Zille makes is that the role of the opposition party is in 
actuality the institutional embodiment of the role of the people. During the 2010 
interview Redi Dreko makes a point that in the majority of African politics the opposition 
party is more often than not facing the party that originally liberated the country. She 
goes on to say, “that comes with a formidable brand. Is that a problem [for the DA]?” 
The truth is that while South Africa has achieved a certain level of formal democracy in 
that regular elections are held and the Constitution is unaltered, the persistence of South 
Africa's racial voting patterns means that minorities are marginalized and that, in effect, 
the ruling party is no longer accountable to the electorate. The persistence of racial 
divisions also enables the ruling party to delegitimize the opposition as racist or 
“defenders of white privilege,” a strategy that only serves to further entrench racial 
divisions.416 In response to Redi Dreko question Zille replies  
The ANC like to build on that brand [as liberators] but the truth is, the 
constitution is not the ANC’s constitution. It was a negotiated constitution 
and the moment of our liberation was the adoption of that constitution, not 
a military victory . . . today the ANC has become the party that is attacking 
and undermining and hollowing out the constitution . . . they still like to 
pretend they are the party of the liberation, but what they are is a small elite 
plutocracy masquerading as a party of liberation . . . the big challenge on 
our continent is why it takes voters so long to see a so-called liberation 
party for what it actually is. And what is our role in presenting that 
alternative and making voters understand what has happened to the party 
that they thought was the liberation party before it destroys the real 
substance of our liberation, which is the freedoms in our constitution. 
 
 In an article by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, he claims that “on the whole, in common 
with other African democracies, SA lacks a tradition of developing issue-based 
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campaigns that define many western democracies and bring a new life into their stale 
political environments.”417 He argues that this is partly because of the confrontational 
undertones that infuse oppositional politics, which means “that the role of the opposition 
has too often been stigmatised in Africa’s democratic discourse, characterised as it is by 
consensus and a respect for (state) authority.”418 Unfortunately, it is almost impossible for 
opposition parties like the DA to not be considered confrontational. Governments get to 
set the agenda, announce targets, unveil programs and are largely free to manage the 
news coverage of government business. Being in opposition, by contrast, usually means 
being reactionary, as Buthelezi puts it, “to respond to events rather than being weather 
makers.”419 This puts Zille in an untenable position. Too often the DA’s participation in 
policy debates is impeded by the “unrelenting ruling party’s spin doctors’ parody that the 
opposition is, at best, an annoying interference; at worst unpatriotic, as the government 
rolls out its meritorious programmes.”420 Seizing the initiative often means waiting for 
the government to stumble or by exposing some scandal or irregularity. Opposition MPs 
usually make names for themselves as “exposers” rather than as opinion makers. For 
example, Democratic Alliance member David Maynier made a name for himself over the 
arms procurement scandal in 2010, in which he claimed that substantial amounts of 
conventional arms were being exported to the repressive governments of Syria, Libya and 
Yemen under ANC rule, despite the preamble to the legislation regulating conventional 
arms sales, which states that South Africa “will not trade in conventional arms with states 
engaged in repression, aggression and terrorism.”421  
 In order for Zille to make an effective bid for the presidency, she must clarify for 
voters what, exactly, is the role of an opposition party in a democracy. She argues in her 
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2010 interview that the role of the DA as opposition is threefold: “We have to provide a 
very clear alternative, an alternative vision, which we do all the time, we have to hold the 
government to account and we have to ask questions and expose corruption where we see 
it.” Many would argue, and I believe Zille is arguing, that these criteria are also the 
responsibility of the people in a democracy. Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart 
contend that there is a new understanding of the driving force behind democratization, 
what they call “liberal” democracy. The more common conception of democracy is 
termed “electoral” democracy. The definition of electoral democracy “hinges on suffrage 
and considers any regime that holds competitive, free, fair, and regular elections to be a 
democracy.”422 In this scenario, elite agreement is key and “mass preferences matter 
little.”423 Advocates of this position argue that certain requisites of democracy such as 
social mobilization are unimportant. However, Welzel and Inglehart contend that liberal 
democracy, as opposed to electoral democracy, is based on mass voice in self-
governance.424  
 During the "third wave" of democratization, which began in 1974 and peaked in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, electoral democracy spread rapidly across large parts of 
the world.425 The popular pressures for democratization, which gripped many African 
countries towards the end of the 1980s, took place within this context, along with the end 
of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union undermined a crucial basis on which 
many regimes in Africa rested, namely the almost unconditional propping up of 
unrepresentative and unaccountable African governments by the Cold War rivals as part 
of their strategy for maximizing their global advantages.426 As a result, many African 
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nations were susceptible to the ideas of electoral democracy as it gave the people the 
illusion of agency, but in actuality allowed the elite of the country to remain in power. 
South Africa continues to bear both the stamp of the Cold War in the continued tripartite 
alliance with the South African Communist Party, as well as the results of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the mindset of electoral democracy. Zille must reconfigure how 
South Africans think of democracy, to persuade them that not only are their voices a 
powerful agent when choosing a government, but that they are, in essence, the 
government itself. Zille must first convince voters of their more active role in the 
democracy and then create bonds of identification with her audience by showing the DA 
as the institutional embodiment of the role of the people. If she can convince voters of 
this, then when she attacks the ANC for whatever reason, she will be seen as a 
representative of the people and not as “an annoying interference [or] unpatriotic.”427 
 The radio interviews also allow voters the chance to call in and talk directly with 
Zille, thereby allowing listeners to actively participate in the very democracy Zille is 
trying to create. The 2001 census states that 98% of non-black South African homes own 
a cell phone and that 31% of black South African homes own a telephone or cell phone, 
and that 57% have access to a nearby phone.428 Combined with the type of radio stations 
on which the interviews were being broadcast, the interviews provided a unique space for 
Zille to interact with her black constituents on a national scale. Since radio is such a 
dominant form of communication for black South Africans it stands to reason that the 
majority of the call-ins would have been by black South Africans—though of course it is 
impossible to know the ethnicity of the caller based on voice alone—which allows Zille 
to directly address concerns held by the “typical” black voter. Her ability to address these 
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concerns on such a widely available format is an important way for Zille to continue to 
build consubstantiality with her audience as well as to prove to voters that the DA “cares 
deeply about poor people.” 
 Unsurprisingly, there are a number of similarities between the arguments Zille 
makes on Facebook and the arguments presented in the radio interviews. In both cases 
Zille emphasizes personal responsibility and agency—though the motivating factors 
behind the arguments change when addressing different racial groups. For black 
audiences, this emphasis is about turning out voters on Election Day and overcoming 
apathy and active boycotting. For white voters, the focus on personal responsibility is an 
implicit promise that the DA believes that black South Africans should contribute equally 
to the country, an especially important point when thinking about the financial and 
economic burden the white population bears. Another common theme is that the DA is 
both practically and morally superior to the ANC—therefore planting the notion of the 
DA as a viable alternative to the ANC and Zille as a legitimate presidential candidate. 
This is an especially crucial argument for black audiences, since most white, or non-black 
minorities, already support the DA. Black voters must overcome their traditional 
deferential way of thinking about politics and politicians, so Zille must constitute a black 
audience that votes based on policy and results, and not on identity politics or along racial 
lines.  
 Both of these particular formats allow Zille to reach specific audiences and make 
targeted arguments to those audiences. Facebook is a space that is accessed almost 
exclusively by the white population, and is a place for supporters and dissenters alike to 
engage in conversation, with each other as well as with Zille. Specifically Zille uses the 
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interactive nature of Facebook to encourage users to participate in the narrative of her 
Facebook page, utilize the visual capabilities of Facebook to create a narrative that fosters 
an identification that transcends race, class and gender barriers, positions her audience as 
transhistorical, and provides a means of understanding how the narrative of her Facebook 
page connects to social action. On the other hand, radio is a format that is easily available 
for black voters, and provides a chance for Zille to focus on those issues that are most 
salient to that population, specifically discussing the problems of Zille’s whiteness and 
social-economic status in a majority poor black country, the lack of agency displayed by 
black voters and the role of an opposition party in a country under the government of a 
liberator party.  
 In order to overcome barriers of race, class, and gender Zille employs a rhetoric of 
non-racialism and tries to position herself as the “next phase” in South African politics. 
In order to accomplish this Zille must use her rhetoric to rearticulate what it means to be 
South African. Navigating the post-colonial forces in a post-apartheid country is a 
difficult task that is fraught with tension. Zille must convince both black and white 
audiences that working together is the only way the whole country can be successful and 
move towards a true democracy. Perhaps more importantly, she must convince audiences 
that this coming together can only happen under DA leadership. As South Africans 
struggle to discover a national identity they must decide what it is that makes them South 
African and through her rhetoric, whether a speech, a radio interview, or a Facebook post, 
Zille is trying to shape South Africa into a country that is post-colonial, post-apartheid, 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 Helen Zille faces many challenges as a politician acting in a post-colonial context. 
South Africa has come a long ways since the dark days of apartheid, but despite the hard 
work that has been done to erase the effects of years of racial law, the stark divisions 
between black and white show that apartheid cannot be easily forgotten. The broad goal 
of this thesis, laid out in Chapter One, was to understand how Zille’s rhetoric functioned 
to overcome barriers of race, class, and gender as she works towards the 2014 
presidential elections. These barriers are largely in place as a result of apartheid. 
EFFECTS OF APARTHEID 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, apartheid is still very much a part of the culture of 
South Africa and continues to have long-lasting effects on the country—social, political 
and economic. It’s been more than a decade since the end of apartheid and people are free 
to go where they want and associate with whom they desire, but South Africa remains a 
highly divided society along racial lines.  For example, though the country is under 
majority black rule, business and commerce continue to remain largely in the hands of 
the white population, despite affirmative action programs meant to speed up the process 
of redress for the many inequalities in South African society and economy. 
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 One of the largest disparities between the races is financial. In a study conducted by 
the Department of Earning and Spending in South Africa released by Statistics South 
Africa researchers found that “African-headed households were, on average, the poorest 
in monetary terms, while white-headed households were, on average, the most 
affluent.”429 The study went on to find that “In all provinces, African-headed households 
had the lowest average annual incomes, followed by coloured-headed households which 
had the second lowest average annual incomes. White-headed households had the highest 
incomes across the board.”430 Research has shown that the economic impact has had a 
crippling effect on the black population in the seventeen years since Mandela was 
elected. Based on a poverty line of R322-R593, per capita per month, 86% of all black 
households live in some of the poorest conditions in the world.431 By most measures, the 
poorest provinces are those encompassing the most populous former homeland areas, 
namely KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo Province, and Eastern Cape. Unemployment is at an all 
time high at 23.5%, with the majority of the unemployed being black Africans.432 These 
startling statistics demonstrate that in order for South Africa to become a true democracy, 
the black population of the country must be lifted out of this devastating poverty. Evelyne 
Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John Stephens conducted an extensive comparative 
analysis of third world countries and the success of democracy and found that “the level 
of economic development is causally related to the development of political 
democracy.”433 They argue that “the underlying connection . . . is that capitalist 
development transforms the class structure, enlarging the working and middle class and 




 Financial constraints are not the only legacy of apartheid. Black South Africans 
are still not allowed in certain places, both physical and psychical. Some night clubs are 
designated for members only—in one case, only seamen were supposed to belong.435 A 
typical bank in downtown Durban will have blacks as cleaners and security guards and 
coloreds may be found at the reception desk, while whites and Indians are behind the 
bullet-proof teller glass.436 More significantly, behind the tellers, in the executive offices, 
whites occupy nine out of ten desks and the remainder will have an Indian behind it.437 
Generations of apartheid law have left deep scars in social attitudes as well. Even as 
South Africans talk about and try to assume their new freedoms, old presumptions, 
stereotypes and prejudices continue to block their path. For example, many whites still 
expect the old deference they became accustomed to during apartheid. They do not 
expect others to talk back to them and away from the corridors of political power, 
"uppity" blacks are still punished through social or financial means. These conditions 
remain due mainly to the great economic power that whites continue to wield.  
 Politically speaking, South Africa seems to continue to be mired in ethnic and racial 
politics. Though the majority of parties in South Africa espouse a non-racial policy, 
looking at the polling numbers, it is clear that whites tend to vote for white politicians 
and blacks vote for black politicians. Since the end of apartheid, South Africans have 
voted in four national elections. During these elections, race has overwhelmingly 
predicted voting behavior for both white and African voters (who together comprise 
nearly 90% of the voting age population)—so much so that many have described South 
African elections as a “racial census.”438 Karen Ferree contends that “parties’ racial 
credentials are a central factor driving the racial census pattern in South Africa.”439  
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 Addressing a Johannesburg conference on Equality Courts in late June, the deputy 
minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Johnny de Lange told the gathering 
that "Equal opportunity alone is not enough to address the apartheid-inflicted legacy . . . 
we must change the mindset of our people."440 In order to overcome the barriers of race, 
class, and gender Zille employs a rhetoric of non-racialism and tries to position herself as 
the “next phase” in South African politics. In order to accomplish this Zille must use her 
rhetoric to rearticulate what it means to be South African. 
OVERCOMING BARRIERS 
  I employed a number of theoretical perspectives in order to understand the ways 
in which Zille’s rhetoric functions to overcome the legacy of apartheid and the barriers 
created by her race, class, and gender. One theoretical lens I utilized was a post-colonial 
framework, which contextualizes Zille’s rhetorical acts. This perspective helps us 
understand the ways in which colonial discourses shaped South African political culture 
and maintained a hegemonic influence even after the establishment of an independent 
South African republic. How South Africans understand themselves is heavily influenced 
by their experience as post-colonial subjects, and in order to understand the constraints 
facing Zille, scholars need to acknowledge the affects of post-colonialism on the 
audience. This understanding is key when analyzing how Zille uses constitutive rhetoric 
to try and create a “new” South African audience, one not constrained by race, class and 
gender.441 I used the theory of exigential flow because it creates a space for a broader 
view of Zille’s rhetorical situation, as opposed to an analysis of one rhetorical situation in 
a given context, which is particularly useful in light of South Africa’s long and 
multifaceted history. Lastly, constitutive rhetoric explains the ways in which Zille’s 
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rhetoric attempts to constitute a new South African identity. The post-colonial 
framework, when combined with White’s theory of exigential flow and Charland’s 
constitutive rhetoric, allows for a complex and multi-varied understanding of Zille’s 
rhetorical strategies.  
 For this study, I analyzed a series of rhetorical objects that provided a more global 
understanding of Zille’s rhetorical strategies. The texts chosen illuminate the multiple 
avenues of persuasion open to political candidates, and the time frame is long enough to 
include the changes in Zille’s rhetorical strategies as they evolved over time.  
 The study focused on three rhetorical forms and five specific texts; two speeches 
delivered by Zille on May 6, 2009 and April 27, 2010, Zille’s Facebook page, and 2 radio 
interviews given by Zille on March 10, 2010 and January 1, 2011. The first speech was 
delivered on May 6, 2009, as Zille officially accepted the post of Premier of the Western 
Cape and laid out her agenda for the coming term. The second speech was given at the 
Constitutional Court in Johannesburg on April 27, 2010, part of the party’s Freedom Day 
celebrations. The Facebook analysis assesses Zille’s page from its creation to March 26, 
2011. The radio interviews were both given on “black” radio stations and focus on the 
political policies of the DA.442 
 There were three major rhetorical strategies that Zille employed when trying to 
persuade audiences to vote for the DA: First, Zille tried to create a very specific agenda 
that favors the DA and plays to their strengths. Second, she used various communication 
formats to build feelings of identification with her audiences, and third, she worked to 
interpellate audiences into a new South African identity. 
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 The agenda that Zille is building is an agenda that the ANC generally shares. Any 
politician that runs for office in South Africa must address issues of poverty, education, 
service delivery, crime, HIV/AIDs, drug abuse, and government transparency. The reason 
that Zille focuses so much of her rhetoric around these issues is twofold: first, it allows 
her to clearly delineate what the DA stands for, as well as set the terms under which the 
ANC should be judged in the coming years. Second, setting this agenda is a way of 
creating a reliable success story since Zille and the DA can make a bigger impact on 
these issues in the Western Cape than the ANC can make on a national scale. This setting 
of the agenda in turn places voters in the position of having to judge the ANC on named 
and visible criteria, forcing them to go beyond identity politics. If Zille’s administration 
is seen as having more success in fighting these problems, she creates a scenario in which 
voters are obligated to vote for the DA, for the betterment of the country, despite her 
race, class, and gender. 
Perhaps the most important function of Zille’s rhetoric is the ability for it to create 
feelings of identification with her audience. One of the largest barriers that Zille is facing 
is that she is not like the majority of her constituency; she is white, affluent, educated, 
and female, whereas the population is majority black, uneducated, poor, and living in a 
strongly patriarchal society. The ANC’s make-up is not any more a reflection of the 
population than the DA, except in one important way—the ANC is almost exclusively 
black. There is an extremely strong culture of identity politics in South Africa that Zille 
must overcome to make a viable bid for the presidency. The majority of voters believe 
that the only party that can better South Africa is the ANC, because they, the voters, are 
the ANC. As laid out in Chapter Two, the ANC played a major role in the anti-apartheid 
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movement during the seventies and eighties, and as a result, the majority of the black 
population sees themselves in the ANC, which is compounded by the near legendary 
figure and leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela. In order to break the cycle of identity 
politics, Zille needs her audience to acknowledge her own position as a South African 
and identify with her as a fellow citizen. In order to create a sense of consubstantiality 
with her audience Zille refers heavily to the history of South Africa, focusing especially 
on her role as an anti-apartheid activist and the reasons the country fought to end 
apartheid—freedom and non-racial democracy. Using the Burkean strategy of antithesis, 
Zille also works to create a distinction between the DA and the ANC on both practical 
and moral grounds, uniting one group in opposition to another group. By making the 
ANC the “other” as well as the “evil” party, Zille forces her audience to align itself with 
the DA in order to be part of the community of the Western Cape as well as a member of 
the “good” party. 
Identification lays the groundwork for Zille’s rhetoric to function as a constitutive 
force. Zille is trying to position herself as the next phase in South African politics, a 
leader of a party, and hopefully a country, where race is no longer a motivating factor in 
an election, but rather where the focus is on a politician’s and party’s policies. However, 
to create this new South Africa, one that focuses on policy and not race, Zille needs to 
rearticulate the identity of South Africans both for blacks and whites. However, Zille is 
aware that in trying to create a non-racial South Africa, she must acknowledge the 
realities of racial division in the country and use them to her benefit. Because each 
population holds differing reasons for their reservations about a race-free South Africa, 
Zille needs to make different arguments to persuade these various audiences that a race-
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free country is both possible and desirable. However, in the process of persuading these 
audiences, Zille must be careful not to alienate one or the other. One way for her to 
navigate this issue is to use specific communication systems that cater to different 
audiences—Facebook and radio.  
These particular formats allow Zille to reach specific audiences and make targeted 
arguments to those audiences. Zille uses the interactive nature of Facebook to encourage 
users (the majority of whom are white) to participate in the narrative she creates on her 
Facebook page. She utilizes the visual capabilities of Facebook to create a narrative that 
fosters an identification that transcends race, class and gender barriers; she positions her 
audience as transhistorical; she provides a means of understanding how the narrative of 
her Facebook page connects to social action. On the other hand, radio is a format that is 
easily accessible to black voters, and provides a chance for Zille to focus on those issues 
that are most salient to that population. She addresses the challenges posed by her own 
whiteness and social-economic status in a majority poor black country; she confronts the 
lack of agency displayed by black voters and she emphasizes the role of an opposition 
party in a country under the government of a liberator party. 
As a white politician acting outside of the ANC Zille must work harder than the 
average oppositional party member to gain credibility and votes. In the devastating wake 
of apartheid Zille needs to convince voters that despite her race, class, and gender, she 
identifies with and can work for her black constituency, that she understands the situation 
of the average South African—poor, black, and uneducated. In order to create feelings of 
consubstantiality with her audience Zille uses her speeches as a tool to appeal to her 
audiences on a national level, and then utilizes various avenues of communication, like 
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Facebook and radio, to specifically address certain racial populations within the country. 
Overall, Zille’s rhetoric, whether a speech or a Facebook post, works on two levels—
altering the exigential flow and creating a new South African identity that allows for a 
truly non-racial government.  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This study, like any, has limitations. There are three in particular that I would like 
to address. First, this study set out to try and gain a more global understanding of Zille’s 
rhetoric. To that effect I chose to study messages delivered via different media spaced out 
over a period of time. However, I was restricted to those texts that were presented in or 
translated into English. Zille speaks three languages and campaigns frequently in all of 
them, though English is the dominant language of politics. I was also restricted to a 
smaller number of texts due to the time and space constraints of a master’s thesis. 
Second, I was restricted in text selection based on the availability of texts online or 
through personal contacts. One challenge facing scholars who produce international 
scholarship is that researchers are frequently limited in their ability to access data based 
purely on geography. Especially in developing or third world nations, access to the 
Internet is restricted either by financial constraints or official government constraints. As 
a result, scholars have a limited ability to access information, whether it is a speech, or 
polling number or basic population statistics. Lastly, I would like to address the 
challenges produced by cultural difference and the risk of possible ethnocentrism. 
Intercultural communication can be fraught with misunderstandings and incorrect 
assumptions as a result of differences in culture and ideology. Though I spent time in 
South Africa and consulted with a number of South Africans throughout this project, as a 
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U.S. American I am constrained by my own cultural perspectives. It is possible that 
certain meanings and nuances of particular words were lost due to my background, or 
that certain inferences were made based on my ideological interpretation of a text. Partly 
as a result of these limitations, I hope to continue this work in the future and I believe that 
this thesis will serve as an excellent springboard for future research.  
 There are still many aspects to Zille’s rhetoric that I would like to explore. One 
particular campaign phenomena that I believe has a great impact on Zille’s black 
audiences are text messages. As discussed in Chapter Four, the 2001 South African 
census stated that 98% of non-black South African homes own a cell phone, 31% of 
black South African homes own a telephone or cell phone, and 57% have access to a 
nearby phone.443 The availability of cell phones has resulted in a unique cell phone 
culture, one that is distinct from the cell phone culture in U.S. America. In South Africa, 
cell phones are more widely used (regardless of economic status) than in the U.S, largely 
because of the easy availability of phones and popularity of buy-as-you-go minutes.  As a 
result, advertisers and politicians have invested in widespread cell phone campaigns, 
sending out texts for deals or rallies. Another interesting avenue of research would be 
Zille’s recently released television ads. On March 30, 2011, Zille released a series of six 
new advertisements for the DA in the lead-up to the 2011 municipal elections held on 
May 28. Television was not a format I was able to explore, and I would be interested to 
see how TV functions as a campaign tool in South Africa.   
In Chapter One I laid out three goals for this thesis: First, I hoped to gain a deeper 
understanding of how women in developing nations impact and shape the political 
landscape through their rhetorical effort by examining the situation of a specific figure 
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like Zille. Second, this work examined how constitutive rhetoric functions in South 
Africa’s complex political landscape. Third, and perhaps most significantly for me, this 
project responded to the need for more scholarship that examines rhetoric in non-U.S. 
contexts.444 I believe that one of the driving reasons behind the comparative lack of 
international scholarship in the discipline of Communication Studies, especially 
international feminist scholarship, is the many difficulties encountered when conducting 
this type of research. I would like to conclude my thesis with a discussion of the 
difficulties I and other U.S. American scholars face when trying to study international 
communication phenomena.  
DIFFICULTIES IN INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP 
 Bess Truman once said, “A women’s place in public is to sit beside her husband, 
be silent and be sure her hat is on straight.”445 It can be safely said that many of Truman’s 
20th  and 21st  century counterparts have not only ignored that advice, but instead have 
actively worked to prove Truman wrong. Unfortunately, many of those women’s hard 
work has been lost, due in large part to the patriarchal system that disciplines or ignores 
strong women. Dale Spender, in her book Women of Ideas: And What Men Have Done 
To Them, writes “I have come to accept that a patriarchal society depends in large 
measure on the experience and values of males being perceived as the only valid frame of 
reference for society.”446 She contends that women, though equally as intelligent as men, 
are “nonexistent, invisible, unreal from the outset” and that “fundamental to patriarchy is 
the invisibility of women, the unreal nature of women’s experience, the absence of 
women as a force to be reckoned with.”447 When confronted with a woman who resists 
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the role assigned her by the patriarchal society, the system actively works to disregard, 
discount, suppress and erase her, effectively make her “disappear.”  
 Feminists have worked hard over the years to “rediscover” women of ideas. 
Unfortunately, as Marsha Houston points out, “The prevailing voices in feminist theory 
in the United States have been those of white middle-class women, economically 
privileged members of the dominant culture. Thus, while one intention of feminist theory 
is to articulate the common condition of women, its frequent outcome has been to 
conflate the condition of white middle-class women with the condition of all women.”448 
Houston argues, “Feminist theory, particularly feminist communication theory, has not 
yet adequately accounted for the different worldviews, different life-chances, and 
differential treatment of women from non-dominant U.S. social groups.”449 So only a 
limited set of women of ideas has been “rediscovered.” Feminists in the field of 
communication studies seem to have taken up the challenge that Houston issued almost 
20 years ago, and have tried to account for the stresses of race and class faced by women 
in the US in their work, but in doing so have often ignored an important population of 
women, that is, much of the attention of feminist scholars has been almost exclusively 
focused on U.S. American women.450 My personal hope is that this thesis will add to, at 
least a little, the expanding conversation of scholars who are exploring the rhetoric of 
women politicians acting outside the U.S. American context.  
 Talking about differences is never easy, and many choose to keep silent rather than 
engage topics that are outside our comfort zones. Houston writes, “We can choose to 
keep silent, not to engage in conversations about difference, or we can choose to 
approach such conversations, in our personal lives and in our research and writing, 
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sensitively, thoughtfully, and respectfully.”451 What holds many scholars back from truly 
exploring and understanding other groups of women is the feeling that they cannot write 
about them. I know that when I chose this particular topic to write about I kept asking 
myself, “Can I write about this woman in a responsible manner? Am I causing more harm 
than good?”  
 Ultimately, what I decided was that I can write about others, I just need to find a 
way to do it that is sensitive, thoughtful and respectful, and the way I accomplish that, I 
believe, is through a feminist lens. Houston writes, “Communication theorists have 
emphasized the advantages of making culture the central organizing concept for the study 
of human communication” and notes that feminist communication theorists “have also 
delineated the advantages of placing women's ethnic cultures at the center of the analysis 
of communication by and about women.”452 Making women's ethnic culture the central 
organizing concept for feminist theory and research means thinking of women as 
“enculturated to a gendered communication ideal within specific ethnic groups,” that is, 
learning how they should communicate as women in the context of a particular ethnic 
cultural experience.  
 Understanding ethnic and cultural experiences is the only way to truly understand 
any particular communication phenomena—a fact that Houston believes has two 
advantages for feminist communication scholars. The first advantage is that it allows 
scholars to examine the "mutual (non-dominant) differences" among women, that is, to 
view every ethnic and cultural group of women as different from every other, with no one 
group's experiences as more essential to defining the “common condition” of women and 
women’s communication than any other's.453 The second advantage is that by placing 
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women's ethnic cultures at the center of our analysis of women's communication we can 
uncover the diversity of experiences within cultural groups. This approach then, can help 
us begin to understand the complex relationships between oppression and privilege that 
define many women's lives. For example, white Afrikaner women are burdened by 
sexism, but privileged by their race; middle-class colored women are burdened by racism 
and sexism but privileged by their economic status. 
 Houston contends that “scholars tend to reduce complex social phenomena to 
their simplest terms in order to study them . . . [by] treating social groups that are 
internally diverse as if they are homogenous.”454 The job of the feminist scholar then is to 
understand that there are important differences among subgroups of women within ethnic 
cultural groups that affect communication events. Studying the subgroups of women 
within ethnic cultures will eliminate the misperception that the women of a non-dominant 
group are an undifferentiated mass, with the same life-styles, communication values, 
styles, patterns, skills etc. Through our theorizing and research and education, white 
feminists are empowered to speak about, and sometimes to speak for, groups of women 
who have no direct access to the public forums of our conferences, journals, and books, 
many of whom are not only different but also less socially powerful than us because of 
their race or socio-economic class. As a feminist communication scholar, I hope to 
develop research questions and methods of inquiry that allow the perspectives of women 
from non-dominant groups to guide my interpretations of their communication and to 
inspire other feminist theorists to do the same.  
 Maria Lugones advises feminists who want to speak intelligently about women 
who are different from them to "follow" those women into their world, not just through 
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reading and clinical, scientific observation, but by physically and emotionally investing 
themselves in their research.455 Feminist research on women's communication differences 
must be grounded in direct, not vicarious, relationships with women who are 
marginalized. As Houston so eloquently puts it, “we must earn the right to speak about 
them, by learning who they are as they communicate in their own ethnic cultural 
contexts, their world, not simply in ours.”456 As feminist communication scholars, we 
must allow the experiences of women different from us—our mutual experiences of one 
another—to reshape our theories and redirect our research. I was inspired to write this 
particular thesis in large part because of my past history with South Africa. When I was 
sixteen I spent a year living in Durban, immersing myself in the culture of Kwa-Zulu 
Natal. In January of 2011, I was privileged to return to South Africa and spend a month 
researching for this thesis, conducting formal personal interviews with scholars like Drs. 
Ruth Teer-Tomaselli and Keyan Tomaselli, two leading scholars in South African media 
at the University of Durban, Kwa-Zulu Natal. I was also able to spend time with Helen 
Zille’s Chief of Staff Geordin Hill-Lewis and learned a lot about the DA’s philosophy, as 
well as Zille’s personal hopes for the future.  
 Houston gives feminist scholars a number of questions that they must ask 
themselves before beginning their research—questions that have been particularly 
relevant to me personally, and to this thesis. I would like to end with these questions, as 
they are never fully answered, and must be asked with every research project, book, 
article and lecture:  
What historic and socio-cultural features have shaped the communication 
of subgroups of women within cultures? How do they define themselves 
and their communication? To what extent do they identify with their 
ethnic culture as opposed to their socio-economic class? What specific 
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features, skills, styles, or patterns do they consider salient to their 
definitions of themselves as communicators? How are these features 
manifest in the various contexts of their communicative lives? How is 
their communication perceived, constrained, enabled, or otherwise 
influenced by others outside their subgroup, for example, by the men of 
their ethnic culture, by women from other classes within their culture, or 





                                                
 429  “Effects of Apartheid Policy Persist Survey,” Polity.org.za, November 2, 
2002, http://www.polity.org.za/article/effects-of-apartheid-policies-persist-survey-2002-
11-13, (accessed May 9, 2010). 
 430 “Effects of Apartheid.”  
 431 Paula Armstrong, Bongisa Lekezwa and Krige Siebrits, “Poverty in South 
Africa: A Profile Based on Recent Household Surveys,” Stellenbosch Economic Working 
Papers, University of Stellenbosch, Department of Economics, Cape Town, South Africa, 
April 2008, http://ideas.repec.org/p/sza/wpaper/wpapers52.html (accessed May 8, 2010). 
 432 Rob M. Stewart, “South Africa Unemployment Hits 25.2%” The Wall Street 
Journal, May 4, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703 
866704575223993865587422.html (accessed March 23,  2011). 
 433 Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and John Stephens, “The Impact of 
Economic Development on Democracy,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 
(1993): p. 83-84 
 434 Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens, “Economic Development,” p. 83-84 
 435 “South African Equality Courts: Redress For Generations of Racism and 
Discrimination,” Mail and Guardian, http://www.imdiversity.com/ 
villages/global/Global_News_Headlines/Archives/EqualityCourts.asp (accessed May 8, 
2011). 
 436 “Equality Courts.”  
 437 “Equality Courts.” 
 438 Karen E. Ferree, “Explaining South Africa’s Racial Census,” The Journal of 
Politics 68 (2006): p. 803–815. 
 439 Ferre, “Racial Census,” p. 814. 
 440 “Equality Courts.” 
 441 There are some similarities between social movement theory and Charland, 
however, since I am not studying a social movement, per se, but am instead examining 
how one rhetorician (who does not fit the general criteria of a “social movement leader”) 
works to constitute a particular South African identity, Charland provides a unique 
framework from which to study Zille that social movement theory does not. 
 442 Helen Zille, Overcoming the political paradox of our times, Weekly e-
Newsletter, May 28, 2010, accessed November 25, 2010. 
 443 “South Africa Census 2001: Key Results,” Statistics South Africa: Census 
20001, http://www.statssa.gov.za/census01/html/Key%20results_files/ 
Key%20results.pdf (accessed May 5, 2011). 
 444 Chandra Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, Third World Women and 
the Politics of Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Marxism and the Interpretation of 
Culture. Eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 
Press, 1988) p. 271-313. 
445 The Presidential Companion: Readings on the First Ladies. Ed. Robert P. 
Watson and Anthony J. Eksterowicz (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
2003): p. xvi. 
 
 174 
                                                                                                                                            
 446 Dale Spender, Women of Ideas: And What Men Have Done To Them (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1982): p. 5. 
 447 Spender, Women of Ideas, p.  p. 11. 
 448 Marsha Houston, “The Politics of Difference: Race, Class and Women’s 
Communication,” in Women Making Meaning: New Feminist Directions in 
Communication. Ed. Lana F. Rakow, (New York: Routledge, 1992): p. 45-46. 
 449 Houston, Difference, p. 46. 
 450 For example of current research in International communication see William 
B. Gudykunst and Bella Moody (eds.), Handbook of International and Intercultural 
Communication, 2nd ed., (London: Sage Publications, 2002). 
 451 Houston, Difference, p. 47. 
 452 Houston, Difference, p. 53. 
 453 Houston, Difference, p. 53. 
 454 Houston, Difference, p. 54. 
 455 Maria Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman, "Have We Got A Theory For You! 
Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for ‘The Woman's  
Voice’'' Women's Studies International Forum 6 (1983): p. 573-581. 
 456 Houston, Difference, p. 55. 






















Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world. 
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